Critical Factors in Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration

An Analysis of Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique & Zimbabwe



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An Analysis of
Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe
and Reference Application
(on CD-ROM)

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Executive Summary

Cross-case analysis of the experiences in demobilization, reintegration and demilitarization (DDR) in four countries—Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe—indicates the following factors as highly influential in the implementation of those programs:

1. Political will is a requirement for DDR:
   - Leaders must be committed to resolving the conflict
   - Ex-combatants must be committed to resolving the conflict
   - A community willing to resolve and reconcile is required
2. Major grievances—those for which combatants were fighting—must be resolved in the peace and political processes for DDR to bring stability.
3. A strategic approach to DDR is more likely to bring long-term stability:
   - It requires extended commitment of support by internal and external actors
   - It requires extended funding
4. The credibility of the central authority responsible for implementation has a great impact on the DDR process:
   - It is critical to establishing an effective security situation
   - Equitable treatment of ex-combatants is essential
5. Effective DDR will end the conflict command structure and enable ex-combatants to fit into the country's civilian social structure:
   - It will sever combatants' ties with the command structure
   - It will target assistance to economic and social opportunities
6. The economics that motivate and perpetuate civil wars will influence DDR programs' effectiveness. In addition, effective DDR has a great impact on shaping a country's post-conflict economy:
   - Countries give DDR a higher priority when their economies are devastated by war
   - War may be an economic way of life for combatants
7. The geostrategic and regional environment in which a conflict occurs significantly influences the range of DDR activities.
8. Longer-term transition to a demilitarized society requires effective demobilization and reintegration.

Key **implications** for future involvement of the US Department of Defense and other for US Government involvement in DDR activities may include the following:

- A country where very strong political will to end the conflict exists could be encouraged to implement DDR more independently.
- Programs to facilitate reintegration should include and gain the benefits of community-based management of resources.
- If political will is distinctly absent in a future situation, policy makers should consider limiting US involvement.
- When involved in countries that will need to undertake DDR, the US Government must ensure that major grievances are dealt with and not postponed.
- The United States should become involved early in countries where DDR will eventually need to occur and encourage other countries to do the same, as this will develop a sense of commitment needed for effective DDR.
- DDR should be integrated into overall rehabilitation of the country.
- DDR programs should begin before and continue after elections and include all winners and losers.
- DDR should include combatants in the planning process to determine their perspective and to ensure fairness and the appropriateness of benefits.
- DDR should focus on combatants' sense of security in determining encampment conditions.
- DDR should promote demobilization benefits that don't deter ex-combatants from finding a longer-term livelihood.
- DDR programs must take into account the economic motivations of combatants and provide a higher incentive to demobilize and reintegrate in productive, legitimate activity than to continue fighting.
- The international community should consider investment in and commitment to DDR as prevention against the expansion of terrorism.
- Larger goals may warrant external actors' promotion of policies at odds with the DDR objectives of the countries.
- The United States will be better able to rely upon countries that are demilitarizing to serve as policy leaders, facilitators, and peace builders in their regions.

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1.0. Introduction

Sub-Saharan African nations transitioning from conflict to peace face an immense challenge in rebuilding their societies. Ex-combatants must shift into newly formed national militaries or be reintegrated into their civilian lives. Nations that endured civil conflict, as did Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, require highly effective programs for demobilization and reintegration, not only as part of the process toward peace, but also to ensure that, in the post-conflict stage, peace agreements bring stability.

The US approach to regional security in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to focus on effective DDR as crucial to stability in the region. Reconstruction, reconciliation, and the availability of resources to address critical health, social and economic problems are added dividends of effective reduction of military forces and the reintegration of personnel into society.

The purpose of the paper is to provide a foundation of historical research and analysis on specific cases, from which to develop a list of factors critical to successful DDR. Lessons from these factors will aid development of policy and program avenues through which the US Department of Defense and other US Government organizations can influence effective future DDR operations.

What follows is a comparative case analysis of four African countries that have conducted DDR programs: Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Each country's DDR effort provides insight into what makes a program a success and what could cause it to fail.

The paper is organized in the following manner:

- Section 2.0 presents the study's research methodology and definitions of the key concepts to be used in the comparative analysis. These include definitions of each phase of the DDR process as well as the categories of critical factors discussed in section 3.0.
- The comparative analysis makes up Section 3.0. It discusses each of the critical factors determined through cross-case analysis, across the phases of DDR, according to category. This section uses examples from the case studies to illustrate each factor.
- Section 4.0 will discuss the implications of the comparative case analysis for DoD policy and programs, and DoD and other US Government organizations' activities in the interagency and international communities.[1]
- Complete case studies for each country analyzed are presented in the appendices.

[1] This report does not discuss policy and programs to address HIV/AIDS infection and resulting DDR issues. The four case studies presented occurred up until the early 1990s, before high incidence of HIV/AIDS was prevalent in militaries in so many areas of Africa. This important issue will be addressed in a future policy options white paper which follows on from this report's findings.

The following are brief descriptions of the cases examined.

Zimbabwe. In 1980, in a high-pressure negotiations process, enforced—rather than mediated—by Britain, Zimbabwe set on track to end one hundred years of white minority rule and fifteen years of civil war. Britain's purpose was to pave the way for the legitimate election of a majority-rule government in Zimbabwe and end its own political ties to the country but maintain its interests in minority-owned national resources. The 83-day, minimally staffed monitoring operation, which Britain, with token assistance from other Commonwealth nations, immediately implemented, achieved its goal of ensuring that elections took place. An international observers' group declared them free and fair, despite widespread violence, and reports of coercion. Although it had coordinated encampment of combatants from all three fighting factions—Zanla, the army of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu); Zipra, the armed force of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu), and the Rhodesian Security Force (RSF)—Britain had made no plan for demobilization or reintegration of these combatants. When the British dismantled their monitoring operation just after the election, they continued some technical assistance for organizing Zimbabwe's new army. However, the new Zanu-led government of Robert Mugabe received some financial but no technical support in demobilization or reintegration of 75,000 combatants. The new government neglected to give priority attention to the ex-combatants who had fought the "war of liberation". Over time, in their discontent, they grew into a political entity whose demands bankrupted the government, contributing to the causes of instability in Zimbabwe today.

Ethiopia. Following a protracted civil war that ravaged Ethiopia's economic and social fabric, the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) gained power and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in May 1991. The TGE immediately decided that for political, security and economic reasons the sizable defeated army should be demobilized and peacefully reintegrated into society. The DDR was also expanded in 1992 to include the fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) whose attempt to secede from Ethiopia failed. The program was also extended in 1995 to include soldiers from the Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF). Despite contentious dealings with and often limited funding from donors, the TGE successfully demobilized approximately 500,000 ex-combatants and provided largely effective reintegration programs aimed at helping the ex-combatants sustain a productive civilian livelihood.

Mozambique. After fifteen years of civil war that impoverished and exhausted the country, Mozambique reached a stalemate. With neither the government, ruled since independence by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), nor the opposition Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) able to win the war, in October 1992, the two sides finally negotiated peace. The international community immediately implemented a comprehensive and well-funded United Nations peacekeeping operation, United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Originally mandated to last one year, ONUMOZ continued for two, bringing a strategic approach to demobilization and reintegration, imperfect but ultimately highly successful. The national will to transition to

peace, combined with extended donor commitment and extensive dedication of resources, enabled over 90,000 combatants to move back into civilian society and a new professionalized army. Despite its economic challenges and natural disasters, Mozambique has remained stable.

Liberia. On July 19, 1997, Liberia's seven-year civil war finally ended through an election that put former faction leader Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party into power. During the civil war, thousands of Liberians were killed, almost half the population remained displaced, and the country's infrastructure was virtually destroyed. There were widespread atrocities committed against civilians led by factions of armed fighters, many just ten years old. Ultimately, over a dozen peace accords and almost twenty cease-fire agreements were signed during the countless negotiations for peace. According to the many peace accords, disarmament and demobilization of combatants and repatriation of refugees were to proceed from November through January 1997, and elections were scheduled for May 1998. Due to the short timetable for the implementation of DDR, little more than confiscation of 10,000 weapons occurred before the election. Combatants were not systematically given psychological counseling, training or other vocational opportunities, or even transported and integrated into their home communities. Insufficient resources plagued the process, and planning for long-term demobilization programs did not occur. Liberia's instability continues today.

2.0. Research Methodology

This section explains the approach used to examine and compare the four case studies chosen for this project. The first task undertaken was a literature review of relevant sources addressing DDR and other related topics. Those writing about these topics, including the World Bank, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations and its agencies, and independent institutes, recognize different terminology and sequencing of phases. Establishing a common taxonomy, as shown below, allowed the research team to examine the case studies in the same manner and, in turn, facilitated the comparative analysis.

The different aspects of a DDR program were examined as phases on a timeline. It was understood that some phases overlapped each other and in some cases the completion of one phase was a prerequisite for the start of another. When establishing the phases, the research team outlined the activities undertaken in each phase and the elements that impact the conduct of each phase. The following definitions were used to describe each phase:

- **End of Conflict/Peace Process:** This stage is when conflict between opposing forces converts from a violent confrontation into a political process. Hostilities between parties may end through a negotiated ceasefire or peace settlement, clear victory by one party or a forced end to the conflict by an outside party. The peace process may begin long before the end of fighting. A level of agreement on the future power structure in the country is often required before the sides agree to put down their weapons. This process may include specifics on carrying out DDR.
- **Planning:** The preparation steps for conducting the DDR may include activities such as determining the timing of the effort, identifying organizations to carry out activities and programs, and identifying sources of funding. The planning for a DDR effort can begin during the peace process or immediately following cessation of hostilities.
- **Demobilization:** This is the process by which the ties binding combatants to the command structure are severed, whether that connection was within a formal or informal military structure. Furthermore, demobilization is the initial step in taking ex-combatants back into society or into a new legitimate armed force recognized by society as a whole. Demobilization typically occurs between the end of the conflict and the reintegration phase. In addition to disarmament and encampment, activities may include registration, needs assessment, counseling, educational and training programs and transportation to their homes or destination of choice.
    - **Disarmament:** This is the part of the demobilization process in which weapons are collected, registered and controlled by a legitimate authority. For

the purposes of this study, disarmament was considered an activity that occurred within the demobilization phase, not a separate phase.

    - **Encampment:** This is the formal assembly of ex-combatants in identified areas. Encampment allows authorities to register ex-combatants, conduct needs assessment for the reintegration phase, provide health services and basic needs and provide pre-discharge orientation or counseling.

- **Reinsertion:** Often called resettlement, this is a short-term period (approximately 6 to 12 months) occurring after demobilization in which ex-combatants face the challenge of establishing a civilian livelihood. During this phase, ex-combatants are often provided with monetary or in-kind assistance (for example, food).
- **Reintegration:** This is a long-term process aimed at assisting ex-combatants in becoming "normal" community members economically and socially. Reintegration activities can include money, in-kind assistance (such as shelter, tools, and production materials), training, grant programs, job placement services, and health care.
- **Demilitarization:** This is the process in which a state moves away from a military-dominated society. Demilitarization is a long-term activity that can occur across generations and governmental administrations. Activities that can occur during demilitarization include demobilization or military downsizing, demining, a shift in fiscal spending from the military toward social or economic development, instituting civilian control of the military with accountability of the army to the people and their representatives, and establishing programs to professionalize the military.

3.0. Comparative Case Analysis

In the comparison across the cases studied, a series of factors emerged as critical to DDR efforts. These factors are not, individually or in combination, guarantors of success. Rather, they are elements without which the research indicates it will be difficult for DDR programs and processes to succeed.

The comparison across case studies will focus on these critical factors, grouped into the five categories described above.

Within each category, this section will explain how the factors impact DDR processes and programs and will provide examples from the cases analyzed demonstrating the importance of the factors.

3.1. Political Will Is a Requirement for DDR

- Leaders committed to resolving conflict
- Ex-combatants committed to resolving conflict
- A community willing to resolve and reconcile

The cases analyzed demonstrated that unless the parties to the conflict genuinely want to stop fighting, settle their differences by political means, and move to a post-conflict society, no amount of involvement of outside mediators will cause DDR to succeed. The cases showed that not just during the peace negotiations but all the way through demobilization, disarmament, reinsertion and reintegration, political will is vital to keeping processes on track.

These cases showed a strong relationship between the parties' weariness with war—due to a stalemate in fighting, difficulty in obtaining resources to continue the conflict, the duration of the war, or a lack of clear goals—and political will. The lack of an incentive to continue fighting, not surprisingly, significantly increased the incentive to stop.

Political will is an element that must extend from the warring factions' leadership down through the military commanders to the combatants themselves. In addition, the society as a whole can demonstrate the will to accept ex-combatants back into their communities and move on.

End of Conflict/Peace Process

In Mozambique, after 14 years of conflict, war weariness prevailed. The two sides were at a stalemate. The government had exhausted its resources prosecuting the war against the Mozambique National Resistance (generally referred to as Renamo). Renamo's sponsors and means of support had all dried up. Severe drought hit in 1991. By the time of the peace talks hosted in Italy by the Sant'Egidio Catholic lay community in 1992, significant momentum had built up to end the conflict and move toward economic and

social recovery. Despite this reality, it took time and effort for the parties to reconcile themselves to cooperation and begin to have any measure of trust. The Renamo leader, faced with having to transform a militarized entity with no central ideology into a functioning political party, put up continual resistance during the negotiations process. He sought to obtain remuneration or benefits for Renamo at every juncture to "finance" this transformation and prolonged the inevitable negotiation of peace.

Once the agreement had been signed, the Mozambican people demonstrated their political will to end the conflict. Tens of thousands of refugees and internally displaced immediately started moving back to their homes.

In Zimbabwe, the parties' desire to accomplish a transfer of power to majority rule was strong. However, political differences between the factions were complex, and compromise-based settlement had been tried and failed many times before. The British approach, therefore, in trying one more time for settlement, was to put forth what the British judged were the acceptable solutions and compel the parties to accede to them.

A range of motivations caused the Zimbabwean factions to participate in the Lancaster House talks held in London in 1979. All three groups were interested in putting aside armed conflict and gaining legitimacy, nationally and in the eyes of the world, through a fair election process. However, all were pressured to participate by their relative circumstances at the time. Because of the British tactics, the PF, especially, ended up agreeing to provisions that were contrary to their interests. For instance, the PF accepted a 10-year constitutional protection against extensive post-election land reform. While the parties came to Lancaster House out of a political will to reach settlement, it was the forceful coercion of the international community, and especially Britain, that compelled agreement.

In Liberia, the lack of political will to end the fighting and resolve differences politically is reflected in the 12 peace agreements that failed to bring the fighting to a halt. New factions emerged from the ones who signed the peace accords. These newly emerged groups failed to make a commitment to the process because they believed that it would ultimately fail. These factions believed that if they participated in the demobilization process, they would be at a disadvantage when fighting resumed. In addition, these factions did not trust ECOMOG, the group in charge of demobilization, because they viewed them as just another faction involved in the civil war.

Demobilization

During demobilization, the government in Ethiopia demonstrated its political will through its stalwart commitment to the process despite a lack of funds and donor support. The government saw that the demobilization was a key instrument for achieving its long-term political, economic, and security objectives. The ex-combatants also participated in the process with limited discord despite extended encampment and often, poor camp

conditions. Many of the participants in the demobilization were simply glad to have the war over and were ready to resume civilian life.

In Zimbabwe, participation of the combatants from the majority factions in the encampment process at all can be construed as a demonstration of political will to achieve a transition of power. The Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) was so small that it had no coercive power to ensure that the combatants reported to the assembly areas. While several thousand Zanu and Zapu forces held back from encampment, most reported to camps. Inside the camps, they had no third-party protection from RSF who—due to the provisions of the accords—were not restricted from leaving encampment at their barracks, or the Rhodesian Air Force, which it was feared might bomb the sites. Neither side was disarmed. The tenuous ceasefire held in Zimbabwe, with political will stretched thin, through the volatile elections of February 1980.

Reintegration

The reintegration process in Ethiopia indicated that political will extended to the community level. Communities were actively involved in the decision-making process during reintegration. Community members were included in committees that managed assistance to ex-combatants. When resources were limited, these committees identified the most vulnerable households and disbursed assistance accordingly. Communities also served an important role as intermediaries for problem solving through advisory committees where community members provided guidance to ex-combatants in their reintegration efforts.

Almost 75% of ex-combatants returned to their previous communities. Therefore, their social capital—the informal networks with family, relatives, and community members—was probably still intact at the time of their arrival. If these bonds were not present, whether the ex-combatants would be accepted depended on their relationship with the community. Resentment on the part of the community seemed to occur only in instances when ex-combatants were unwilling to work and could not sustain themselves economically, thereby burdening the community.

A further example of the political will of the country overall in Mozambique occurred in the elections. The day before elections for a new government were scheduled to take place, the Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, fearing a negative result for his party, declared the election process tainted and announced that Renamo would not participate. States in the region reacted strongly, fearing that Renamo would duplicate what had occurred in Angola's recent election, where the national Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) declared the results unfair and resumed warfare against the government. While regional mediators and the UN were attempting to change Dhlakama's mind, the polls opened. Citizens lined up all day to vote. Renamo's declaration apparently had no effect on the populace, which wanted a new political start

in Mozambique. Dhlakama, under intense pressure, stated the next day that Renamo would in fact participate. Over the three days of voting, approximately 90% of registered voters, which was more than 75% of the adult population, voted for their party and president of choice. International observers declared the elections free and fair.

Demilitarization

The lack of political will in Zimbabwe to move away from conflict is evident in the difficulty experienced in integrating the new Zimbabwean Defense Force. After the election, just prior to the CMF's departure, it was determined that the Rhodesian Security forces would take over administration of the assembly areas, in consultation with Zipra and Zanla liaisons, since the RSF was thought to have greater technical capability to do so. In actuality, whichever faction's combatants were in the camp ended up taking charge. Joint training of 600 soldiers each from Zipra and Zanla with the RSF had been planned prior to the election, but they ended up training separately with the RSF. Ironically, Zipra and Zanla "ex"-combatants seem to have trusted the RSF more than they trusted each other. Integration of the new army proceeded extremely slowly, due to an intense rivalry between former Zipra and former Zanla commanders and their men, loyal only to their wartime factions (MacBruce in Baynham, ed.: 1992, p. 212).

3.2. Major Grievances Must Be Resolved in the Peace and Political Processes for DDR to Bring Stability

Combatants and their leaders come to the DDR process with expectations of what they were fighting to obtain for their factions or themselves as individuals. If the peace and political processes fail to resolve any major grievances, usually over transfer of power, power sharing or control of assets, this may undermine DDR and the achievement of stability over the mid- to long-term. If those expectations will not be met, this will impair the effectiveness of DDR.

A crucial example of this point is the failure of the peace agreement in Zimbabwe to sufficiently address land reform. Patriotic Front combatants fought a war of liberation to obtain the rights of citizenship in their own country. While the expectation of black majority control of the government was fulfilled, the expectation of equitable land distribution, for a complex series of reasons, was never fulfilled.

The question of land policy reform was a highly contentious element in the Lancaster House negotiations. The constitution that the British put forth gave significant protection to the small percentage of white landowners who controlled the majority of the nation's best land. The constitution, which would be in effect for ten years after the transition, mandated that all land acquired by the government be purchased as a "willing seller–willing buyer" sale, meaning it could not be confiscated and the price must be mutually agreed upon—and paid in foreign currency. The PF factions vehemently and repeatedly protested this restriction, as the funds to buy sufficient land to effect meaningful land

redistribution would be far beyond any new government's resources. Lord Carrington's methods of brinksmanship and leveraging the influence of regional leaders subsequently pressured the PF into accepting the land provision. The consequences have caused instability up through the present.[2]

Also completely overlooked in the Lancaster House process were the deep divisions between Zanu and Zapu. It was convenient for Britain to concentrate on the achievement of black majority rule as the one critical issue in Zimbabwe in 1980. Zanu and Zapu agreed to participate together as the Patriotic Front to gain access to the political process. Once the agreement was signed they separated to stand for elections on their own, each party wanting to achieve power for itself. A violent dissident guerrilla war that lasted seven years and killed thousands was the result of failing to use the ceasefire process to reconcile fundamental differences.

In Ethiopia, unresolved grievances by the parties to the conflict remained at a minimum. The EPRDF was the clear military victor in the civil war (outside of Eritrea) and it espoused a policy of political powersharing among the factions involved in the conflict. The factions signed the charter, founding the TGE, and promised to hold free and fair national elections within three years, agreeing that the country would be a federal state consisting of 14 autonomous regions. The transition to the new form of government was relatively peaceful, ultimately facilitating successful demobilization and reintegration. While there were pockets of dissent, the only substantial threat to peace was the activities of the OLF. In the summer of 1992, political differences over the procedures for declaring Oromia a free nation precipitated OLF's withdrawal from the TGE. The conflict soon escalated into violent confrontation, with the government eventually defeating the OLF and providing demobilization and reintegration programs to the OLF fighters.

3.3. A Strategic Approach to DDR Is More Likely to Bring Longer-Term Stability

- DDR requires extended commitment of support by internal and external actors
- DDR requires extended funding

When parties external to the conflict, including mediators, donors and supporters, are committed to assisting DDR over years rather than months by providing advice and counsel, training, personnel, supplies and funds, these efforts have greater likelihood of success.

Similarly, if the post-conflict government in the country has an approach to DDR that incorporates planning, preparing for and thinking through all the stages and the full

[2] See discussion of land reform in the Zimbabwe case study.

spectrum of activities needed, preparing for later stages when carrying out earlier stages, this will increase effectiveness.

End of Conflict/Peace Process

In Mozambique, the international community was committed to assisting the country in achieving peace, security and economic and social stability long before the end of the conflict. The United Nations began a broad-spectrum emergency assistance mission in Mozambique in 1987, providing desperately needed food aid and other assistance toward economic rehabilitation and development. In 1989, the World Bank expanded the rehabilitation program. By 1990, agencies from 35 countries, numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other donors were involved in relief efforts in Mozambique.

While peace negotiations in Rome were under way, the parties came to a gradual consensus that they would need an entity to monitor the peace accord once it was reached and that the United Nations was the appropriate choice. Planning for a UN operation began before the peace agreement was signed; the UN deployed technical planning teams for ceasefire implementation and the elections process to Mozambique two months before the parties had signed the peace accord. Final ceasefire negotiations included discussion of timing of the UN operation.

The General Peace Agreement laid out a broad mandate for ONUMOZ, and the UN agreed to commit to the endeavor. The international community's intensive participation in Mozambique helped establish a foundation for peace and stability.

Planning

Planning for DDR in Mozambique was part of a much larger effort to rebuild the country. As provided for in the General Peace Agreement, donors met to determine finances needed not only for demobilization and reintegration of combatants, but for the electoral process, emergency programs, resettlement of refugees, rebuilding of basic services, demining, road repair, and needs concerning agriculture, the water supply, health and education. Overall needs were assessed to cost $775 million (Barnes: 1998, p. 167).

By contrast, in Zimbabwe, although detailed planning began even before the signing of the ceasefire agreement, there was never any intention on the part of the British to implement a strategic program for DDR. The objectives were to ensure that the ceasefire held through encampment of the three armies, an election campaign, and a monitored election. Once the election had been declared free and fair, the British intended to leave. They planned an operation to last less than two months. In the end, it lasted 83 days. Demobilization and reintegration of combatants were areas left to the new Zimbabwean government. The British provided only last-minute guidance on how these programs should be carried out.

In Liberia, plans were outlined for demobilization in the peace accords signed at the end of the conflict. These plans also did not take into account a strategic approach to DDR.

Instead, they focused on the impending election as the means to restore peace to Liberia, as opposed to the process of DDR. As a result, demobilization was a rushed process. This tight timeline and lack of overt strategy led to a quick-and-dirty approach to demobilization in which ex-combatants finished the process in less than a day. The focus on the elections also meant that the reintegration process was neglected, and few resources made available to carry it out.

Demobilization and Reintegration

Despite the international community's apparent strategic commitment to DDR, demobilization in Mozambique was delayed. This was due to disputes over the number of government troops to be demobilized and whether each side had withheld troops from encampment. These delays caused serious unrest among the combatants confined to camps (see section 3.5). To speed demobilization, once political issues were settled, the donor community recognized the need for a quick incentive for ex-combatants to reintegrate into their communities. The program arrived at motivated combatants to choose demobilization and establish themselves in new lives, so as to receive additional benefits.

Because of unpredicted political delays, ad hoc solutions were required, solutions that led to unintended negative results. The demobilization program was not strategically beneficial in helping create a new army in Mozambique. The size of the new Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique or FADM, after contentious discussion in the peace negotiations process, was planned at 30,000 men, 15,000 each from the government and Renamo forces. Only about one-third this number volunteered for service in the army, rather than opting for demobilization. This was due in large measure to war weariness among the combatants, but also in part to the attractiveness of the demobilization package (Macaringue: 2001). To the present, this leaves Mozambique with an armed force smaller and less prepared to meet the country's security needs than had been desired.

The DDR program in Ethiopia was part of specific, well-defined strategic objectives. There was no time constraint to complete the demobilization hastily and there were strong economic, security and political imperatives. Demobilization activities, such as needs assessments and pre-discharge orientation, were undertaken to help guarantee success during the reintegration phase. The government also recognized that the reintegration process was a long-term endeavor and planned programs accordingly.

Reintegration

Reintegration programs in Mozambique were set up to follow on from the demobilization and reinsertion assistance that ex-combatants received. An information and referral service, vocational and entrepreneurial training, kits for self-employment and small grants to businesses or projects that employed former soldiers were set up. These, however, were set up piecemeal, not strategically. Employers often took the money and employed noncombatants. Because support payments were bimonthly, saving for bigger

needs was difficult. A majority of ex-combatants stated that they would have preferred to receive cash payments in a lump sum, to start a business or project (Kingma, ed.: 2000, p. 189). As a result of this fragmentation, but also because of the extremely weak status of the economy, reintegration support had no significant effect on initiating recovery or development in Mozambique.

3.4. The Credibility of the Central Authority Has a Great Impact on the DDR Process

- It is critical to establishing an effective security situation
- Equitable treatment of ex-combatants is essential

During a ceasefire, or once the parties to a conflict have agreed to a peace treaty, unless a credible central authority provides combatants from all factions with a sense that the situation is secure and controlled, they will not disarm or demobilize.

Another element that appears critical to ex-combatants' ability to leave behind their military identities and become integrated into the post-conflict society is for all factions' combatants to receive equal treatment in the DDR process and generally to be treated with impartiality. A credible central authority also remains neutral in the conflict and noncombative.

End of Conflict/Peace Process

Under the peace accords signed in Liberia, ECOMOG, a regional military group, headed by Nigeria, was tasked with implementing DDR. Unfortunately, ECOMOG did not remain impartial. ECOMOG "peacekeepers" involved themselves in extensive fighting with many of the factions. Most Liberians saw ECOMOG not as a peacekeeping faction but as a combative group, controlled by Nigeria. In addition, underpaid and over-tasked ECOMOG soldiers developed a reputation for looting and other crimes against the Liberian people. These actions severely damaged ECOMOG's integrity as a peacekeeping force. As a result, rather than creating a sense of security, ECOMOG added to the climate of chaos and lawlessness. UNOMIL, a UN-sponsored group in charge of monitoring ECOMOG, was viewed as a weak and ineffective force. This lack of strong central authority with integrity in the eyes of the Liberians was a great hindrance to the successful completion of DDR.

Central authorities have been known to manipulate the credibility factor for their own internal political purposes. Britain had credibility going into the Lancaster House talks as the *de facto* colonial entity, in a sense responsible for ensuring transition to a legitimate majority-rule government. However, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative party government elected in Britain just prior to the installation of the puppet Muzorewa government were expected to endorse that government, due to Conservatives' longstanding sympathies with the minority in Rhodesia. Stedman (1988) discusses how the Thatcher government was skeptical that a ceasefire settlement could be

reached, given all the attempts so far. If the Conservatives tried one more time to facilitate an agreement, their credibility would increase in Africa and internationally even though the agreement would likely fail. Britain could then endorse the Muzorewa government as the best possible alternative and be done with the responsibilities of a colonial power. By getting the Commonwealth African states to recommend ceasefire negotiations strongly controlled by British authority and ensuring that those states convinced the parties to come, Britain began the Lancaster talks in a credible position. By the end of the talks, the strong-arm tactics Britain had used to get to a settlement caused the parties to regret placing faith in Britain's authority. In particular, the ceasefire provisions that favored the RSF over the PF in encampment conditions caused mistrust. However, political momentum had built up and each party was focused on winning the election.

Planning

The general consensus is that establishing a credible sense of security among factions requires substantial commitment of personnel on the ground. This was the expectation in Mozambique, where, despite careful planning, the credibility of ONUMOZ was not initially high, because of delays in getting enough UN troops on the ground to establish a secure situation. Although the peace agreement was signed in October 1992, the first military ceasefire observers did not arrive until February 1993. Sufficient contingents to protect the key commercial corridors were still arriving until August 1993, at which point there were 6,000 ONUMOZ soldiers on the ground.

In Zimbabwe, the size of the CMF was deliberately so limited—initially about 1,300—that its credibility was not intended to come from enforcement capability. The small CMF teams of 17 to 20 men, each of which was assigned to administer an assembly area holding hundreds of combatants, were intended to be credible because they were undertaking a difficult role despite the monitors' extreme vulnerability.

However, while the CMF monitors gained credibility in this way, the operation overall did not create a sense of security, because the encampment process was much more favorable to the RSF, and the Patriotic Front forces knew it. The PF leaders had argued strongly at Lancaster House for the Rhodesian Air Force to be grounded during the transition. The British insisted they would need the Air Force for transport during the operation. Rhodesian forces also were not strictly confined to barracks, as they were to be available to the CMF for security enforcement. Apprehension over the RSF at was one reason both Zipra and Zanla held forces back from encampment, forces which in turn threatened the security of the encampment phase and the run-up to elections. When security breaches started almost immediately, the CMF did deploy Rhodesian forces to contain them, although RSF combatants were sometimes the cause of these breaches. This example of unequal treatment of forces renewed Zapu's call to increase the CMF to 5,000 neutral (armed) enforcers. The British did not consider this an option. The British

gambled that the factions' desire to see elections through would keep full-scale violence in check for the short time before the CMF left.

Demobilization and Reintegration

Only if the requisite sense of security exists will combatant factions actually begin to demobilize. The central authority has the key role in helping bring this about. When demobilization begins, combatants' perception of the fairness of the process affects their level of cooperation. In Mozambique, the United Nations had to expend significant effort to ensure the parties' trust in the process so that demobilization could start. The government and Renamo could not agree on how many combatants were to be demobilized, and both sides stalled in carrying out the process for fear of losing strategic advantage should conflict break out again. The combatants, who had been in camps for months under crowded conditions, violently demonstrated their unrest, lashing out against the situation. Riots and mutinies broke out. Some combatants left encampment and blocked roads, detained vehicles and hostages, and looted government, UN and NGO supply warehouses. Donors would have pulled out if the situation could not be controlled. The UN Security Council repeatedly urged the parties to come to an agreement. ONUMOZ troops had to be deployed around camps on several occasions. Only after the UN Secretary General came to Mozambique and mediated the situation did demobilization proceed.

Combatants from the government and Renamo were treated essentially the same all the way through the demobilization and reintegration process. The one difference was that government soldiers who had served long enough received government pensions, unlike Renamo combatants, who had not paid into any benefit system. All received the same training and education in encampment, the same money and goods upon demobilization, and the same two-year reintegration support. Both were equally eligible to serve in the new armed forces.

In Ethiopia, one side was the victor, so demobilization was a certainty. The government ex-Derg soldiers, ex-OLF fighters and active ENDF forces were demobilized in relatively the same manner. Demobilization activities for these groups were similar, and assistance provided was identical throughout each phase. Ex-Derg soldiers and OLF fighters even received the same pensions, which were dependent on the number of years of service. Furthermore, within each of these groups, ex-combatants were not treated differently due to ethnic background. This equitable treatment may have assisted overall reintegration, as one group did not receive better benefits, which would have caused resentment among the others.

In Zimbabwe, after elections, when demobilization was to begin, the new Zanu-led government did not create a situation in which both Zanu and Zapu combatants were secure or treated equivalently. Many ex-combatants stayed in encampment for a long time—up to a year—waiting for demobilization. Most RSF forces, by contrast,

transferred to the new Zimbabwean Defense Force or retired. The rivalry between Zapu and Zanu combatants—fueled by Zapu resentment over the election results, which they did not consider fair—broke out into violence between their encampments. The government's repressive reaction sparked the formation of a dissident movement, in which some ex-Zipra re-mobilized. The government responded with a campaign of massacres against dissidents and civilians in Matabeleland, Zipra's home province. The violence interfered with DDR and derailed national reconciliation.

3.5. Effective DDR Will End the Conflict Command Structure and Enable Ex-Combatants to Fit Into the Civilian Social Structure

- DDR will sever combatants' ties with the command structure
- DDR must target assistance to economic and social opportunities

The test of effective demobilization and reintegration is whether the process ends combatants' self-identification as a member of a fighting faction, detachment or unit, and gives them a civilian identity. An important first step is to sever the links to the command structure.

At the same time, combatants need incentives for leaving what for many has been the only life they have known. Targeted assistance can provide that incentive. In the cases studied, a range of programs and different levels of assistance were provided to ex-combatants toward transition to civilian life. The type of assistance that put ex-combatants at the best advantage, and led toward the greatest stability—and thus the greatest security—was targeted assistance. This was assistance that took into account an ex-combatants' skills, what they she wanted to do for a living post-conflict, and where, and especially what, work opportunities were likely to be available. The assistance provided ranged from assessment of interests and training while in encampment to provision of stipend, seeds and tools upon transportation and reinsertion to small grants programs, vocational training, and job counseling for longer-term reintegration.

Planning

The United Nations had learned from its experience in Angola in 1992, where elections were held before demobilization was attempted. The loser of the elections, UNITA, disputed the results, took its soldiers out of encampment and resumed the armed struggle. As a result, in planning the operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ determined that demobilization—and the transition to a new unified armed force—should begin before the elections were held. There was a conscious decision to pay attention to moving the combatants away from their factions and units.

Demobilization

The well-planned DDR in Liberia, which most likely would have helped sever combatant ties to their command structure, was never fully implemented. The program was

ultimately condensed into a quick-and-dirty process compacted into several hours. Additionally, the ex-combatants often were not welcome back in their home villages and so remained together with other ex-military. There were plans also to target assistance toward ex-combatants and groups such as child soldiers. However, donor support was insufficient and the National Disarmament and Demobilization Committee opposed aid packages for ex-combatants—aid that could have served as an incentive for severing those ties. In the end, a majority of the child soldiers walked away from the demobilization areas, ultimately returning to the control of their commanders.

In Zimbabwe, the government did not offer a program of demobilization assistance structured as an incentive for combatants to disperse; many remained in the camps because they were being paid their full salaries and given a place to live. The combatants remaining in the camps were not willing to leave behind their wartime allegiances to their factions. Remaining together with their wartime companions, with no goal in sight and nothing to do, likely contributed to the outbreak of violence between ex-Zipra and ex-Zanla in the camps, which led to the dissident war.

In Mozambique, even though many combatants wanted to demobilize—some even left of their own accord with no assistance—delays in the process kept combatants' ties to their military identities intact. As a result of the unrest in the camps, the international community realized that the medium-term programs planned for reintegrating ex-combatants, including training, credit schemes, employment programs and referral services, must be supplemented. They realized that combatants first needed a near-term incentive to demobilize and start a new life. The solution proposed—the extension of severance pay to a two-year cash subsidy—caused 97% of soldiers to elect to demobilize.

In Ethiopia the ties binding ex-combatants with their command structure were successfully broken in several ways. First, President Mengistu fled the country as his power weakened, leaving the Derg without a leader at the highest level. During the encampment, the ex-combatants were required to participate in group discussions on the causes of war and the need to establish a civil and democratic society. After leaving the camps, the ex-combatants were required to register with their local reintegration offices establishing their civilian support structures and breaking their reliance on their former military leadership. Although former combatants staffed many of these offices, there does not appear to be any evidence that this capacity extended any sort of military command structure.

Reintegration

In Mozambique, reintegration assistance was not clearly targeted to ex-combatants' wishes or the opportunities available. This was mostly because there were few opportunities at all in Mozambique's decimated economic climate. Donors and the UN and other organizations developing reintegration programs put a heavy assumption on ex-

combatants' wanting to take up small-scale agriculture, thus the wide distribution of seeds and tools.

This was a miscalculation in several respects. Poor roads, land mines, the lack of agricultural credits and low prices were some of the reasons farming was not an easy choice. Most ex-combatants could not earn enough for the extended number of dependents they were expected to support, including parents and younger siblings. Historically and culturally, agriculture had been a supplement to wage labor in Mozambique, and most combatants needed to find paid jobs, leaving their families to farm to supplement income. While some did turn to crime—especially the illicit gun market—after demobilization, former combatants' mostly peaceful reintegration into civilian life despite lack of economic opportunity is attributed to the support of the communities they joined and their conflict fatigue.

In Ethiopia, during the encampment phase, socioeconomic data on ex-combatants, including information on education, skills and work experience, was collected in the discharge centers. From this information, the Commission classified ex-combatants into four categories: 1) rural settlers, 2) urban settlers, 3) disabled ex-combatants, and 4) war veterans under pension schemes. During reintegration, programs were created to support their distinct needs.

Reintegration assistance in Zimbabwe was not particularly targeted to ex-combatants' individual needs or interests. The monthly subsidy that combatants received for two years upon demobilization was sufficiently generous that it was a disincentive to find work. It was not big enough, however, to enable saving up for education or other long-term goals. There were some education and skills training programs, set up by the government and NGOs, available to serve only a small percentage of demobilized combatants. When their two years of assistance ran out, the government set up cooperatives—in large-scale farming and small business—to assist ex-combatants. Many of these went bankrupt, due to supply problems, poor transportation, and fraud.

The most prevalent way that the Mugabe government reintegrated ex-combatants was to re-employ them. Even those who had received and used up their demobilization benefits were allowed jobs in the new Zimbabwean Defense Force and the civil service. By 1988, over half of the 75,000 combatants demobilized following independence were back working for the government (World Bank: 1993, p. 38). These extensive expenditures on compensation to veterans, which continue today, are the product of an unstable political situation and, in turn, burden Zimbabwe's economy and contribute to instability.

3.6. The Economics That Motivate and Perpetuate Civil Wars Will Influence DDR Programs' Effectiveness; Also, Effective DDR Has a Great Impact on Shaping a Country's Post-Conflict Economy

- Countries give DDR a higher priority when their economies are devastated by war
- War may be an economic way of life for combatants

In countries such as Mozambique and Ethiopia, a combination of depletion of resources due to protracted fighting, drying up of resources from outside sponsors to continue the war, and natural disaster seems to have contributed strongly to the willingness of the parties to end the conflict, the level of priority given to DDR programs, and—along with other important factors—the success of DDR.

In Liberia and Mozambique, it is clear that war to a certain extent became an end in itself, a means by which to justify criminal methods of gain. The examples below illustrate how combatants supported themselves during the conflict through looting, extortion, theft and trafficking in black markets. A critical difference was that in Mozambique, at a certain point, there were no more resources to exploit, while in Liberia, access to exploitable goods was the main reason conflict continued despite many attempts at peace and DDR.

It is possible to strike a peace agreement under both types of economic environment. Yet only through demobilization, reintegration and military and social transformation does peace last. The cases show that in a poor country, a well-developed DDR process can provide sufficient economic incentives to enable transformation to a peaceful society. However, in an economy where access to valuable commodities drives conflict, the challenge is very great to provide incentives for factions to comply with DDR.

End of Conflict/Peace Process and Planning

A country whose resource base has been destroyed has little choice but to negotiate peace. In Mozambique, when the two sides finally began to negotiate in 1990, the Frelimo government knew that it would soon be unable to finance the conflict. The Renamo opposition force, which for so many years could count on outside sponsorship, could do so no longer. The food and other supplies that Renamo had always commandeered from the rural population were scarce or gone, due to war devastation and drought. With troops from Tanzania and Zimbabwe protecting the transport corridors, Renamo could no longer extort protection money from companies with assets in those areas. The outside and regional entities persuading the factions toward peace used Renamo's dire status, providing economic incentives at every step of the peace process.

In Liberia, the continual breakdown into renewed conflict despite many attempts at negotiations shows that the factions believed they could gain more advantage from war than from peace. Control of the country's resources, including diamonds, timber, rubber,

iron ore and gold, is to large extent an issue of control of territory. The factions little expected that peace would bring them the unilateral right to the resources they wanted.

The DDR in Ethiopia was also directly tied to dire economic imperatives. The Ethiopian government recognized that it was unable to maintain such an enormous army given the devastated social and economic foundations of the country. Furthermore, the government hoped that the employment of ex-soldiers in the private sector or their engagement in self-employment would facilitate the economic revitalization of the country.

Reintegration

Ex-combatants may appreciate the benefits of demobilization and reintegration programs more when there are no broad disparities in wealth in the country. Ex-combatants more easily blend into a society where everyone is struggling to make a living. In addition, in countries such as Mozambique and Ethiopia, the severity of the economic situation meant that programs to speed the transition from war were given high priority, so that recovery could begin as soon as possible.

The Ethiopian government took a "minimalist" approach to reintegration by providing only basic needs. Given limited resources, this approach ensured that the maximum number of ex-combatants could be supported. Additionally, it reduced the risk of antagonizing civilian communities by creating a privileged subgroup.

The communities in which Ethiopia's ex-combatants settled also benefited through the new skills the ex-combatant may have brought to the community (that is, engineering, medical training) and through public works programs sponsored by the Government and NGOs. CRS also sponsored a program that required all beneficiaries to donate 5% of their assistance to local authorities for use in community-promoting projects.

By contrast, in Zimbabwe, reintegration resources became to a degree an economic industry in themselves. Many ex-combatants used up one type of support and returned to the government for more. The Mugabe government kept paying because it feared that veterans would become a competing political force and wished to co-opt them. Over time, these payouts have undermined the Zimbabwean economy, which is much worse off today than it was at the end of its protracted war of independence.

3.7. The Geostrategic and Regional Environment in Which a Conflict Occurs Significantly Influences the Range of DDR Activities

Each of these conflicts occurred within the broader context of the history, politics, economy and geography of its region. These elements influenced the level of interest of regional and international actors to serve as mediators, advisors, donors, and peacekeepers in relation to conflicts. They also influenced how and when outside actors

opposed resolving the conflicts or actively fueled their continuation. The level of interest and participation of external actors affected DDR programs at every stage.[3]

After ninety years of whites' economic and political domination of Rhodesia, Great Britain wanted to end its involvement in its last colony in Africa. Britain did not accept any of the means since 1965 through which Rhodesia and then-Prime Minister Ian Smith had attempted to proclaim independence, because none included black majority rule. States in the region—mainly Zambia and Mozambique—that supported the majority opposition forces were more weary of conflict than white or black Rhodesians. The so-called Front Line states, supporters of black nationalist movements in Southern Africa, anticipated a moral and tactical victory if Rhodesia went to majority rule. South Africa, intent upon maintaining regional dominance and economic stability, believed that a majority government run by "moderate" blacks best served its purposes in Rhodesia (Stedman: 1988, p. 81).

Three attempts since 1974 at brokering agreement had failed—attempts in which South Africa, Zambia and Britain were involved, as well as the Ford and Carter administrations. Bishop Muzorewa had been elected the first black African prime minister, but to a government in which parliament was largely reserved for whites and in which state institutions were white-controlled. Internationally, Rhodesia's government held no legitimacy. Internally, Zanu and Zapu gave no credit to Muzorewa's puppet government and continued prosecuting the war.

Britain stepped into this seemingly intractable situation and was able to use the motivations of and pressures on the parties to conclude a settlement. Britain's objectives for the cease-fire operation it then implemented were limited to achieving a political transition that could be perceived as legitimate, as quickly as possible. Britain never intended to become involved in brokering national reconciliation or the transformation to a society that would be stable in the long term. Fearing protracted involvement, as in Northern Ireland, Britain also preferred its own solution to what would perhaps have been a broader approach by the United Nations. When the Commonwealth operation departed Zimbabwe in March 1980, many of the country's problems were still unresolved. DDR was one of the most immediate ones.

Over the years, Zimbabwe has been unable to achieve a balanced society where violence and intimidation are not relied upon as matters of policy. In large part, this is due to single-party politics and the ruling party's protection of itself and its interests over the good of the country. But it is possible that Zimbabwe might have evolved differently over the past 21 years if additional time and attention by the international community had been paid to, first, solving fundamental divisions in the society; second, assisting the majority in its transition to governance; and third, demobilization, reintegration and demilitarization.

[3] These elements are discussed below across the phases, for the sake of continuity.

Mozambique is an example where the external participants did follow through—much longer than in other cases—in their involvement in DDR. In Mozambique, the strategic position of the country as the commerce corridor to the Indian Ocean for landlocked Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia caused those countries to participate actively over many years in trying to broker peace in the country. All three committed troops to help the government fight Renamo. All three had large influxes of refugees from Mozambique, whose presence taxed their economies.

Political and economic factors contributed to Italy's high level of interest in the Mozambican conflict. Italy saw the impending opening of new markets in southern Africa in the early '90s and the opportunity to establish a presence there, due to Portugal's withdrawal from colonies in the region and South Africa's transition to majority rule. Italy valued this prospective opportunity highly enough that it not only served as an accommodating host to the peace talks but also provided money, goods and services to Renamo throughout the peace process as incentive to continue and was a generous donor throughout demobilization and reintegration.

Another big reason for so much interest by outside countries in bringing about peace and stability in Mozambique through a successful UN operation was the recent failure of UNAVEM II in Angola. Donor countries decided to expend considerable effort and money to bring Mozambique's conflict to conclusion. There was no appetite for protracted involvement in another unsolved civil war. Although the United States in the early 1980s had a strong Washington pro-Renamo lobby, due to the government's Marxist leanings, by the late '80s the United States became involved in donating humanitarian assistance to Mozambique and became a strong supporter of the peace process, eventually helping develop the military sections of the 1992 peace accord.

While commitment of the external community began to wane toward the end of the ONUMOZ operation and was less strong during reintegration, this was in part because Mozambique's ability to remain stable looked promising. The extensive involvement of donors and supporters during DDR has meant continued interest in the country and support when needed. Mozambique received significant external help during the floods of 2000.

The Derg in Ethiopia was able to maintain its war with dissenting groups through support from the Soviet Union and its allies. The end of the Cold War dissolved this support, leading to the eventual fall of the Derg regime. Ethiopia managed DDR with sporadic external support but firm internal commitment to building its own economic and social infrastructure. As such, Ethiopia stands as a good example of an independently driven, successful DDR program. The circumstances under which it occurred, however, are fairly unique.

Since 1991, Ethiopia has drifted back into the influence of the United States, which has in some ways proved beneficial to Ethiopia's demilitarization endeavors, particularly in the

area of military justice and military professionalism. Although this assistance is, in the long run, good for the country and its people, US interest is primarily aimed at its own geopolitical and strategic interests. Ethiopia is regarded as a counterweight to Arab dominance over the Red Sea region, which includes the sea lanes carrying oil from the Persian Gulf and Israel. Ethiopia has also proven a buffer against the radical expansionist Islam promoted by the alliance between Sudan and Iran and extremists in Somalia. Given the political dynamics in the Horn of Africa, US presence will inevitably provide a focal point for the Government's Islamic opponents within and outside Ethiopia's borders.

The recent conflict with Eritrea has also been a major setback for demilitarization. Mutual massive military buildup has resulted in significant loss of life on both sides and has dominated both governments' attention. Extensive propaganda campaigns and escalation by extremists on both sides have forced Ethiopian society to be once more preoccupied by military matters.

Liberia's attempts at DDR are an example of external actors' involvement proving counterproductive to stabilization efforts. Liberia's war started out as an internal conflict between ethnic groups. Over time it has become a regional crisis, growing to include the war in Sierra Leone and direct intervention by Nigerian troops under the banner of ECOMOG. The conflict split along Anglophone-Francophone lines, with the West African Anglophone nations supporting Nigeria and ECOMOG and the Francophone countries supporting Charles Taylor. Also, the conflict has taken on an international dimension with the outside trade-based interests of Libya, Burkina Faso and Lebanon. Despite external actors' broad and intimate involvement in Liberia's conflict, international interest in and financial assistance to DDR have been lacking.

Following its direct intervention in the conflict, ECOMOG attempted to become a partner in DDR. However, they were not accepted as a neutral observer or participant. Additionally, the expansion of the conflict into a regional one and economic gains to be made from black-market diamonds and other goods undermined any political will that existed to solve the conflict and participate in DDR.

A final factor was the relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG. ECOMOG, despite having become a combatant, was given responsibility for security of the United Nations. ECOMOG was involved in Liberia for some time and resented the late-arriving UN and the perception that they needed outside monitoring. These factors contributed to the marginalization of the two major external authorities charged with assisting in DDR implementation.

3.8. Longer-Term Transition to a Demilitarized Society Requires Effective Demobilization and Reintegration

Demilitarization is a long-term process in which a state moves away from a military-dominated society. Key activities for the long-term success of demilitarization are the

effective demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. Demobilization is the first step in breaking the combatants away from their combat lifestyle, their weapons and most important, from their military command structure. Effective disarmament, in particular, helps stem the flow of arms that could potentially foster a culture of violence in the population and increase the likelihood of armed conflict and insecurity. Effective reintegration also helps to curb the culture of violence that lives on in societies during and after periods of war. Reintegration programs can also help stimulate a postwar economy, enabling ex-combatants to find economic opportunities other than those advantages gained through warfare.

In Ethiopia, the successful demobilization and reintegration programs facilitated the country's steps toward demilitarization. First, the demobilization allowed military expenditures to decrease—at least in the area of personnel costs—which allowed the government to transfer funds to more productive sectors. Defense spending dominated the economy during the Derg regime. Military spending as a share of total government expenditure fell from approximately 60% in FY 1989-90 to approximately 30% in FY 1992-93. Over the same period, spending on health and education grew from 12% of total government expenditure to approximately 20%. The shift in funding represents a shift in government policy focus from the military to social and economic issues.

The demobilization and reintegration also helped decrease the number of potential problems with organized, armed opposition groups that would further the need for the military to maintain internal security. This allowed the army to pass on the internal security job to regional and local police forces, thus reinforcing a civilian authority for security. The successful disarmament process also controlled the widespread proliferation of weapons and a resulting arms trade that could have furthered the economic need for conflict and fostered a culture of violence in the population.

The demobilization of the ENDF forces was an attempt at creating a more ethnically representative armed force, since at that time ex-TPLF soldiers dominated the army. The restructuring of the army was a solid indication of the government's commitment to developing a force acceptable to all Ethiopians and was seen as a key step in enhancing security, stability and socioeconomic development.

In Mozambique, demobilization and reintegration were fairly successful, despite delays and fragmented implementation. Ineffective disarmament and difficulties in establishing a postwar army of sufficient size and professionalism have slowed the country's efforts toward demilitarization. The disarmament process attempted by ONUMOZ failed to collect all the arms, and those collected and not used by the FADM were not secured or destroyed. The arms trade has provided a means of income for many ex-combatants who left the army with few marketable skills. The proliferation of arms has contributed to an increase in crime and banditry, which in turn continues the cycle of violence within the society. A response has been increased use of violence by police.

While the FADM is still not as large as was envisioned for Mozambique's security, steps have been taken to make the organization more independent from party politics. Joint training has reduced rivalry between soldiers who were formerly enemies. Relative civilian control of the military has increased, although a full transition will take more time. Reductions in Mozambique's defense budget have not necessarily been positive for the FADM, although its lack of resources are also attributed to corruption and diversion of funds by senior officers and political officials. Weak security institutions are one reason Mozambique has become a transit center for the international drug trade.

Additional positive steps toward demilitarization have taken place in Mozambique, as indicated by attention to nonmilitary priorities, including active participation in regional organizations, economic growth, and social healing. Demobilization and reintegration programs put Mozambique on the right course post-conflict; continued attention to social, political and security issues will be needed to maintain stability.

In Zimbabwe, demobilization occurred, reintegration was problematic, but demilitarization was not the end result, nor the government's objective. During the 1980s, the military increased in size, due to both the government's need to provide employment for ex-combatants—to neutralize them politically and so they could support themselves—and Zimbabwe's internal and regional involvement in conflicts. The dissident war fought between some former Zapu combatants and the government's forces lasted from 1980 to 1987. The government raised a new brigade, carefully selected from former Zanla fighters and trained by North Korea, to crush dissidents as well as massacre Ndebele-speaking civilians during that conflict. Zimbabwe was Frelimo's staunchest supporter and provided up to 12,000 troops to the Mozambican civil war up until settled in 1992. Zimbabwe maintained active military support for revolutionary movements in South Africa until transition to majority rule occurred there.

In the early 1990s, defense expenditure went down somewhat as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), only to rise with Mugabe's ambition of modernizing and professionalizing the army. Zimbabwe was involved in peacekeeping in Angola in the 1990s, and since 1998, provided up to 12,000 troops to support the Kabila government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But the clearest evidence that demilitarization has not occurred is the continual use by the government of defense forces to intimidate and repress dissent in the country.

In Liberia, demobilization and reintegration were unsuccessful endeavors. Failure in these processes has hampered any positive steps toward demilitarization in Liberia. At the societal and government levels, violence and corruption dominate the everyday order of business. The current regime under President Charles Taylor remains repressive and corrupt, with power and wealth continuing to flow to the president and his cronies. Not only does Taylor continue to include Liberia in conflicts in Sierra Leone and Guinea, but armed conflict within Liberia continues, with armed bandits roaming Monrovia and the countryside. Without a comprehensive demobilization and reintegration program,

factions have easily remobilized fighters, and without any viable economic alternative, these fighters are easily brought into a culture of crime and violence. The poor security situation itself prevents any new reintegration programs from functioning properly.

Disarmament was a critical failure in the demobilization effort in Liberia. The actual process for disarmament varied from site to site, leading to inaccurate documentation and making it easier for the factions to beat the system and hold onto large caches of weapons. For example, because children were allowed to demobilize without weapons, some factions sent great numbers of children to demobilization sites in order to give the appearance that they were disarming without actually doing so.

4.0. Implications and Conclusions

The implications that follow stem from the factor analysis in section 3.0. The conclusions will be tested, toward the development of recommendations for policy action, in the next phase of this study—a series of interviews with DDR analysts and practitioners. Those interviewed will be asked to comment on the factors determined in case study analysis, implications and conclusions presented here and to recommend—based on their experience—policy actions, programs, planning or preparation for future DDR needs in sub-Saharan Africa. The scope of these recommendations may include policies and programs on several levels, including the Defense Department, theater Commanders in Chief, interagency programs, and regional and international efforts. Implications and conclusions below are described with reference to the factor in section 3.0 to which they relate.

4.1. Political Will

Cross-case analysis demonstrates that the process of DDR cannot effectively begin unless clear political will exists to end violence and move toward rebuilding the society. Without political will, parties will not agree to assembly of combatants, combatants will not disarm or demobilize, and the society will not accept reintegration of combatants.

Political will may be stronger at some levels than others. In the example cases, political will was at times stronger in the population overall than it was within the armed groups or at the political level. Our research found that strong political will within the society can help bring around the political and military leadership.

The cases also showed that political will is demonstrated not in words spoken or even in agreements on paper, but in the actions taken by parties to move toward a post-conflict transition.

In the cases studied, political will sometimes held the DDR process together in the absence of funding and external support. Conversely, funding or external support cannot ensure that DDR will be successful if the political will to go forward is weak.

Community-based entities played a key role in the reintegration stage in countries where societal political will to move past conflict was strong. In a sense, the involvement of community organizations helped solidify political will to reintegrate ex-combatants.

Conclusions

A country where very strong political will to end the conflict exists could be encouraged to implement DDR more independently. The Ethiopia example shows that DDR has been carried out successfully, with sometimes limited funding and support, on a foundation of strong political will. However, each case is unique. Other elements, such as humanitarian concerns, regional issues and security problems, may militate against

leaving a country on its own. The relevant factors should be weighed in taking such an approach in future situations.

Programs to facilitate reintegration should include and gain the benefits of local community-based management of resources. Involvement of the community will reinforce normalization of former combatants more strongly than will institutions created for that purpose.

If political will is distinctly absent in a future situation, policy makers should consider limiting US involvement. Political will is probably the most critical element to the overall success of DDR efforts. A higher degree of coercion is required to maintain the conditions for DDR in the absence of political will, and a higher level of risk comes with it. Without political will, it may be appropriate to limit US Government assistance to humanitarian aid.

4.2. Resolution of Major Grievances

If a peace process or political transformation leaves major grievances—or the underlying causes of the grievances—unresolved, it is likely that conflict will break out again at some point in the future. DDR may become a cyclical process and occur more than once until the grievances are resolved.

Conclusion

When involved in countries that will need to undertake DDR, the US Government should ensure that major grievances are dealt with and not postponed. Either the peace agreement or the political process must resolve issues in what is perceived as a fair manner. If major grievances (or their underlying causes) cannot be resolved, it may be appropriate to restrict US Government involvement.

4.3 Strategic Commitment

The cases indicate that external commitment to support DDR is more likely if there is already commitment to humanitarian aid. Commitment of the international community to providing humanitarian assistance to a war- or disaster-ravaged country creates a sense of involvement that can carry over to commitment to DDR.

The research shows that in the planning stage, commitment to a portion of the process compromises the rest of the process. Most notably, if planning for and commitment to DDR extend only through elections, the elected government will have a difficult time following through. Planning DDR in the context of rebuilding the country overall can help demobilization or reintegration programs gain resources and attention that they might not get in isolation.

The examples demonstrate that even the best-laid plans for DDR can be derailed once the programs are under way when differences arise over carrying out the plans. Assembly

and demobilization are particularly contentious processes. When this happens, revised plans or solutions developed on the fly may not be optimal. The tendency will be to try to solve the immediate problem rather than look toward the long term.

Conclusions

In countries where DDR will eventually be a priority, the United States should become involved early and encourage other countries to do the same, as this will develop a sense of commitment needed for effective DDR.

Integrate DDR into overall rehabilitation of the country. Planning DDR in the context of rebuilding the country overall can help demobilization or reintegration programs gain resources and attention that they might not get in isolation.

Develop plans and programs to be available to whoever wins the election and assumes the government. Programs should begin before and continue after elections and include all winners and losers.

Learn from past experience what may derail plans. When plans have to be revised, continue a strategic focus, not quick fix.

4.4. Credible Central Authority

From the cases, it appears that a central authority will have the credibility to carry out a transition process and DDR if it commits to the process early, gets donors to provide funding rapidly, and incurs some risk itself, in the form of personnel on the ground. If the process is seriously or repeatedly delayed, the central authority, even if not specifically responsible, will lose credibility with the combatants and the donor community. This can cause DDR to go further off track.

Demobilization and reintegration benefits programs must be perceived as fair by the combatants—their perception matters to the success of the outcome and will affect how they respond to the central authority overall.

In the encampment phase, conditions—including proximity to other groups they feel are threatening, level of disarmament, and access to resources and territory—must be equal for the various factions. Otherwise, the parties will not feel secure and may not comply with the central authority's instructions. They may abandon encampment or take steps to protect themselves.

Conclusions

To avoid or limit delays, **ensure good logistics support; leverage the political process to keep parties on track.**

In planning benefits programs, include combatants in the process to determine their perspective.

Focus on combatants' sense of security in determining encampment conditions. The central authority must gain the trust of combatant commanders.

4.5. End Conflict Command Structure/Support Civilian Structure

In several of the cases, benefits provided as an incentive for former combatants to demobilize and leave behind the military command structure to begin a new civilian life had unintended effects. Benefits provided a higher standard of living than ex-combatants could easily achieve on their own and lasted a long time or were renewed if they ran out. This proved a disincentive in many cases for ex-combatants to find an independent means of making a living early on. As a result, these combatants did not quickly reintegrate into the communities, but kept their identities as veterans. In some instances, this led to politicization of their post-conflict condition, and to violence in reaction to it.

Additionally, highly attractive benefits for demobilization have affected recruitment for new postwar militaries and slowed the development of more professional, accountable armed forces.

Demographic data collected during DDR in the past shows that many combatants either joined or were conscripted into the armed factions at very young ages, a significant percentage even as children, and have fought for years. As a result, many have no knowledge of civilian life and no understanding of a way of life that doesn't include violence. They also lack basic skills for sustaining a job or profession.

With regard to reintegration programs, shortcomings observed in the case studies included the lack of targeting to those opportunities that were actually available and of interest to former combatants. In poor economies, job opportunities are few, regardless of training provided; agriculture may be the last resort. In countries where war has centered on competition for wealth-making resources, attracting ex-combatants to stable employment in the community is a difficult task.

Conclusions

Promote demobilization benefits that don't deter from finding a longer-term livelihood. This may mean that benefits should be shorter-term,and less attractive than moving into a reintegration program or into a new postwar military. There is a fine line between appropriately limiting benefits and leaving ex-combatants with too little to make the transition to civilians. Also, benefits should not be so extensive that they cause discord or economic distortion between former combatants and other war-affected groups.

Demobilization programs should include orientation to civilian life and the rule of law and civic responsibilities as well as basic skills in money management and sustaining a household.

Develop reintegration programs that are appropriate in the social context, appropriate to specifics of the ex-combatant population, and—if possible—feasible in the economic climate.

4.6. Economic Motivations

The level of priority given to DDR will be higher in poor countries hit hard by the devastating effects of war and lower in countries with resources to spare. It will be most difficult to implement DDR in countries where control of valuable resources is still at issue.

Absent effective demobilization and reintegration of combatants into legitimate, productive activities, there is likely to be a higher rate of black market activity involving former combatants and, if disarmament has not succeeded, their weapons. This will affect the stability of the country and how it is perceived by prospective post-conflict donors and investors. Donors and investors' actions help shape the postwar economy.

Demobilization and reintegration programs that cause dependency in former combatants can skew the economy in other ways. Over-expenditure on benefits and using government employment to support large numbers of ex-combatants is burdensome on a country's economy. Ex-combatants who are dependent on benefits are not contributing to the country's recovery and growth.

Conclusions

DDR programs must take into account the economic motivations of combatants and provide a higher incentive to demobilize and reintegrate in productive, legitimate activity than to continue fighting. Otherwise, experience shows, DDR will fail repeatedly.

Disarmament is a complement to but not a precondition for successful DDR. **In poor countries, offering goods for guns should be pursued, and guns destroyed, not just stored.** Disarmament must be self-motivated in countries with more resources.

4.7. Geostrategic Environment

Outside actors have an understandable desire to limit the length and scope of their involvement in sub-Saharan African countries stricken by war. Politics at home, finances and competing priorities, not to mention risk aversion, argue for minimizing participation in DDR. However, a country left with armed young men who have no productive means of support or diversion and limited ties to civilian communities is a problem waiting to happen. Recent lessons show that terrorism or other unwanted influences can easily take root in such societies.

The international community should consider investment in and commitment to DDR as prevention against the expansion of terrorism.

Larger goals may warrant external actors' promotion of policies at odds with the DDR objectives of the countries—an example is Ethiopia's growing role as a regional counterweight to Islamic extremists in the Horn of Africa—a role that may conflict with downsizing its military. Under the circumstances, this appears to be needed.

4.8. Transition to Demilitarization

Demilitarization is a long-term process more than it is an end state. Elements of this process may include a number of factors, among which are

- Downsizing of the military
- A decline in military spending, with a shift of funds toward economic and social priorities
- Professionalization of the military
- Disarmament (if not completed during DDR)
- Demining
- Civilian control of the military

This last factor is not to imply civilian abuse of the military or use of military forces for personal or political gain. Extrapolating further, it may be possible to link demilitarization with the growth of democratic or civil society institutions, such as an independent media and judiciary and independent election commissions. However, this would be a process toward a particular condition, rather than what is directly implied by demobilization: progress away from the conditions that fostered and supported war.

Conclusions

A demilitarization process will assist a country's other important goals, such as economic growth, social reconciliation, and, perhaps, progress toward democracy. It will enhance stability and make return to conflict more difficult as new priorities based on peace emerge. **The United States will be better able to rely upon countries that are demilitarizing to serve as policy leaders, facilitators and peace builders in their regions.**

The United States should support and help promote the process of demilitarization through technical assistance, training, advice and—where possible—support to programs.

Appendix A.
Demobilization, Reintegration and Demilitarization Case Study: Zimbabwe

1. The Nature of the Conflict

A great stone city, with walls fifteen feet thick and thirty feet high, was built by a prosperous African state sometime between the 9th and 13th centuries A.D. The "Great Zimbabwe" ruins, near Masvingo, are those of a civilization that traded with the East African Coast and may have lasted until the early 18th century (Wiseman and Taylor: 1981, p. 1). Europeans began coming to Africa in the 15th century. The Portuguese were the first in south central Africa. Almost every European power took part in colonizing the continent.

In the late 1800s, Cecil Rhodes, under a charter granted by Great Britain, colonized the area in Southern Africa that became known as Rhodesia. Rhodes had secured the area for his British South African Company through force and ingenuity against its African inhabitants, about 700,000 Ndebele and Shona speakers. The whites came expecting to find gold. When none was apparent the British South African Company instead began dividing up the land into farms and settling on them, thereby coming into conflict with the customs and policies of the people who lived there. The indigenous custom was to own land communally, with chiefs allocating land for the benefit of all (Chitiyo: 2000, p. 4). Differences over access to land, along with other settler-imposed restrictions, caused conflicts between the Europeans and the Africans in the 1890s.

By the end of the century, the British South African Company had "solved" the land use problem through a land apportionment act, creating about 60 "Native Reserves" over approximately 20 percent of Rhodesia, on which about half the population lived. By 1920, approximately 1 million indigenous Africans and 800,000 head of livestock were living on about a third of the country's land—the most arid and difficult to cultivate—while about 2,500 white settler families occupied the other two thirds, the best arable land.

The white settlers maintained control under the nominal rule of Britain until 1923, when the British government allowed the whites to govern themselves in a colony formally annexed to Britain, called Southern Rhodesia. Britain retained the right to intervene in the affairs of the colony as it saw fit.

After World War II, the white population in Rhodesia grew to about 140,000, with many coming from Europe to settle. The indigenous population had grown to 4 million. By 1955, 55 out of 98 Native Reserves were overpopulated (Chitiyo: 2000, p. 7).

When British decolonization began in the 1960s, the entrenched white minority government in Rhodesia, under conservative Prime Minister Ian Smith, feared that Britain would require majority rule as a condition for independence. After negotiations with the British regarding independence failed for just that reason, in November 1965, Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence. Britain called this action unconstitutional, and the United Nations declared the UDI to be illegal, calling upon member states not to assist or recognize the Smith regime. In 1966, The UN Security Council, for the first time in its history, imposed mandatory economic sanctions on a state. These were broadened in 1968 to almost total embargo on trade and investment with Rhodesia (US Department of State: 1995).

Figure 1. Map of Zimbabwe

The "UDI" era witnessed the establishment of three main black nationalist liberation movements, two with military strength, which differed in their ethnic base and ideology. Zanu, the Zimbabwe African National Union, founded by Ndabaningi Sithole and eventually led by Robert Mugabe, had its base with the ethnic majority Shona speakers, received military training and assistance from China, and—after its independence in 1974—had support in the region from Mozambique. Zapu, the Zimbabwe African People's Union, was principally made up of Ndebele speakers who comprised 15% of the black majority population, had military assistance from the Soviet Union, and a regional base in Zambia. The broadly based African National Council (ANC) was eventually led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa (Stedman: 1993).

By 1972, the militaries of the nationalist movements stepped up their activities against the minority government, defended by the RSF . Zanu's military arm, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla), employed guerrilla tactics, perpetrating violence against vulnerable white-owned schools and farms, and spreading their political message. Zanu was able to intensify the war with the exit of Portugal from their colony in Mozambique, as this opened up a 600-mile-long sanctuary for Zanla across Rhodesia's

border. Refugees driven across the Mozambican border by Rhodesia's crackdown in the area became an available pool of fighters joining Zanla's ranks. Zapu's military wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolution Army (Zipra) was less prone to use terrorist tactics, priding itself on better-trained, more "professional" combatants against the Rhodesians.

By around 1974, it had become apparent to some in the Rhodesian government, especially in the intelligence organization, that this was not a war they could win, and the Rhodesians should move toward settlement. Smith and the politicians were far more optimistic about the whites' advantages, while the military was somewhere in-between, needing the experience of fighting the war to come to the conclusion that they could not win (Stedman: 1998, p. 39). Zanu and Zapu had formed a coalition in 1976 despite some fundamental differences, calling themselves the Patriotic Front (PF), which increased their political leverage. Three major, high-level attempts at negotiating a settlement were made between 1974 and 1979. The first involved South Africa and Zambia as mediators; the second involved Secretary of State Henry Kissinger representing the Ford administration, and South Africa; and the third included Secretary of State Cyrus Vance for the Carter administration and Foreign Minister David Owen of Britain. All three failed, and it appeared to many that Rhodesia would end up as intractable a dispute as that between Israelis and Palestinians.

One reason the Vance-Owen attempt failed was that Bishop Muzorewa, believing that the Americans and the British were intent on empowering Zapu and Zanu to the exclusion of his ANC, entered into secret unilateral negotiations with Smith. In March 1978 they announced what would be called the "internal settlement." Muzorewa would be allowed to run for prime minister of the country but a high number of legislative seats would be reserved for whites, and they would still control the army, police, civil service, and other institutions of power. Muzorewa won in a landslide victory, but internationally, the election was considered a sham, and the new government, illegitimate.

2. The End of the Civil War

By August 1979, the Salisbury regime of Muzorewa and Smith was in difficult straits. The military conflict was taking a heavy toll, and Rhodesia's economy was weakened by ongoing economic sanctions. And although Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government, newly elected in June, had campaigned in favor of lifting sanctions against Rhodesia, they had not done so. Neither had they recognized the Muzorewa government, as all sides in Rhodesia had expected. Britain was more than anxious to be rid of its responsibilities to Rhodesia, but extremely frustrated by the dynamics that had caused previous settlements to fail. Stedman (1991) states that British foreign secretary Lord Carrington argued persuasively to Thatcher that the time was right for one more try at a settlement including all sides. He said that recognition of the internal settlement would not end the war, and would hurt Britain's credibility in the international community. Also, elements now existed which had not in the previous negotiation attempts, elements

that would provide Britain with leverage. Britain needed only to convince Muzorewa that it would in fact recognize his government if negotiations failed because of the Patriotic Front, and also, that if a settlement was reached and elections scheduled, he would undoubtedly win. Conversely, Mugabe and Nkomo could be compelled to participate by the threat of Britain recognizing Muzorewa's government if they would not. They also must believe without doubt that they would win elections, for settlement to occur.

Zanu and Mugabe did believe that it could win elections, and also that it could win the war if the talks failed. Zapu's Nkomo faced the reality that the talks to which the parties were invited, at Lancaster House in London, were its last chance. Zapu did not have the military strength to win the war on its own; it did not have the political strength to win an election on its own either. Nkomo had been informed in no uncertain terms by the leaders of Zambia and Mozambique that they had been too hard hit, and would no longer support the war if the negotiations failed. Nkomo realized that Zapu's last chance was dependent on the tenuous relationship with Zanu, in which there were longstanding grudges, suspicions, and ideological and ethnic differences.[4]

Britain's perspective, based on past experiences, was that the parties would never reach agreement if it merely acted as a mediator. Their strategy, after leveraging the influence of Zambia and Mozambique in getting the Patriotic Front to attend, was to perform the role of an arbitrator. At an August meeting, the Commonwealth states had resolved that it was Britain's responsibility to propose a solution to the impasse in Rhodesia. Britain's goal was thus to state what it determined were fair conditions for a new constitution, for transition to a new government, and for a cease-fire—in that order—and consider the parties' suggestions only as they dealt with the British recommendations. Lord Carrington, who led the talks, sought to isolate the extremists, Smith and Mugabe, and to strictly control the discussion by allowing only bilateral exchanges between each of the parties and himself. Thus the PF and Salisbury delegations were not able to debate between themselves but only to react to what the British put on the table.

The three-month proceedings were extremely contentious. Proposals regarding the new constitution which were especially difficult to negotiate included extensive protection of minority rights, including reserving seats in the legislature for whites, automatic citizenship for those who had been Rhodesian citizens, and especially, land rights and compensation issues. The new constitution, which would be unchangeable for ten years, outlawed compulsory land acquisition. The only way the new government would be able to acquire land was to buy it, in foreign currency, from a willing seller at a price both agreed to. This provision went against a fundamental principle for which PF combatants had been fighting, and would cause problems for the next government for years.

[4] See Kriger in Furley and May, eds: 1998, for a thorough discussion of the history between Zanu and Zapu.

As for transitional arrangements, the British put forward a structure to include their formal resumption of colonial authority during the transition under a governor, the use of the existing Rhodesian security and police forces under British supervision, and a Commonwealth monitoring group overseeing but not enforcing the cease-fire. No United Nations forces would participate, and the period would last two months until elections. Carrington refused to entertain the PF's proposals for a six-month transition operating under United Nations peacekeepers and election monitors.

With regard to the ceasefire, Britain proposed a small monitoring force—ultimately scarcely more than 1,500—that would assess and monitor the assembly of RSF forces at their military bases, and PF combatants at 15 designated assembly areas. A ceasefire commission would review any violations of the ceasefire. RSF forces, including the Air Force, were to be available to the monitoring force for security and logistics. Combatants would not be asked to disarm. The Patriotic Front insisted that there should be zones assigned to each army—they did not wish to encamp combatants and so lose control over territory. The PF insisted that both sides' militaries must be used for security and that the Rhodesian Air Force must be grounded so it could not bomb encampments.

The Lancaster House process—which has been held up over the years as an example for conducting difficult negotiations—had significant flaws. The British used control tactics compel the two sides to agree. Carrington used brinksmanship—appointing a British governor to Rhodesia and dispatching him before the agreement had been signed—threats, and pressure through patrons to each of the parties to achieve settlement. Only slight accommodations were made to the parties' most strident demands, and then mostly as face-saving measures once the sides agreed to Britain's stipulations. This would later cause some serious repercussions. On the land distribution question, the ten-year constitution would later be one of the factors impeding DDR, and causing hardship and embarrassment to former combatants. And the assumption that a settlement to resolve the majority rule issue which suppressed deep political differences within the majority could lead to a stable transition, would prove to be short-sighted. (This was evident almost immediately, when the Patriotic Front broke apart; Zanu and Zapu stood separately for elections.) The settlement stopped far short of establishing plans for demobilization of combatants, no less reintegration. It envisioned no objectives beyond controlling combatants through ceasefire and encampment so that elections could be held. This plus the absence of technical support would handicap the newly elected government. The British did not consciously decide *not* to plan for demobilization. They did not even consider the need to do so.

Lancaster House had one redeeming quality in the view of the participants: it set up a framework under which legitimate elections could occur, and each party believed it could win.

3. Planning for Demobilization and Reintegration

The parties signed the Lancaster House agreement on December 21, 1979. Britain had already appointed Lord Christopher Soames, a close advisor to Thatcher, as interim governor on December 7, and he had arrived in Salisbury on December 12. At that point, Rhodesia formally reverted to British control and the international sanctions were lifted. Soames also lifted the ban on Zanu and Zapu as political parties, and granted amnesty to the combatants. After the signing, all movement of troops into Rhodesia was to cease immediately. Hostilities were to stop within a week. Seven more days were allotted for movement of Patriotic Front forces to predetermined assembly areas in Rhodesia, up until January 4. Elections were set for February 27, 28 and 29.

The CMF, eventually comprised of 1,548 troops—predominately from Britain but including small numbers of Australians, New Zealanders, Kenyans and Fijians—had the challenge of planning and monitoring the encampment of 22,000 Zanu and Zapu combatants (Wiseman and Taylor: 1981, p. 56). The extent of the planning included: setting up operations and logistics for the CMF; putting teams at the rendez-vous points to meet Zanu and Zapu forces and escort them to the assembly areas, monitor the assembly areas and the Rhodesian bases throughout the ceasefire; assuring safe transport; and determining and investigating breaches of the ceasefire. The operation did not even fully think through how to feed and shelter the combatants while in encampment, until the urgency of doing so was apparent.

Lord Soames and his entourage of policy and planning officials invested considerable effort on setting up the conditions that were to exist to conduct elections. Encampment of combatants was one of these conditions, and the most challenging. But the objectives of encampment did not extend to preparing for demobilization, no less reintegration. In an operation that took 93 days from start to finish, what to do with the encamped combatants after the election of a new government was a very late afterthought.

A. Political, Economic and Social Conditions

Political. The political situation during the transition period was highly charged. The parties were now faced with complying with the conditions to which they had acceded in the Lancaster House accord. The Rhodesian leadership was in a state of denial, holding on to the trappings of office without the ability to exercise power, and hoping that either the ceasefire would fail and Britain would recognize the Muzorewa regime, or they would again be elected. The Rhodesian military and police forces were poised to respond with gusto to any call by the resident governor to enforce security during the ceasefire, more or less assuming that Zanu and Zapu would break the rules. The rank and file of Zipra and Zanla were wary of the encampment process, suspecting the Rhodesian army at every step. They were also apprehensive about each other. Zanla feared that the thousands of Zipra forces known to be holding back from encampment, in Zambia, were planning attacks on Zanla once they were vulnerable in the encampment sites. Zanla also

held back troops from encampment, deploying them into the countryside, as a hedge against Zipra or RSF attack, and also to serve Zanu's purposes of "persuasion" during the election campaign. The campaign itself was marked by widespread incidents of violence, ranging from theft to kidnapping to threats of harm unless people voted as instructed, to attacks and killings. A limited amount of trust developed among military leaders, when bilateral meetings between the CMF and each military group became multilateral (Wiseman and Taylor: 1981, p. 63).

Despite numerous reports of intimidation of voters, especially by Zanu, the elections were declared free and fair. Zanu won 63 percent of the vote, 57 seats in the legislature and Robert Mugabe would become prime minister. Nkomo's Zapu won 24 percent, 20 seats and was invited by Mugabe to form a coalition government. Muzorewa's ANC won 8 percent of the vote. The country's response to the outcome of the election was jubilation on the part of the winners, and somber acceptance by the losers. Britain formally granted independence to Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980.

Following the election, the new nation of Zimbabwe was in a delicate state. A new uncertainty took over. The British governor and the CMF departed almost immediately—within ten days of the election. More than 35,000 combatants—including the RSF—were still in encampment, and still armed. No one was sure how the newly elected Zanu government would react to the power it had acquired.

The initial activities of the new government seemed promising. Mugabe spoke in terms of inclusiveness about a new start for the country. He demonstrated this by appointing General Walls of the RSF as the head of the new Zimbabwe Defense Force . Zipra commanders were also asked to lead. He assured whites that their property rights would be respected in accord with the 10-year constitution established at Lancaster House. Joshua Nkomo, head of Zapu, was appointed to the Cabinet.

Economic. Despite sanctions, Zimbabwe's economy had not weathered the war too badly. Agricultural infrastructure had been damaged, and this was a priority for the new government from a political as well as economic perspective. Commercial agriculture as a share of GDP had declined from 17 percent in 1974 to 12 percent in 1980 (Jenkins: 1997, p. 5). Because the war was fought in rural areas, however, manufacturing assets, located in the cities, were not highly impacted, and manufacturing retained its share of GDP. Services contributed relatively more to GDP by the end of the conflict.

It was expected when the war ended that recovery would be possible without a large investment in reconstruction, and that a peace dividend would result from decreased spending on defense. Investment, which had declined due to sanctions, was expected to increase. Mugabe expected influxes of economic aid—up to $1.9 billion—promised during the Lancaster House negotiations (Jenkins: 1997, p. 11).

Zimbabwe faced labor market difficulties at the end of the war. The majority of the 75,000 Zapu and Zanu combatants had an elementary level of education or lower and

were unskilled for much other than warfare. Tens of thousands of refugees were returning to Zimbabwe and would need a means of subsistence. Land distribution was an issue needing to be addressed.

Social. Those combatants who demobilized quickly were initially greeted as heroes of the liberation war in the communities to which they returned. The communities had expectations that after independence, the former combatants would have a role in helping to bring improvements home, whether better land distribution or infrastructure. Families were willing to accept them back, but had high expectations for a better way of life (Barnes in Bhebe and Ranger: 1995, p. 126). After the elections, several dynamics ended up disrupting these social expectations. It took more than a year for some combatants to be demobilized, as the government was slow in formulating demobilization plans, and not anxious to demobilize all the combatants at once. Integration of the new army proceeded slowly, and was marred by the outbreak of a dissident conflict between the government and former Zipra combatants, who felt both disaffected and persecuted. Expectations of government help in beginning a new life were mostly unfulfilled. Many ex-combatants, seeing the corruption that flourished after the conflict, became embarrassed in subsequent years to admit that they had fought in the war (Barnes, p. 127).

B. Rationale

The new government couldn't, and didn't want to, demobilize large numbers of combatants rapidly. Because the British had left so quickly, providing no plan or technical assistance for demobilizing the still-encamped Zipra, Zanla and RSF combatants, it took a while for the new government to determine what to do with them. It was thought that releasing a great many ex-combatants into the urban streets and countryside all at once would be destabilizing. Few of the funds promised by donors during negotiations were ever delivered, so demobilization and reintegration had to be largely funded by Zimbabwe itself. The government wanted to integrate into the new armed forces sufficient numbers to even out the ethnic composition of the force, as most of the predominately-white RSF, with the exception of those who retired on pensions, was to become part of the Zimbabwean Defense Force. The new government wished to move more blacks into civil service positions as well, to "Africanize" government institutions, achieve greater ethnic balance, and also to provide many ex-combatants with jobs. The civil service increased from 71,000 in 1980 to 89,400 in 1985 (World Bank: 1993, p. 9).

C. Objectives

Following a planning period of several months, during which time Mugabe appointed himself Minister of Defense with authority over the army, and—after sustained negotiation—appointed Joshua Nkomo as Minister of Home Affairs, with authority over the 8,000-man police force, a demobilization process was established. The government's objectives in implementing a DDR process were, in order of priority: sustaining the peace

process by defusing tensions among the armed combatants; restructuring an integrated, ethnically balanced armed force; and aligning the size of the armed forces with the threats against it, which was to mean a reduction to around 25,000 soldiers (World Bank: 1993, p. 13).

D. Resources

As incentive and encouragement to the parties in the Lancaster House negotiation, outside countries and institutions had promised significant financial assistance once a settlement was reached. Presumably most of this was to be for longer-term development, but the new government had expectations of assistance with demobilization and reintegration of the army as well. In large part these expectations were disappointed. For instance, in 1976, Henry Kissinger had promised $1 billion in assistance from the United States upon resolution of Zimbabwe's conflict. In 1980, the US officially promised only $25 million. The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) was held in 1981 to remind donors of the assistance they had pledged prior to the election, and 45 countries pledged $1.9 billion, the single largest donor being the World Bank. Few of these pledges were forthcoming at the time demobilization commenced. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe embarked on a demobilization program, providing compensation to ex-combatants at an ambitious level. Because of the high level of borrowing which the government undertook for public sector programs generally, Zimbabwe acquired a debt problem in the early 1980s, and spending habits which have been detrimental to the country's stability.

4. How Were Demobilization and Reintegration Implemented and Managed?

A. Organization

As described above, the CMF oversaw the encampment phase prior to the election. Its functions were

- "To maintain contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front forces throughout Rhodesia;
- To monitor and observe the maintenance of the ceasefire by the respective forces
- To monitor agreed border crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the ceasefire."[5]

About half the CMF's 1500-plus personnel were engaged in monitoring activities. The other half were involved in advisory functions, headquarters, communications, and

[5] From *Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Conference*, Lancaster House, London, in Wiseman and Taylor: 1981, p. 48.

support through operation of CMF aircraft. The monitoring staff was deployed throughout the country, in small teams assigned to either RSF bases or the encampment areas for Zanu and Zapu combatants. There were also liaison teams in Zambia and Mozambique.

Zimbabwe's new government organized demobilization after the departure of the CMF. They established a Cabinet-level committee for demobilization and reintegration in April 1980, chaired by the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. A Demobilization Directorate was also established, to administer both the demobilization program and reintegration.

The Ministry of Education oversaw formal education programs for reintegration. Non-governmental organizations set up their own vocational training.

B. Targeting Participants

Estimates of the number of combatants at the end of the conflict range from 75,000 to 100,000: approximately 50,000-75,000 RSF troops, around 15,000-20,000 Zanla and 10,000-12,000 Zipra forces.[6] Essentially all of the RSF, except for a few thousand who retired, were expected to remain with the new Zimbabwean Defense Force. The new Zanu government valued the high level of professional training which RSF soldiers possessed. This is evident in the extent to which Mugabe went to create a spirit of cooperation with the former military, initially appointing General Walls of the RSF as the head of the new Zimbabwean Defense Force.[7]

The goals of the integration of the new armed forces were to develop a professionalized, ethnically balanced force, which would eventually be reduced in size, commensurate with a reduced threat. Choosing which combatants from the nationalist forces would be integrated was a political matter, given the differences between Zipra and Zanla, including Zipra's perception of itself as a better trained force which had largely rejected guerrilla tactics, and their perception of Zanla as an untrained, unruly guerrilla force. The incidents of violence between Zipra and Zanla that began during demobilization and led to the dissident conflict through much of the 1980s had an effect on who was chosen for the new army. Some former Zipra left encampment or the army of their own accord to join the dissidents; others experienced persecution in the army which caused them to leave (Barnes in Bhebe and Ranger: 1995).

Not much attention was paid in the demobilization stage to the differences among combatants who would be demobilized, or what their relative goals or skills were. The

[6] See for example different estimates in Rupiyah, M. "Demobilization and Integration: Operation Merger and the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980-1987." *African Security Review*, cited in OECD: 1997, p. 26, and in World Bank: 1993, p. 8. (This latter source appears to have inadvertently switched the RSF and PF force sizes in the table which appears.)

[7] This good will was dealt a blow in 1980 when General Walls admitted in an interview that he had called Prime Minister Thatcher following the election and asked her to declare the results null and void. This caused an uproar and the dismissal of Walls from the ZDF (Wiseman and Taylor: 1981).

programs were developed with the objective of defusing tension in the society, not catering to individual needs. For instance, Lancaster House had outlined that RSF forces would receive pensions upon demobilization, as combatants had paid into a pension fund, while PF forces had not. Upon demobilization, the government ended up giving all combatants pensions, calculated for ex-Zanla and ex-Zipra combatants based on age and length of service.

C. Demobilization

As described, the demobilization and reintegration program in Zimbabwe differed from those in other cases because two vastly different central authorities, with different goals and levels of organization, participated in stages of DDR. The British-controlled CMFimplemented encampment of combatants on a strict and very brief timetable, with the objective of maintaining order just long enough for the holding of elections. No planning or thought was given to how long the forces would remain in encampment, what could or should be done to assist in demobilization and reintegration, or even how to feed and shelter them for more than a few days, as the CMF planned to depart Zimbabwe immediately following the election. These questions were assumed to be the purview of whichever party won.

When Zanu assumed the mantle of the government in February 1980, demobilization and reintegration, though highly charged politically, were a small subset of the concerns that confronted Robert Mugabe and the government he formed. A wholesale transformation of the society was contemplated, and former combatants were, to an extent, put low on the government's agenda. This was an oversight which came back to cause difficulty in Zimbabwean society numerous times in the years to come.

i. Implementation

Rendez-Vous. As called for in the Lancaster House accords, the CMF dispersed small teams to 23 "rendez-vous" points, separate for Zipra and Zanla forces, to meet the combatants and escort them to the 15 encampment areas. The nationalist forces had approximately one week from when the ceasefire went into effect to enter the camps. After that time period, they would be declared to be illegally moving forces within the country. Because of the slowness of Zanla and Zipra forces in coming to trust the encampment process, the rendez-vous points were kept open an extra week.

RSF forces were to withdraw deployed units back to their bases during the same period of time. CMF monitors were stationed at the RSF's five Joint Operational Commands (JOCs), 17 sub-JOCs and at company bases. The JOC monitors were required to report on activities to Zanla and Zipra liaison commissioners. As described, RSF forces and the police were to be available to the CMF for maintaining security in the event of breaches of the ceasefire, so their remaining on base was conditional. Also, the Rhodesian Air Force was made available to assist the CMF in logistics, supplies and communications.

The small groups of about 20 monitors who went into the countryside to meet Zipra and Zanla combatants were accompanied by PF liaison officers, whose task was to build confidence that the CMF was legitimate and non-threatening, and that the encampment areas were not a trap. The combatants would enter cautiously, sending scouts ahead, then one or a few men, and then a unit would report. Once trust began to develop, large numbers of combatants would arrive. This complicated logistics, as transportation to the encampment areas was limited, roads were in disrepair or mined, and Zanla and Zipra feared ambush along the way by RSF. By the deadline, 15,730 combatants had reported (Ginifer: 1995, p. 31). As described, somewhere in the range of 10,000 Zanla and Zipra remained outside the encampment areas prior to the election, many Zanla inside the country and Zipra forces mostly still in Zambia.

Assembly. The CMF had made almost no arrangements for feeding, housing and providing medical and other support to the combatants. While combatants were instructed to show up for encampment with their own supplies, most came with just their weapons. Whether the CMF overlooked these conditions, or it was assumed the country would provide for these needs itself, differs among accounts. In addition, some of the encampment sites had inadequate water available and no sanitation facilities. The lack of food other than emergency rations angered combatants in some camps. In one instance, monitors were taken hostage because of the lack of meat (Ginifer: 1995, p. 36). The danger was that Zanla and Zipra forces would abandon the assembly areas and abrogate the peace process because of lack of food. The CMF appealed to the Rhodesians for supplies but were refused. As a result, an urgent international appeal went out. Hundreds of tons supplies were flown in from the United States, South Africa and elsewhere. A logistics team set up to assist the 1500 CMF monitors was required to manage an operation for 20,000.

The CMF bolstered relations with the combatants by providing medical care, not only to Zipra and Zanla but also to the surrounding communities. Around 250,000 civilians were treated by CMF medical assistants, plus combatants suffering from unattended wounds and disease. This provision of medical care was so effective that the nationalist leaders declared it "…among the most powerful weapons in the battle for guerrillas[’] hearts and minds" (Ginifer: 1995, p. 36).

Disarmament. Disarmament of the combatants prior to encampment or the election process was never seriously considered either at Lancaster House, or by Lord Soames in implementing the Commonwealth mission. Disarmament was assumed to be too controversial and too difficult to enforce. Zanla and Zipra combatants were not required to turn in their weapons when coming into the camps, and in fact, fearing attacks on the assembly areas by RSF forces, they set up manned fortifications at the camps—complete with anti-aircraft weapons—and armed patrols scouting for hostile forces. Those eventually demobilized were required to turn in their weapons, which were provided for use by the new Zimbabwean Defense Force. And those participating in the limited joint training that occurred under the CMF agreed to turn in weapons beforehand.

After the elections, the government tried to implement disarmament, establishing a weapons amnesty in February 1981, the disarming of former-combatants still encamped and—in a move related to mounting friction between the government and Zipra—the collection of Zipra weapons inside and outside Zimbabwe. However, this did not eliminate weapons as an issue in Zimbabwe. For years after the demobilization exercise, caches of arms were discovered in the countryside.[8]

Encampment. The CMF-monitored stage of encampment, which lasted approximately eight weeks, from assembly up until the election, was a period of tense anticipation. Incidents occurred at the assembly areas, including clashes between Zanla and Zipra encamped near each other, and some intimidation of CMF monitors. Most of the violence leading up to the election, however, was outside the camps. Zanla reportedly perpetrated election-related intimidation against prospective voters. This was severe enough that Lord Soames considered banning Zanu from contesting the elections in some regions of the country. The RSF reacted to Zanla activity outside the camps, and also took some actions intended to provoke combatants within the camps (Ginifer: 1995, p. 39). Despite these disruptions, overall, the ceasefire held.

The limited objectives of the British for encampment had been to contain violence and build trust and cooperation. Toward the latter goal, opportunities to develop personal relationships, such as sports matches, were created. The object was for the military entities to come to trust the CMF, and build confidence in broader interaction with each other. Joint patrols had some success. A limited amount of joint training, took place, with Zanla and Zipra forces willing to train with the RSF, but not with each other. The CMF realized only shortly before the election that no provision had been made for what to do about encamped combatants afterwards. While in some camps, a successful transition to RSF administration occurred, in many instances, the combatants assumed control of their own camps, after Zanla and Zipra commanders issued the order to "stay there."

Under the new Zanu-led government, combatants continued to stay. Some remained in the camps up to a year, while the government took time to institute a demobilization program, and slowed the process to the point where it was thought demobilization would not increase unrest in the country. Combatants were paid their full salaries while they remained encamped. The international aid that had supported encampment prior to elections had fallen off. A few programs were created to lessen the financial burden on the government, including Operation SEED, set up in the spring of 1980 as an income generation project for combatants in the camps and soldiers in the army. The program was intended to provide participants with new skills and self-sufficiency, organizing them to grow their own food. Despite support from Prime Minister Mugabe, few opted to participate, citing no interest in learning agriculture (World Bank: 1993). Another

[8] One such discovery of arms on an ex-Zipra-run communal farm was used as the reason for dismissal of Joshua Nkomo from the Cabinet in 1981, which fueled the flaring of the Zipra-vs.-Zanla dissident conflict.

popular program gave basic education and literacy training to Zanla and Zipra while encamped.

Benefits. Combatants who decided to demobilize early on, and gave up their military salary, were given a lump-sum payment of $556. Many took this option, only to return to the camps after the money had run out. Subsequently, the government offered another package with monthly allowances. Even those who had received the first round of benefits were able to receive this package, which amounted to $139 per month while in the camps and $259 per month when demobilized, over two years. Ex-combatants were given a Post Office Bank savings book, from which they could withdraw monthly. This was a generous amount of monthly support, given that Zimbabwe's per capita income was $780 in 1980; the benefits therefore served as a disincentive for finding work (World Bank: 1993, p. 60).

The government provided no financial counseling, employment advice or targeted skills training to the combatants while in encampment. No transportation was provided so many stayed in the camps after demobilization, receiving their salaries and benefits until the funds ran out.

D. Reinsertion

The reinsertion phase did not occur in Zimbabwe. Reinsertion pertains to the short-term period of approximately six to twelve months after demobilization. During this phase, the ex-combatants face the challenge of establishing a civilian household. Money was provided upon demobilization, but the "seeds and tools" type of assistance that was given in DDR programs in other countries was not a factor in Zimbabwe. Because many ex-combatants began foundering, unable to save up their monthly stipends towards longer-term goals, or find stable employment, the government took additional steps towards reintegration. In addition, NGOs stepped in to partly fill the gap.

E. Reintegration

No comprehensive, planned program of reintegration occurred in Zimbabwe. Reintegration refers to a long-term period during which ex-combatants gradually become "normal" community members, both in social and economic terms. The programs that were implemented occurred on an *ad hoc* basis, after it was apparent that many ex-combatants were not easily finding a way back into civil society. The government ended up supporting ex-combatants several times over, providing government funds or jobs even after demobilization assistance had been used up. Reintegration may have been more difficult to achieve because veterans came to depend on—and expect—continuing assistance programs.

i. Implementation

The programs that the government offered as a step toward reintegration included seven schools for veterans, with a total capacity of 2,000 students. Two schools were for ex-Zipra combatants and five for ex-Zanla. The schools were funded by the government, and provided room and board. About 5700 ex-combatants went to these schools for secondary or university level courses. Nongovernmental organizations established vocational training schools, where ex-combatants could learn marketable skills.[9] These programs were in response to the profile of Zimbabwe's demobilized ex-combatants:

- 50 percent age 20-25
- 80 percent single
- 13 percent had no previous education; 69 percent had part or complete primary educations
- 52 percent had no previous employment (besides military)
- 23 percent were unskilled[10]

Some of the vocational training that the NGOs provide was tied to agricultural and commercial cooperatives, as well as small-scale industry. A NGO called the Zimbabwe Project funded 100 cooperatives that employed former combatants. By 1984, about 10,000 veterans received basic agricultural training, cattle management, carpentry and bookkeeping. The Zimbabwe project also set up a panel to approve those combatants who wanted to withdraw up to $3369 from their two-year stipend, to invest in education or a business. According to one evaluation, about 40% of these cooperatives failed, due to poor management, lack of business, supply problems, poor transportation and fraud.

In addition to these programs—or despite them—the government ended up reabsorbing a great many former combatants, some after they had already used up their demobilization assistance, and unsuccessfully attempted reintegration through collectives or other means. By 1988, up to 55 percent of former Zipra and Zanla were employed in the Zimbabwean military or civil service. Funds were also established to support ex-combatants whose demobilization money had run out.[11]

ii. Program Perception by Population and Ex-combatants

Anecdotal interviews, as well as subsequent historical events reveal that many ex-combatants did not receive what they felt they were due in the demobilization and

[9] One of the most successful of these was the Danhiko Project, where ex-combatants, including the disabled, learned garment making, furniture design and upholstery. The school was successful because the director conducted research on market demand for the skills to be taught (World Bank:1993, p. 71).
[10] World Bank: 1993, p. 56.
[11] During the period of the dissident conflict, approximately 1981-1986, many ex-Zipra were excluded from state job opportunities and persecuted if they had already joined the ZDF or civil service. Steps to address the problems of former Zipra specifically were considered after Zanu and Zapu united in 1987 (Brickhill in Bhebe and Ranger: 1995, p. 166).

reintegration programs.[12] Many expected land distribution, a goal closely associated with freedom from white majority dominance. Ex-combatants interviewed in retrospect repeatedly emphasized that access to better and more land was a critical expectation for demobilization and reintegration. Many felt it was their due for fighting the long war of liberation from minority rule (Barnes in Bhebe, Ranger, eds.: 1995).

Because of the complications which the failure to redistribute land has caused, up through the present, it is worth discussing in detail. In the ten years in which Zimbabwe was under the Lancaster constitution, up until 1990, only 52,000 families—among which were ex-combatants—were resettled, as versus the 162,000 the government stated it planned to resettle during that time. Although the Mugabe government, in power throughout, fully attributed the shortfall to the restrictions in the 1980 constitution, there is no evidence that the government had concrete plans for carrying out high-level land reform. In addition, the white landowners continued to maintain significantly more political influence in Zimbabwe than associations of peasant farmers (Herbst in Baynham: 1992).

In 1990, with the expiration of the Lancaster constitution, the Zimbabwean government revised its land laws to allow confiscation of land, and payment of whatever the government found fair, with no appeals. Expectations heightened, including among former combatants, that the government would provide resettlement to more families, faster, despite the complexity and cost.

Since 1990, national land policy has continued to be haphazard, and a disappointment to ex-combatants as well as the general population. Land distribution was one of the issues veterans raised in voicing their discontent with postwar treatment by the government, as they emerged as a political force in the early 1990s. Seeking to diffuse the threat to its power, the Mugabe government put forward several veterans' compensation packages, which included reserving 20% of all resettlement lands for veterans. In 1997, under heavy political pressure, Mugabe and Zanu-PF instituted payments to all legitimate veterans of $3,000 lump sum and $300 per month for life. This $240 million expenditure caused a serious financial crisis in Zimbabwe, but completely won over the veterans as a political entity to the Mugabe government. The land seizures that those calling themselves veterans are carrying out today are rooted in the still-unsolved land distribution issue that Lancaster House perpetuated. However, the veterans themselves are being manipulated to serve the government's political self-preservation needs, a problem of its own creation.

Overall, ex-combatants expected to be taken care of more than they were. Despite the range of programs and jobs created, there were many thousands whose enterprises failed, who didn't benefit from training or education, or who just believed they had been left out.

[12] See Barnes in Bhebe and Ranger: 1995.

Ironically, many of those who fought in the name of freedom and self-governance for Zimbabwe are now instruments of President Mugabe's disdain for democratic principles.

5. Was the Zimbabwean Demobilization and Reintegration Program a Success?

Zimbabwe's demobilization and reintegration program is considered by many to have been a success. It can only be regarded as such from certain limited perspectives.

The meticulous planning of the transitional exercise under the CMF did not extend to demobilization and reintegration, and no technical assistance was offered after the election. As a result, comprehensive advance planning, which could have improved the effectiveness of the efforts, did not take place. The neglect of the new government in according high priority to demobilization and reintegration made the programs it did introduce incomplete; NGOs supplemented to a degree. In another sense, however, demobilization assistance may have been too generous, removing incentives for ex-combatants to find work. Many former combatants became dependent on financial help, and the government ended up paying for some of the same demobilized combatants several times over.

From its outset under the CMF, the demobilization program was not structured to sever the ties of the ex-combatants to their wartime military factions. Fundamentally, this is because the ceasefire accord did not address deep levels of mistrust between Zanu and Zapu—it concentrated only on the transition to majority rule. But because Zipra and Zanla forces were assembled and encamped separately, and because Zanu and Zapu stood separately for elections, those identities were strongly maintained. Divisions based on party and ethnicity disrupted the stability of the country before demobilization could be completed.

A clear shortcoming of the reintegration program is that although many did create new lives and become incorporated into the society, a vocal subset of former combatants became disgruntled, and were unable to part from an identity as crusaders for freedom whose contribution had been ignored. Social reintegration was apparently incomplete as well.

The one area where integration was relatively quite successful was in the Zimbabwean Defense Forces. Sustained technical assistance from outside interested parties, the emphasis on professionalism and a balance of ethnicities, and the fostering of a new identity as an elite fighting force unique in the region, all contributed.

6. Demilitarization in Zimbabwe

Although it has been 21 years since the civil war ended in Zimbabwe, a clear pattern of demilitarization has yet to emerge in the country. A pattern of corruption and violence has unmistakably appeared.

Military expenditures over time did not declined as they might have. While a peace dividend in the form of reduced spending on defense was expected at the end of the war, defense spending rose by 50 percent in real terms in 1980. Military spending declined slightly as a proportion of total government spending by the end of the 1980s. At the same time there were real increases in defense spending, and the falling relative expenditure is accountable to even faster growth in public spending in other areas during that time. Reasons for these increases were the cost of professionalization and integration of the new military after independence; the raising of a new unit, the 5th Brigade, to suppress the dissident and civilian population in Matabeleland province during the inter-party conflict in the 1980s; participation of up to 12,000 Zimbabwean troops in protecting transport corridors during the Mozambican civil war; and active support for South African revolutionary movements through 1990 (Jenkins: 1997, p. 7). Defense spending declined after 1992, when the World Bank reported Zimbabwe to have the third highest defense budget in Africa, after South Africa and Libya (OECD: 1997, p. 25). The goal in 1992 was to reduce the military from 51,000 to 40,000 by the end of the century. No demobilization on this scale ensued. In fact, by 1998, Zimbabwe, eager to demonstrate it still matters in southern Africa, committed what has grown to 11,000 troops supporting the Kabila regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This is despite an economy that has been in free fall since 1997. Zimbabwe's real GDP fell from $645 in 1995 to $437 in 1999. Consumer-price inflation was at 80 percent in mid-2000. The people of Zimbabwe are one-third poorer than they were at independence (Rotberg: 2000).

Ex-combatants continued to be a disgruntled and destabilizing entity in the society—for a long time disgruntled against the government, more recently disgruntled on behalf of the government. During the dissident war, which ended in 1987 when Zapu and Zanu united, many ex-Zipra felt persecuted within the society. Then, a national campaign in the late 1980s and early '90s to venerate war heroes raised ire among non-privileged ex-combatants, who decried the way veterans in the government had forgotten them, and how those in high places with no war experience had superseded them. Many veterans were dying of AIDS. This led to the organization of veterans as a political force in the early 1990s. The government negotiated with the newly organized veterans. Mugabe, protective of his one-party control of the country, offered additional veterans' compensation. Mismanagement of that program and accusations of graft, fraud and abuse fueled further veteran pressure. The government designated 20 percent of all resettlement land to go to ex-combatants in 1995, and in 1997, agreed to pay each "genuine" veteran a lump sum of about $6250 and $600 per month for life. This won the veterans' loyalties to Zanu-PF and Mugabe, but caused the financial crisis described above.

Today, so-called former veterans—some of whom are thugs for hire, too young to have fought in the war—are those attacking white-owned farms at Mugabe's bidding. Mugabe's monopoly on power is threatened by the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which won a significant proportion of legislative seats in the June 2000 parliamentary election with black and white support. This was despite government-sponsored violence against MDC supporters—several dozen were killed—and a doctored electoral process that United Nations monitors refused to sanction. Should Mugabe lose the presidential election scheduled for April 2002, it is feared that he will use the army to remain in power (Economist: 2001, p. 1).

If Zimbabwe remains under the control of Zanu-PF and Robert Mugabe, there appears little chance that a society based on the rule of law, free from the abuse of power, the abrogation of human rights and the use of violence as a means of statecraft will prevail. A complex pattern of events has ensued since Zimbabwe's flawed demobilization and reintegration efforts began. Had the process brought more stability, it might have helped.

Appendix B.
Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration Case Study: Ethiopia

1. The Nature of the Conflict

Until the end of the 19th century, boundaries of the Ethiopian empire were fluid. When Tigrayan princes were in the ascendancy, they extended their influence towards the Red Sea coast of Eritrea, exacting tribute from the Muslim lowland chiefs. From the 16th century the coast plain passed through Ottoman and Egyptian hands before coming under Italian rule in the 1880s. Italy promptly attempted to use it as a base from which to extend its influence into Ethiopia. These hopes were dashed when the Italians were defeated in 1896 by Ethiopian forces of Emperor Menelik in the battle of Adua. The Italians accepted their reverse, and signed treaties with the emperor in 1900, 1902, and 1908 establishing the border between their new colony of Eritrea and Ethiopia. With the rise of fascism under Mussolini, Italy was determined to extend its presence in the Horn. Its invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935 was condemned by the League of Nations, but it was only with the outbreak of the Second World War that the world took a decisive stand against Italian aggression. By 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie had been returned to his throne by a combination force of British, South African, Indian and Sudanese troops fighting alongside Ethiopian patriots.

While Ethiopia was independent once more, the international community was left with the problem of what to do with Eritrea. It was not until 1952 that it was finally decided by the United Nations that the territory should be federated with Ethiopia. The emperor managed to alienate the population by a series of decrees outlawing the teaching of the Eritrean languages, by dismantling industries and removing them to Addis Ababa and by repressing the trade unions and political parties.

By the early 1960s, this repression was being met by armed resistance. In November 1962, after intense pressure from Addis Ababa, the federation was ended and Eritrea was absorbed into Ethiopia. This served to spur on the opposition, led at first by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and then the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in the early 1970s. The EPLF rejected ethnic differences and stood for a secular and socialist state.

Despite military and economic support from the United States, Ethiopia's campaign against Eritrean self-determination did not go well. Discontent inside the Ethiopian army over the conduct of the war and the handling of a devastating famine led to the overthrow of the emperor in 1974. Haile Selassie was replaced by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), known as the Derg. Land, foreign businesses, and church properties were nationalized in the early stages of the Derg regime. A series of

sweeping reforms affected every part of Ethiopian life and destroyed the feudal system completely (Plaut and Gilkes: 1999, pp. 1-4).

By 1977, the politicization of the army had turned the Ethiopian revolution into just another military coup. Idealistic dreams faded as purges, torture and witch-hunts against political opponents in the cities turned into a meaningless bloodbath. This "Red Terror" lasted throughout the late 1970s and conservative estimates say that up to 30,000 people were killed. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as the country's new ruler at this time.

The Derg never managed to reach a peace agreement with the Eritrean rebels. It also failed to tackle demands in Tigray, Oromo and Somali. Several armed resistance movements were formed, the most important of which were the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the OLF.

Saved by the Soviet Union and Cuba from defeat in 1978, the Derg government remained firmly in the communist camp for the rest of the Cold War. Socialist, central planning of the economy was introduced, and a restrictive agricultural policy gave little incentive for farmers. Price controls and interference in marketing led to a mediocre production of food and cash crops. Ethiopia became the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, controlled by a single party, the Worker's Party of Ethiopia. Open political dissent was dangerous, and rare. Large numbers of political prisoners were detained and a powerful security apparatus silenced all but a few critics.

The civil war ravaged Ethiopia in the 1980s. Brutalized by a ferocious but incompetent leadership, 100,000 soldiers of the Derg Army died. The former rebel movements are reluctant to release full details of the deaths on their side but in Eritrea and Ethiopia combined, their losses were possibly almost as high. Civilians suffered on both sides of the front lines. In the government-held areas, forced conscription and arbitrary taxation devastated communities and in liberated areas, the Ethiopian Air Force bombed and burned schools, clinics and villages in an attempt to terrify people into resisting the rebels. Napalm and cluster bombs were used on civilian targets. Hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans and Eritreans became refugees in Sudan, fleeing the war and famine.

In the most notorious atrocity of the war, a key market town in Tigray, Hawzie, was bombed by Mengistu's Air Force in June 1988. As MiG bombers pounded the town, helicopter gunships strafed thousands of fleeing civilians. At least 1,800 people died in that single day (Parker: 1996, pp. 1-2).

2. The End of the Civil War

The EPLF achieved major successes in Eritrea from late 1987 onwards, and the TPLF dislodged Government forces from Tigray in 1989. An attempted coup in May 1989 failed to oust Col. Mengistu, but in February 1990 the EPLF took the port of Massawa and the northern third of the country—with the exception of an enclave around Asmara—was under rebel control.

On May 28 1991, the forces of the EPRDF, a coalition of opposition groups let by the TPLF, entered Addis Ababa as resistance by Government troops collapsed. Only one week earlier, Mengistu had fled the country (UNDP: 2001, p. 7).

In fact, the civil war really came to an end at the point when the Government could no longer continue the conflict. First, there was a sharp reduction in the flow of Russian munitions to the Derg as the Cold War wound down. Second, the Derg found it increasingly difficult to maintain its very high rate of expropriation of resources through taxation of the population. Third, the Government had run a very large domestic budget deficit through the 1980s that was unsustainable (Bevan: 2001, p, 3).

The Tigrayan-led EPRDF forces emerged as winners in the civil war, establishing authority over most parts of the country. The EPRDF inherited a war-torn economy and a country shattered by political conflicts, recurrent drought and inappropriate policies. A conference on a peaceful and democratic transition in early July 1991 approved a Transitional Charter and formed an 87-member Council of Representatives, composed of representative from numerous ethnic and political movements. The charter provides for basic human rights, as well as self-determination by all "nationalities" within Ethiopia who so wish. The Tigrayans attempted to re-form the Ethiopian state along ethnic lines. They shaped the constitution to allow for a "voluntary union of the nationalities of Ethiopia." The Council elected Mr. Meles Zenawi, leader of the TPLF, as the President of the newly formed TGE.

During the July 1991 conference, agreement was reached on Eritrea's right to self-determination, ending nearly 30 years of civil war. A referendum in April 1993 established Eritrea as an independent state.

Although military activity had centered on the north of Ethiopia during the civil war, serious conflagrations between the EPRDF and internal and external forces had occurred in the eastern part of the country on various occasions. Moreover, anti-TGE peasant uprisings occurred in the south and northeastern parts of the country during this period. In the summer of 1992, political differences over the procedures for declaring Oromia a free nation precipitated the withdrawal of the OLF from the TGE, and the conflict soon escalated into violent confrontation. The EPRDF eventually defeated the OLF and captured 21,200 OLF fighters.[13]

3. Planning for Demobilization and Reintegration

The defeat of the Derg's army and the demise of the regime left about half a million soldiers dispersed across the country. Most ex-soldiers returned to their homes by

[13] Since then, there have been sporadic violent clashes between government forces and surviving elements of the OLF. However, the government has the situation under control and recent attacks attributed to the OLF have been more akin to banditry than a continuation of the armed struggle against the regime (George: 1997, p. 10).

themselves but some fled to Sudan and Kenya. Soon after the takeover the new government decided to formally demobilize the defeated Derg soldiers. Only three weeks after its accession to power, the TGE established the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Former Soldiers and Disabled War Ex-Combatants, widely known as the Tehadisso ("Reintegration") Commission.

The directives for the establishment of the Commission clearly defined who would be considered members of the former army, as well as disabled ex-combatants. The directives also stipulated the objectives, powers and duties of the Commission. An advisory council, chaired by the Commissioner was formed. Members of the council included the Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation and Vice Ministers of nine relevant ministries as well as representatives of appropriate agencies.

Figure 2. Map of Ethiopia

A. Political, Economic and Social Conditions

Political. Given the extremely far-reaching changes to the formal system of governance in Ethiopia since the early 1990s, there seems to be surprisingly little dislocation or evidence of widespread dissent. The evolution of the economy, of economic policy and the operation of government itself seems to have exhibited the sort of continuity which might have been expected under an extension of the old centralized system. There might be several explanations.

First, the civil war was not a conflict between parties holding fundamentally different ideologies. Both the Derg and the EPRDF shared much the same ideological vision and subscribed to a state-socialist perspective. Consequently, the end of the war did not signal a switch away from Marxist-Leninist precepts. In fact, in 1990 the Derg had accepted the inevitability of increasing the role of market mechanisms and had moved towards liberalizing the economy (Bevan: 2001, pp. 1-2).

Second, although the EPRDF was the clear military victor in the civil war (outside of Eritrea), it espoused a policy of political powersharing among the different factions involved in the conflict. The factions signed the charter, founding the TGE, and promised to hold free and fair national elections within three years, agreeing that the country would be a federal state consisting of 14 autonomous regions.[14] Each region has its own elected assembly and selects representatives to the federal parliament. Some argue that the formal separation of regions into autonomous units is irrelevant as long as the EPRDF exercises real power. Within the regions there are zones, which are divided into woredas of on average 100,000 people. The woredas are the key units of local government, central to the provision of public services. The woredas are further divided into electoral units called kebeles where community grassroots participation takes place. The EPRDF and affiliated parties effectively manage this process across most of the country. The EPRDF won a landslide victory in 1995 elections; however, almost all the country's opposition groups boycotted the elections.

Third, due to the prolonged internal conflict, disputes over possible policy choices were dominated by the immediate needs generated by the extensive damage to the infrastructure, the poor state of social and other services, and the prevalence of poverty (Bevan: 2001, p. 10).

Fourth, despite the great ethnic, cultural and ecological diversity of the Ethiopian people, they have a rather coherent national view of the proper business of the state (Bevan: 2001, p. 10). While there have been several regional uprisings—the one in Oromia being the most substantial—for the most part the political process in Ethiopia has remained peaceful.[15] The government has been accused, however, of suppressing opposition parties, editors of the private press and leaders of labor organizations who challenge the EPRDF through harassment and repeated detention.

Economic. The country at the time of the demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) had a very low per capita income, and an infrastructure that had always been inadequate but had been further damaged by the war and by the repercussions of state socialism. This damage included physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, etc, but it also involved institutional structures such as markets and regular economic migration. Private as well as public investment was very low, so the overall productive capacity of the economy was probably deteriorating despite the explicit damage (Bevan: 2001, p. 3).

[14] The regional units created are overtly ethnic in character and were intended to codify and express ethnic differentiation from the outset. The regions even have the explicit right, given certain checks and balances, to secede from the federation or to re-configure themselves in various ways.

[15] There were also been reports of political instability and armed activity of forces hostile to the TGE in Somali, Gondor, Eastern Harerge, the Ogaden, and Gambela. Tensions have also remained high along the border with Somalia where the government has responded to incursions by the fundamentalist Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (Islamic Unity) by striking at its strongholds across the border and by backing armed factions in Somalia opposed to Al-Ittihad.

The urban labor market also had a significant impact on the reintegration phase of the DRP. At the end of the 1980s, the public sector was by far the most important employer, and, in general, wage employment was more important to urban incomes than self-employment or informal sector employment. But the economic reforms of the 1990s altered this picture. Retrenchment and an end to job guarantees to university graduates resulted in a substantial reduction in public employment. By the early 1990s, the urban job market was under severe pressure, and this was compounded by the addition of a large number of demobilized soldiers.

Social. Almost 75% of ex-combatants seem to have returned to their previous communities. Therefore, their social capital, the informal networks with family, relatives and community members, was probably still intact at the time of their arrival. On the other hand, many ex-combatants found their families and relatives killed or dispersed, and many wives had remarried.[16] In these cases it depended on the ex-combatant's relationship with the community as to when he/she would be accepted. The longer the duration of military service, the higher the rates of separation and divorce. Many ex-combatants also became frustrated by the difficult living conditions to which they had returned (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 79).

Interviews suggest that female ex-combatants had greater difficulties in social reintegration. Having lived an army life for some time, many were no longer willing to accept traditional family roles. This was seen particularly with ex-combatants returning to rural areas. Many Derg soldiers had also been recruited as boys and by force. On their return, they were likely to find the men who had forcibly recruited them still in their villages. Resentment between victim and culprit was likely to arise, placing child soldiers under a formidable psychological and social challenge (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 79).

B. Rationale

The TGE had three reasons for demobilizing the ex-combatants. First, the TGE felt that soldiers of the disintegrated army posed a threat to the security of the country. Accounts of Derg soldiers' involvement in banditry were common. Furthermore, there was a feeling that the large number of Derg soldiers who had fled the country, especially the 51,000 in the Sudan, could potentially destabilize Ethiopia and indeed the Horn of Africa region.

Second, the option of temporarily integrating the vanquished Derg soldiers into an expanded new Ethiopian army was dismissed. The TGE concluded that Ethiopia's torn social and economic fabric could not afford a large army and that its policy focus should be on the economic rehabilitation and development of the country. Furthermore, the TGE

[16] Some of the soldiers who had been in Eritrea for up to 20 years had taken second families or formed liaisons with Eritrean women. This was underlined when the EPLF expelled at least 65,000 Eritrea women and their half-Ethiopian children, significantly increasing the number of civilian displaced in Ethiopia.

felt there was no external or internal security threat to justify the maintenance of such a large army.

Third, most of the Derg soldiers had been conscripted, often forcibly, to join the Derg military and were eager to return to civilian life.

C. Objectives

The TGE had several objectives for its ambitious DRP. The *security* objectives included disarming the ex-combatants, dispersing them to their home communities in a transparent matter, reducing the possibility of former combatants resorting to criminal or political violence, and facilitating a restructuring and professionalization of the military.

The *political* goals of the Ethiopian DRP included strengthening the democratic government, consolidating national unity and reducing fractional strife. On the *fiscal* level, the DRP would allow the Government to reduce public expenditures on unproductive (military) activities and transfer resources to productive sectors.

Lastly, the *economic* objectives for the DRP included

- Encouraging the resumption of normal economic activities free of security concerns (for example, banditry)
- Enhancing economic stability
- Facilitating the return of ex-soldiers to productive activities, thereby minimizing the possibility of aggravating already serious unemployment levels
- Improving the skills of ex-soldiers so that they could market themselves in civil society

The employment of ex-soldiers in the private sector or their engagement in self-employment would help them to become self-supporting and contribute to the economic revitalization of the economy (Colletta, pp. 28-29).

D. Resources

The Commission's DRP received substantial financial assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors and international NGOs. Although such support was indispensable for ensuring the program's success, donor involvement seems to have hindered success in some areas. The TGE has repeatedly claimed that the assistance of a number of donors was driven by self-interest and characterized by a lack of relevance to Ethiopian needs.

From mid-July 1991 onward, the TGE, donors and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began discussions on the terms under which ex-combatants could be repatriated to their communities. At the same time, resettlement and reintegration planning began under the auspices of a Demobilization Technical Committee (DTC), which was established by donors and in which the TGE was represented by the

Commission. The task of the associated steering committee was to mobilize resources, while the DTC's primary objective was to identify cost-effective strategies to reintegrate rapidly a large number of impoverished and unskilled ex-combatants. A subcommittee of the DTC, consisting of experts from the World Bank and the ILO, was responsible for appraising and revising the TGE's initial reintegration proposal before it was approved by the DTC.

By September 1991, the donor group had agreed in an Aide-Memoire to pledge funds in the amount the US$154 million to a two-phase, training-oriented program. This program had been originally submitted by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) and adopted by the TGE after a two-month process of negotiation. The understanding of the Commission was that this Aide-Memoire would ensure funds availability for the program.

Following intensive discussions and another "outside" appraisal report, the Commission assumed ownership of the final version of the proposal and expected the donor community to honor previous pledges. By this time, however, the donors decided this plan was unrealistic. Some donors argued that the needs of the ex-combatants would best be addressed in the context of an integrated social action program. At this point, the relationship between donors and the Commission temporarily dissolved.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) then funded a consultant agreement, which presented its recommendation in early February 1992. On the basis of this report, negotiations between the Commission and donors recommenced. The new proposal stressed reintegration into society at large rather than training. To the Commission this was essentially a revision of the TGE's program.

The Commission's demobilization activities proceeded independently of the negotiations with donors with the TGE borrowing funds from the Ministry of Finance. Eventually, the Commission accomplished the provision of a transitional safety net only with the assistance of the ICRC and Ethiopian Red Crescent Society (ERCS), which distributed food aid to urban and rural beneficiaries for the first three months of the ex-combatants demobilization.

Many donors and agencies were unable to provide rapid and effective financial or technical assistance to the demobilization and reinsertion program. Among the donors and the TGE, there was a lack of agreement as to whether relief/rehabilitation, development or political criteria should be used to determine program priorities. Such disagreement was in large part responsible for the delay in preparing a concerted donor response to the TGE's request for support. Once agreement had been reached, donors failed to develop effective and timely response mechanisms.

In March 1992, the TGE finally took ownership of the UNDP-revised program and the donor community endorsed the proposal because it appeared a more viable and cost-effective way of assisting in the resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants. Italy,

the United States, Japan and the European Commission (EC) pledged 52,360 tons of food, US$79 million in hard currency and ETB 117 million counterpart funds to the new program. The TGE was to cover the administrative costs and salaries of local staff amounting to ETB 3.8 million.

With full confidence in the donor's integrity, the Commission began implementing the program in both rural and urban areas. Pledged assistance, however, often did not arrive on time, even when the requisite agreement and formalities had been completed. This forced the TGE to revise the content, scope and timetable of the program and to divert resources from other programs to keep the reintegration process going.

It's virtually impossible to provide a precise account of the total costs and financing of the Ethiopian DRP for several reasons. First, many of the expenditures during the emergency demobilization phase cannot be properly established. Many interventions have been implemented simultaneously without necessarily sharing pertinent information to the government. Different organizations also had different categorization of the DRP phases than the Commission. In addition, the devaluation of the ETB during the DRP process further complicates calculations of foreign contributions.

4. How Was the DRP Implemented and Managed?

Implementing a demobilization and reintegration program in a country emerging from war with little institutional capacity and a lack of administrative coherence was a formidable task. A substantial number of agencies were, therefore, involved in the Ethiopian DRP. As stated above, first among them was the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans. During the three phases of DRP, the Commission received direct implementation assistance from other Ethiopian government departments, NGOs and bilateral donors.

A. Organization

The Commission is not part of the regular government structure. Legally, it is under the Ministry of Defense, but this ministry has never had any influence in the Commission's operations. In practice, the Commission is under the Prime Minister's Office and is supervised by an Advisory Committee.

Representation in the field was crucial for successful program implementation. Therefore, the Commission established field offices at the same time that ex-combatants were transported from discharge centers to their destinations. The Commission eventually set up seven regional executive offices and 36 branch offices.

The executive offices reported difficulties to higher authorities or relevant line ministries and created guidelines for overcoming these difficulties in conjunction with the Advisory Committee. The branch offices organized and coordinated field implementation.

Headquarters staff regularly interacted with the branch office staff. The field-based staff was mostly EPRDF ex-combatants. They also acted as outreach staff. Two-to-four ex-combatants were assigned to each branch office. In many cases, they were familiar with the problems and opportunities at the localities. In fact, the use of ex-combatants seems to have been a major factor in the successful implementation of the program. Most combatants, even those from the Derg army, accepted them. Their main responsibility was to solve ex-combatant social or program-related problems. Ex-combatants also collected information, registered new ex-combatants and counseled their former opponents.

B. Targeting participants in the DRP

The ex-combatants who were demobilized were comprised of former Derg soldiers (approx. 454,559), OLF fighters (approx. 21,000) and ENDF soldiers (approx. 30,000). Socio-economic data on ex-combatants was collected in the discharge centers, including information on education, skills, and work experience. From this information the following characteristics of ex-combatants have been deduced:

- Many ex-soldiers had stayed in the war front and not visited their families for a prolonged period of time; thus, many did not know the whereabouts of their family.
- With the exception of high-ranking officers, the majority of ex-combatants were undernourished although their health status was generally good, irrespective of their duration of service.
- 30% of ex-soldiers were below the age of 25 when joining the army.
- Approximately 50% of the ex-combatants were married with the rate being higher in rural areas. Just over half of the ex-combatants had children to support.
- Over 50% had not gone beyond primary school, and close to 10% were illiterate. Most were unskilled or had low skill level.
- Most came from poor families, and none but a few had the resource necessary to start a civilian life [17] (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 36).

The Commission classified the ex-combatants into four categories for the reintegration packages:

- Rural settlers
- Urban settlers
- Disabled ex-combatants
- War veterans covered under the pension scheme

[17] Most of these insights were based on information about the ex-Derg soldiers.

Almost equal numbers of Derg ex-soldiers returned to rural and urban areas. The OLF ex-combatants tended to be more rural based. Those who were willing to return to rural areas were further classified into three groups:

- Crop farmers
- Coffee farmers
- Pastoralists

Those ex-Derg soldiers who expressed their desire to live in urban areas included those with urban upbringing as well as those who, although of rural background, were in the army for long periods of time, and hence, were exposed and used to urban life. This group also included the majority of the elite of the Derg and OLF armies.

A distinct subgroup of ex-combatants was the approximately 37,500 disabled Derg. In the centers, medical personnel classified disabled ex-combatants according to type and severity of injury into three categories:

- The less severely disabled: the person did not require further medical treatment and was directed into the mainstream reintegration program.
- The moderately impaired: the person required medical treatment and special training before they could be reintegrated.
- The more severely disabled: the person's injury precluded any training or placement in productive activities.

Derg and OLF ex-combatants were covered under the same pension scheme. Those who were 45 years or older and who served in an army for at least 20 years were eligible for a government pension. All disabled ex-combatants were eligible for pension benefits as well, irrespective of their disabilities (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 64).

C. Demobilization

The Commission set up a demobilization program that included the following phases:

- Call to assembly
- Encampment at discharge centers (this included disarmament)
- Pre-discharge orientation
- Transportation

This approach allowed the Commission to conduct a thorough needs assessment to facilitate planning for resettlement and reintegration programs. The encampment phase also allowed the Commission to screen ex-combatants in order to identify possible wanted criminals. In addition, the TGE was adamant that ex-combatants should not be allowed to leave the centers without appropriate material and moral support (Fenton, p. 9).

i. Implementation

Call to Assembly. In July 1991, Derg ex-soldiers were ordered through television, radio and newspaper to present themselves for demobilization at nine discharge (or transit) centers. Former Derg military training centers and well as RRC camps located in Addis Ababa, Adigrat, Bahir Dar, Botar Tole, Dedessa, Haik, Hurso, Kombolcha, and Tatek were chosen to serve as transit centers (the population in these centers ranged from 5,000 to 45,000). The Derg ex-soldiers filtered into the camps in two batches. Initially, 365,000 soldiers reported to the closest discharge centers where they were provided with minimal shelter, sustenance, and health services. Once it became apparent that soldiers in the centers were not being maltreated, but rather were receiving benefits, another 90,000 soldiers showed up to participate in the demobilization program (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 42).

The call for assembly, however, became a point of contention between the TGE and the donor community. While donors acknowledged the TGE's humanitarian and security concerns, most felt unable to support what they viewed as "detention" centers. Donors and the ICRC were especially concerned that the centers would be associated with political re-screening and reeducation. Repeatedly, the TGE stated that the discharge centers were not political detention camps but a way to facilitate orderly demobilization and reintegration.

At the end of the civil war, many Derg ex-soldiers fled to neighboring countries, especially Sudan. In accordance with a tripartite agreement between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Government of Sudan, and the TGE, UNHCR repatriated 50,888 ex-combatants from Kassala, Sudan. During their encampment in Kassala, the ex-combatants were provided with food from WFP and registered by UNHCR. They were eventually repatriated using the Sudanese and Ethiopian national airlines. After they arrived in Ethiopia, the Commission registered them at the airports and issued identification cards, entitling them to reinsertion and reintegration assistance.

A similar operation was undertaken for 1,375 ex-soldiers who were repatriated by air from Djibouti. On the other hand, the 80,000 soldiers and students who had fled to Kenya were repatriated by road directly to their respective communities and families. Once repatriated, the returnees were treated much like those who had stayed in Ethiopia. Most of them were only registered at their point of disembarkation and then transported to the destination of choice. The high-ranking Derg officers among this group, however, were first transported to the discharge center at Botar Tole and provided with pre-discharge orientation.

The 21,200 OLF ex-combatants were interned in two military camps, Dedessa Camp (Welega Region) and Dedessa (Harerge Region), for a six-month period. The same

socioeconomic data was collected on this group and they received the same pre-discharge orientation.

Disarmament. The Derg soldiers captured by the EPRDF or EPLF had already been disarmed before demobilization. Those Derg ex-soldiers still possessing weapons were advised by the TGE through mass media to report to the nearest village to surrender their arms. Civilians were also asked to report when they saw ex-Derg soldiers with weapons. When the ex-combatants surrendered their weapons, the local peace and stability committee issued them receipts. The weapons were handed over to the EPRDF and are now in the possession of the ENDF. Around 51,000 former Derg soldiers in Sudan and 28,000 in Djibouti surrendered their weapons to authorities in the refugee camps[18] (Ayalew and Dercon: 2000, p. 144). While many weapons remained at large, this weapons-collection policy appears to have caused insecurity only sporadically, in some areas (Ayalew and Dercon: 2000, p. 170).

Encampment. A lack of food, potable water, and shelter combined with overcrowding and the poor physical condition of the ex-combatants posed a serious health risk. This was further exacerbated by the arrival of the main rains in mid-June. Several soldiers died from outbreaks of fever and chronic upper respiratory tract infections. Sexually transmitted diseases were also a serious problem. There was constant movement of ex-soldiers in and out of the centers, however, preventing the outbreak of major diseases.

Overcrowding and the long periods of detention contributed to serious security problems within some of the camps. For example, in Bahir Dar, the absence of EPRDF resulted in inmates enforcing a type of vigilante justice. The security situation was compounded by the fact that about 2,000 petty criminals who had been incarcerated in Asmara prior to the EPLF victory were mixed with ex-soldiers in several centers (Fenton: 1994, p. 9).

Serious discord between the TGE and donors continued in regard to the encampment and the duration of detention. Donors argued that the rapid release and repatriation of the ex-soldiers would enhance the TGE's reputation for reconciliation and reduce the threat of instability. They also felt the unsatisfactory conditions in the centers justified rapid repatriation on humanitarian grounds. The TGE, on the other hand, felt that a six-month encampment phase allowed the Commission to register the ex-combatants, screen for criminals, and provide orientation. Moreover, the Commission had to establish a detailed list of the destinations of all the soldiers to create a transportation plan.

The total encampment phase ultimately lasted more than six months, due to the scale of the operation and funding delays. Some ex-soldiers were kept in the camps for much shorter periods ranging from a few weeks to a couple of months. OLF ex-fighters were kept in the camps for a six-month period. For the most part, the duration of individual encampment did not appear unreasonable.

[18] There was a flow of arms to neighboring countries such as Kenya, Djibouti and Sudan, though information is scant on this issue.

Predischarge Program. The TGE claimed that many of the Derg soldiers had been subjected to intense ethnic and antisocial indoctrination over long periods of time and required social and political counseling. Within the camps, ex-combatants were "encouraged to participate in group discussions organized to make former soldiers understand the causes of war and help them part with some undesirable habits they might have developed while in service with the army and at the same time prepare them for a post-war civilian life" (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 46). The purpose of these orientation session were, therefore, to help assuage feelings of hopelessness and militarism and to address antisocial behavior. In addition, in-depth discussions were held on the causes of war and the need to establish a civil and democratic society. Despite donor fears, it does not appear that ex-combatants were subjected to coercion, indoctrination or intimidation in the political reeducation program. The Commission claims that ex-combatants voluntarily participated in the sessions and decided themselves what to discuss.[19]

The orientation in the centers included some general information, for example, on deforestation and AIDS. For the most part, however, the orientation focused on political topics at the expense of socioeconomic topics that might have better prepared the ex-combatants for a successful civilian life. In fact, these sessions, may have contributed to ex-combatants' unrealistic expectations about their reintegration.

Transportation. The final task in the Ethiopian demobilization phase was transportation of the ex-combatants from the centers and camps to their community of origin or destination of choice. Transportation was primarily by road supplied by ICRC/ERCS in close cooperation with the Commission. They used the time during the encampment phase to develop schedules and mobilize transportation. On termination of the pre-discharge orientation sessions, the majority of ex-soldiers were transported first to the transit center in Nazret and subsequently to the zonal centers closest to their final destination. Some ex-combatants received a travel allowance and food sufficient to find their way home independently. Upon arrival, all ex-combatants were required to report to the respective branch office. The transportation phase was managed speedily and effectively (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 47).

ii. Organizations Involved in Demobilization

The TGE, through the Tehadisso Commission, completed its demobilization efforts with very little resource support from the donor community. The Commission was responsible for overall implementation and coordination, registration and data collection, pre-discharge orientation and negotiations with donors. Other agencies within the Ethiopian government also provided important services during demobilization. The Ministry of Defense was responsible for the disarmament of ex-combatants in the discharge centers, tracing the whereabouts of ex-Derg soldiers not reporting and providing necessary

[19] Unlike their Derg counterparts, OLF ex-combatants did complain about this treatment.

security. The Ministry of Transport provided vehicles for transportation of ex-combatants from the discharge centers to their home communities.

Non-governmental organizations and international organizations provided essential assistance during the demobilization phase. UNHCR was responsible for the repatriation of ex-combatants from neighboring countries. WFP provided food aid at the discharge centers. ICRC/ERCS managed the discharge centers and provided food and health care. They were also instrumental in the transportation of ex-combatants.

There was also some limited bilateral assistance during this phase. The US Department of Defense provided food in the form of "Meals Ready to Eat" (MREs) and tents for the discharge centers. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) also provided transportation for the OLF ex-fighters to their home communities.

iii. Program Perception by Ex-combatants

In general, the demobilization was well received by the ex-combatants. For the most part, the ex-combatants were disciplined and crime did not occur on a systematic or serious level. Many ex-combatants were in fact in a state of shock and were generally happy that the war was over. The unrest that did occur happened in centers where ex-combatants were encamped for long periods, in overcrowded conditions.

D. Reinsertion

Reinsertion pertains to the short-term period of approximately six-to-twelve months after demobilization. During this phase, the ex-combatants face the challenge of establishing a civilian household (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 49). The reinsertion program provided a "transitional safety-net" package to overcome the immediate problems of ex-combatants during the return to their localities. The package consisted of cash and in-kind assistance starting immediately on the ex-combatants reporting to their kebeles and the local Commission office in their respective communities.

i. Implementation

The financial and in-kind assistance differed according to location of settlement and duration of service. Ex-combatants who received other benefits—pensions or placement in public office, for example—were not eligible for cash payments. Rural settlers received a transitional allowance of ETB 137, food rations for ten months (with an extension for the needy), free health care until full reintegration, and provision of land and housing reconstruction assistance. Urban settlers received a transition allowance of ETB 137, a monthly stipend of ETB 50 for seven months, food rations for seven months, and free health care until full reintegration.

Ex-combatants with fewer than 18 months of service received a transition allowance of ETB 137 and food rations for six months. The moderately disabled ex-combatants received a one-year food allowance and six-month rent allowance. The same type of

reinsertion assistance was applicable to Derg, OLF, and ENDF ex-combatants. While the program was not focused on ex-combatant dependents, free health care to dependents was provided in this program.

ii. Organizations Involved in Reinsertion

The Commission provided overall implementation and coordination for the reinsertion program and provided the monthly stipends. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) also provided monthly stipends to a targeted group among urban settlers because they felt the stipend provided by the Commission was inadequate.

ICRC/ERCS Food provided aid distribution for the first three months. The RRC provided food aid distribution for the remaining period. The Ministry of Health provided health services for the ex-combatants and their families.

E. Reintegration

Reintegration refers to a long-term period during which ex-combatants gradually become "normal" community members both in social and economic terms. The TGE decided that the ex-combatants needed targeted social and economic reintegration assistance for two reasons. First, they were deemed a special needs population, who lacked marketable skills. Second, the ex-combatants posed a potential threat to security with their access to arms, their training, and the desperate economic condition of the country at the time of the demobilization.

The TGE took a "minimalist" approach to reintegration by simply providing basic needs. Given limited resources, this approach ensured that the maximum number of ex-combatants could be supported. Additionally, it reduced the risk of antagonizing civilian communities by creating a privileged subgroup.

The TGE also adopted an integrated and simple institutional structure and management with decentralized decision making. To minimize potential conflicts of interest at the community level, the involvement of beneficiaries, local administrations and communities in decision making was enhanced. The Commission also utilized existing government and NGO manpower, technical resources and infrastructure to improve the coverage and success of the program.

iii. Implementation

Distinct programs were designed and implemented for the four target groups based on their needs.

Rural Settlers. The Commission extended material and technical assistance to help ex-combatants engage in subsistence agriculture. The support provided in the rural reintegration program included:

- **Provision of land.** The Commission claims that nearly all ex-combatants who returned to rural areas received land for cultivation. In cases where there was a problem with access to land, public land or land that the Derg had set aside for farmers' cooperatives was used. Ex-combatants, however, frequently complained about the quality of the land they received.
- **Provision of basic agricultural inputs.** This included seeds, fertilizers, tools and implements. Settlers who failed to attain a sustainable standard of living in the first year received inputs for a second crop year.
- **Supply of plough oxen and heifers.** These were provided to the most vulnerable among the crop producers and pastoralists. Due to resource constraints, only 1/3 of the ex-combatants received oxen/heifer, although the initial plan was to distribute one plough ox or heifer to all those returning to rural areas. Some members of the donor community felt that the Commission's intentions were too generous in comparison to the average Ethiopian peasant. To fund the program, the Commission diverted funds from other areas and was supported by NGOs.

The rural reintegration program itself did not contain extension services targeted explicitly at ex-combatants. The Ministry of Agriculture covered them under its regular program. The community provided any additional technical assistance. For example, communities assisted them in constructing houses with materials and labor and helped in working the fields (Colletta, et al.: 1995, p. 56).

Humera Resettlement Scheme. The TGE demobilized approximately 30,000 soldiers (mainly TPLF fighters) as a part of its restructuring of the ENDF. Significant portions of these soldiers were encouraged to participate in the Humera Resettlement scheme for cotton growing. Instead of returning to their original communities, participants were resettled on sparsely populated land in western Tigray. The communities of origin of many of these ex-TPLF soldiers were under population strain and were in drought prone regions. Far fewer people live in Humera, which, although potentially fertile, is lowland historically plagued by malaria and snakes.

Urban settlers. The reintegration of the urban ex-combatants was more complex and difficult than that of the rural ex-combatants because of the diverse social and economic backgrounds of the ex-combatants, the tight of the urban labor market and the different measures required to assist this group. The Commission introduced various reintegration schemes including:

- **Public sector employment creation.** The ENDF absorbed 6,000 ex-combatants who had specialized skills. The Ministry of Health employed 1,400 health

practitioners. Another 39,300 were provided contractual employment as drivers, guards or short-term public works programs.

- **Employment referral and skills verification.** The Commission issued skill certificates for those who acquired technical, electrical, driving and construction skills during their tenure in the military.
- **Formal education.** The Commission encouraged ex-combatants who had not completed their studies (secondary and post-secondary) to resume them by facilitated applications and overriding entrance formalities, such as overriding entrance deadlines.
- **Vocational training programs.** The objective of this training was to impart or upgrade skills in order to enhance the employment potential of the ex-combatants. While in training, participants received some cash and accommodation and transportation allowance when training took place outside their place of residence. The Commission, other government agencies, NGOs and international donors and organizations sponsored training.
- **Revolving Credit Fund.** The objective of the fund was to assist ex-combatants who received training but did not possess the capital or collateral to secure loans from commercial banks. The beneficiaries were not required to produce collateral but the Commission established guidelines to ensure repayment of the principal. Beneficiaries were encouraged to form cooperatives and higher numbers of participants were encouraged to increase coverage while decreasing per capita costs. The TGE asked USAID to support the fund, but they declined because they questioned the financial stability of the program.

Disabled ex-combatants. The approximately 20,000 less severely disabled ex-combatants who did not required long-term medical care were absorbed into the mainstream reintegration program. The 15,208 moderately impaired ex-combatants with treatable disabilities (including those needing prosthetic or orthopedic devices) were eligible for vocational training at specialized centers. They were also provided with the necessary materials to start a productive life, such as tools and raw materials. The more severely injured ex-combatants were given institutional care.

War veterans under the pension scheme. Derg ex-soldiers and OLF ex-fighters who are 45 years and older are covered under the same pension scheme. Around 300 soldiers and their families held a demonstration in April 1996, requesting government to keep its promise of pension payments or otherwise to refund their base contribution during service (Ayalew and Dercon: 2000, p. 141).

Additional Programs. Bilateral and multilateral organizations and NGOs, in collaboration with the Commission, participated in reintegration support. These programs included:

- **German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) Reintegration Programme**. The objective of this program was to promote employment and income opportunities. The program sponsored food and/or cash-for-work projects, provided agricultural inputs and hand tools, sponsored training programs, supported small-scale income generating projects using credit and/or grants, provided a salary subside scheme, and assisted in low-cost house construction for disabled veterans.
- **Catholic Relief Services (CRS) rehabilitation fund**. CRS initiated small-scale credit schemes for micro-enterprise activities targeting a limited number of ex-combatants.
- **Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund (ESRF)**. Initiated by the World Bank, the objective of the ESRF was to assist community-based income-generating activities for displaced people, demobilized soldiers and other poor socioeconomic groups.
- **OXFAM (UK/Ireland)**. OXFAM also directly participated in reintegration support for demobilized soldiers, mainly through rural development programs.

ii. Organizations Involved in Reintegration

The Commission was responsible for overall implementation and coordination of urban, rural, disabled reintegration programs. Several other government agencies supported the reintegration program. The Ministry of Agriculture provided seeds, fertilizers, and tools for rural settlers and employed any ex-combatants in public works. The Ministry of Education provided formal education to ex-combatants, while the Ministry of Labor was responsible for skills certification and vocational training. The Ministry of Defense managed the reintegration of ENDF ex-soldiers and integrated 6,000 ex-Derg soldiers into the ENDF. At the grassroots level, community committees procured seeds, oxen and heifers or rural ex-combatants, issued plots of land, distributed agricultural inputs and identified the needy beneficiaries.

As stated above, NGOs, international organizations and bilateral donors also played important roles in the reintegration. The African International Development Bank (AIDB) implemented the Revolving Credit Fund. GTZ, CRS and OXFAM sponsored several reintegration programs for both broad and targeted assistance.

iv. Program Perception by Population and Ex-combatants

Complaints about the reintegration program from both the communities receiving the ex-combatants and the ex-combatants themselves were relatively few. Given the depth of poverty, the length of time since the conclusion of the war, and the lack of reconciliation

in some areas, some community members did resent the fact that ex-combatants received special assistance. The level of resentment was increased when an ex-combatant was unwilling to work and could not sustain himself/herself economically and continued to be a burden to the community.

To address the problem of resentment, community members were involved in decision making as much as possible. For example, community representatives were included in the committees that managed assistance to ex-combatants at the community level. Furthermore, CRS required all beneficiaries to donate 5% of their assistance to local authorities for use in community-promoting projects. Indirectly, public works programs sponsored by the Commission, GTZ and CRS also benefited the community at-large.

Recently, as stated above, some veterans groups did organize protests about the pension plan, claiming that they have not received the proper payments.

5. Was the Ethiopian Demobilization and Reintegration Program a Success?

In general, the Ethiopian demobilization and reintegration process was considered a success by the government and the donors. At least 70% of the Derg and OLF ex-combatants benefited from various programs. Logistical problems appear to have been kept at a minimum and resources were used efficiently with low administrative costs. The lion's share of the cost was borne by the government although over time, the donors provided assistance to complete the process. There are indicators of targeting inefficiency, but no evidence that this directly hindered reintegration.[20]

The security situation appears to have been relatively stable during and following the demobilization program. Arms were collected, although no figures are available about the amount gathered. Following the demobilization there was no increase in insecurity from criminal behavior that might have been expected. The government was able to maintain the overall security situation and establish itself as a credible authority in this area.

Studies show that reintegration appears to have been successful in that the ex-combatants are in the same economic situation as their counterparts and share the same level of poverty. In particular, demobilized soldiers in rural communities have not faced major problems in gaining access to land.[21] Most ex-combatants returned to poor communities and remain as poor as their fellow citizens, thus indicating that they received little benefit from their time in the army. The ex-combatants do appear to be more vulnerable in times of need (that is, drought) due to their lower level of assets, particularly livestock.

[20] See Ayalew, Dercon and Krishnan, *Demobilization, Land and Household Livelihoods: Lessons from Ethiopia* for more information.

[21] The demobilization has initiated land reform policies because ex-combatants received land at the expense of other households or were provided with marginal or infertile land (Ayalew, Dercon, Krishnan, p. 16).

Reintegration into the rural community may have been easier because of the degree of community support. Communities are very sympathetic to the destitution of any of their members. For example, ex-combatants could benefit from the traditional labor-sharing agreement that is a common practice in rural Ethiopia[22] (Ayalew and Dercon: 2000, p. 132). Although some ex-combatants did not participate in the formal assistance process, but were able to get assistance from their communities, friends and relatives.

Urban settlers faced a more difficult time in reintegration because of tough labor markets and a lack of marketable skills. The end of the war led to a decrease in public sector employment, which was the primary source of jobs in urban areas. There is also a negative attitude towards private sector jobs and self-employment. Reform programs and reintegration schemes do not seem to have generated an adequate amount of private sector jobs and unemployment remains high.

The reintegration program has been criticized for its lack of focus on female ex-combatants and child soldiers. The Commission argued that women had an easier time than male ex-combatants because they held positions such as musicians, cooks, secretaries and radio operators. Not everybody shares this view and some believe that low participation in reintegration programs was due to the insensitivity of the responsible agencies towards women (Ayalew and Dercon: 2000, p. 144). The situation of child soldiers was the worst, both economically and psychologically, because there were no special programs for them. Their situation was extremely dire due to a lack of marketable skills and a low level of education. Most were left to struggle with minimal assistance.

Despite these criticisms, the overall program was deemed successful, especially given the scope of the challenge undertaken. Several factors may have contributed to the overall Ethiopian DRP success, including:

- **Non-contentious transition from pre- to post-war economic and political structure.** The war was not a conflict between parties holding fundamentally different ideologies. The TGE still had a state-socialist perspective just with more ethnic regionalism.
- **Strong level of commitment from the government, ex-combatants and local communities.** The government recognized the importance of the DRP and maintained the level of commitment despite lack of donor support. Ex-combatants for the most part participated without complaint and were simply relieved the war was over. Communities also seemed willing to accept the ex-combatants back into their social structure without discord.
- **The DRP was part of specific, well-defined strategic objectives.** There was no time constraint to complete the demobilization hastily and there were strong economic, security and political imperatives for success.

[22] Farmers were also obliged to work without pay on the fields of combatants while they were in service.

- **The program was well organized and planned.** Planning started early in the process and there was no real breakdown in any of the phases. Problems with disarmament and encampment in particular could have led to serious problems during reintegration.
- **Decentralized decision making during reintegration.** Community involvement in the reintegration phase, particularly in rural areas, aided in the programs overall success because it facilitated community acceptance of the program.
- **Provision of reinsertion package for ex-combatants.** Providing a "safety net" during the transition from war to peace helped ex-combatants and their families bridge the difficult period between demobilization and reintegration.
- **State ownership of land.** This allowed ex-combatants with easy access to land in rural communities.
- **Ex-combatant networks and informal safety nets in rural communities.** Veterans groups met to discuss issues, work together on cooperative schemes and provide an informal support system that aided in reintegration. Also, the close-knit rural community provided assistance to ex-combatants households in need.

6. Demilitarization in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has moved slowly towards a demilitarized state since the fall of the Derg regime in 1991. Despite the slow progress, the government has made steps in the right direction. First, the successful demobilization program facilitated demilitarization in several ways. The demobilization allowed military expenditures to decrease (at least in the area of personnel costs), which allowed the government to transfer funds to more productive sectors. Defense spending dominated the economy during the Derg regime. Military spending as a share of total government expenditure fell from approximately 60% in FY 1989-90 to approximately 30% in FY 1992-93. Over the same period, spending on health and education grew from 12% of total government expenditure to approximately 20%. The shift in funding represents a shift in government policy focus from the military to social and economic issues (George: 1997, p. 14).

The demobilization also helped decrease the number of potential problems with organized, armed opposition groups. The most important example of this was the disbanding of OLF forces in 1992. Furthermore, significant armed factions, such as the OLF, extended the need for the military to maintain internal security. Reduction of armed opposition groups allowed the army to pass on the internal security job to regional and local police forces thus reinforcing a civilian authority for security.

The successful disarmament process also controlled the widespread proliferation of weapons that could have furthered the economic need for conflict and fostered a culture of violence in the population.

The demobilization of the ENDF forces was an attempt at creating a more ethnically representative armed force—at the time, the army was dominated by ex-TPLF soldiers. The restructuring of the army was a solid indication of the government's commitment to develop an army acceptable to all Ethiopians and was seen as a key step in enhancing security, stability and socio-economic development.

The reintegration process in Ethiopia was also a key factor in the transition from war to peace. The process helped prevent further outbreaks of violence and curbed the culture of violence that dominated communities during and immediately after the war. The reintegration program aided ex-combatants in establishing productive civilian households and, in concert with other rehabilitation programs, tried to address fundamental issues of unemployment and poverty, which could have led to discord and even violent opposition.

The government also took solid policy actions towards demilitarization. The principle that the military should be subservient to civil control finds support at the highest levels. The Constitution of December 1994, under Article 87, "Directives of National Defence," states:

1. "The Composition of the national defence forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.
2. The Minister of Defence shall be a civilian.
3. The national defence forces shall protect the sovereignty of the country. They shall carry out responsibilities assigned to them under any state of emergency proclaimed in accordance with the Constitution.
4. The national defence forces shall at all times be governed by this constitution.
5. The national defence forces shall carry out their duties free of any political partisanship to any political party or political organization" (George: 1997, p. 13).

Six parliamentary committees have also been formed to cover key policy areas, including security, thereby making the defense process somewhat more transparent. Ethiopia also has several research institutes and civilians with expertise in security issues that acts as an independent body of informed opinion that can monitor related developments.

Under the government's decentralization policy, law enforcement tasks have been increasingly entrusted to regional and local police forces, leaving the army to concentrate on its primary role of defending the country from external attack. The establishment of a credible police force puts local security under civilian control and accountability.

Although there have been indications of advancement towards demilitarization, several factors have impeded progress. Despite movement towards a more ethnically

representative force, military leadership remains primarily Tigrayan, and control of political and internal security affairs also lies in the hands of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front Central Committee. Many thousands of the demobilized Tigrayan fighters were recruited into the policy and given significant pay raises. It seems likely, therefore, that ethnic animosity may remain a factor in Ethiopia's internal security affairs.

Since 1991, Ethiopia has also had a poor report card in terms of human rights abuses. The private press and international human rights organizations have reported that the army, opposition separatists, and Islamic militias all committed human rights violations, including extra-judicial killings, in the eastern part of the country. These abuses, particularly those by the military and other armed groups, further the cycle of violence which in turn inhibits any lasting progress at a societal level. The government has also restricted the freedom of the press and the freedom of peaceful assembly. These conditions can spark unrest and increases the likelihood of armed conflict and insecurity.

There have also been credible reports that thousands of children have been forcibly recruited into the Ethiopian army, particularly during the build-up to a major offensive in May 2000. Recruitment reportedly focused on Oromos and Somalis, ethnic groups that traditionally formed the backbone of political opposition to the government, and on grades 9 to 12 of secondary schools. However there were also reports of children press-ganged from marketplaces and villages. Ethiopian representatives at the African Conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers in April 1999 stated that the government had put in place programs to demobilize children and to reintegrate them, but that efforts have been hampered by the conflict with Eritrea (Human Rights Watch, *Ethiopia: Child Soldiers Global Report 2001*). The use of child soldiers has an enormous impact on the society as a whole as these children are often alienated from their communities, psychologically numbed and left with severe adjustment problems. They often cope with conflict and pain by exhibiting defiance, violence and anti-social behavior.

The recent conflict with Eritrea, for example, was a major setback for demilitarization. Both countries conducted massive military buildup. Significant loss of life occurred on both sides and dominated both governments' attention. The scale of remobilization of the Ethiopian military was very large and came with a heavy cost to the evolving social program. Furthermore, extensive propaganda campaigns, and escalation by extremists on both sides, forced Ethiopian society to be once more preoccupied by military matters.

It also appears that tens of thousands of new land mines were laid during the conflict, adding to an already serious problem.[23] Each government has alleged that the other planted mines and observers have expressed concern that both sides may have used

[23] While the Ethiopian government estimates the number of uncleared landmines in Ethiopia at more than 1.4 million, the US Department of State puts the number of existing mines in Ethiopia at 500,000. Affected areas include Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Gamela, Oromiya, and Beni-Shangul. Even before the most recent border war, the border area between Eritrea and Ethiopia was heavily mined.

mines.[24] Civilian casualties are now on the rise as a result of new use of landmines. Insurgents opposed to the government of Ethiopia, particularly the OLF and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) are believed to have also used landmines in Ethiopia recently. There were three incidents in 1999 of mine attacks on the Ethiopian-Djibouti Railway. According to press accounts, OLF took responsibility for at least one of the attacks, claiming that the train was transporting war material for Ethiopia and young Oromo men used by the Ethiopian army as "cannon fodder" and "mine sweepers" on the Eritrean front (Human Rights Watch, *Ethiopia: Landmine Monitor Report 2000*).

External influences have also hindered demilitarization. Since 1991, Ethiopia has drifted back into the influence of the United States, which has in some ways proved beneficial to Ethiopia's demilitarization endeavors, particularly in the area of military justice and military professionalism.

Although this assistance in the long run good for the country and its people, US interest is primarily aimed at its own geopolitical and strategic interests. Ethiopia is regarded as a counterweight to Arab dominance over the Red Sea region, which includes the sea lanes carrying oil from the Persian Gulf and Israel.

If the US war against terrorism expands to areas in African, such as Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia will most likely play a part in those operations. Ethiopia has proven a buffer against the radical expansionist Islam promoted by the alliance between Sudan and Iran and extremists in Somalia. In particular, Ethiopia is believed to be providing support to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and is reportedly sending arms to the Sudanese regime's opponents. Given the political dynamics in the Horn of Africa, US presence and influence will inevitably provide a focus for the Government's Islamic opponents within and outside Ethiopia's borders.

[24] Ethiopia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In a statement at the signing ceremony, the government reaffirmed its commitment to the treaty, and as a mine-affected nation, urged the international community to adhere to the articles of the treaty dealing with assistance for mine clearance and mine victims. In March 1999, and again in May 1999, the Ethiopian government stated that it had "already triggered" the procedure for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, but to date Ethiopia has not ratified the treaty.

Appendix C.
Demobilization, Reintegration and Demilitarization Case Study: Mozambique

1. The Nature of the Conflict

Mozambique came under Portuguese influence as early as the 15th century. By the early 1900s, Mozambique fell under colonial rule; Portugal established sugar and cotton plantations, and developed a textile industry. Mozambique's highest value as a colony came because of its strategic location. Portugal benefited from remittances paid by land-locked neighbors for access to transport goods to the Indian Ocean.

It was not until 1951 that Mozambique officially became an overseas province of Portugal. In 1962, Eduardo Mondlane established the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo). Frelimo began an armed guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese colonists in 1964. Samora Machel assumed Frelimo's leadership in 1969. By 1970, Frelimo was gaining territory, and had captured the entire northwestern province of Tete. The Portuguese launched Operation Gordian Knot, a ruthless military campaign employing napalm and scorched earth tactics. The colonists forcibly relocated rural poor to controlled settlements called aldeamentos. The colonial regime attempted to involve South Africa in the conflict as well.

In 1974, the military in Lisbon revolted, disillusioned with the colonial wars being waged in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. Sixty thousand troops withdrew from Mozambique. Fearing majority rule, the Portuguese colonists unsuccessfully attempted a unilateral declaration of independence, as had occurred in 1965 in Rhodesia. In September 1974, the Portuguese signed the Lusaka Accord, formally ending colonial rule and handing power over to a transitional government headed by Frelimo, with Samora Machel as president.

About 250,000 embittered Portuguese fled the country, destroying what little infrastructure remained. Inexperienced at governance, Frelimo established one-party rule. Intent on limiting opposition, Frelimo instituted repressive political and social policies. Political opposition leaders were arrested and sent to "re-education" camps. A secret police extended surveillance over rural areas, detaining anyone suspected of anti-state behavior. The government repressed religious freedom, targeting especially the Roman Catholic Church, which was associated with the Portuguese regime. Frelimo also nationalized private schools and hospitals, and implemented broad social development programs in health and education.

In 1977, Mozambique officially became a Marxist-Leninist party, and established ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Measures taken in the name of economic policy—such as forced communal "villagisation" of rural populations, which undermined

traditional community authorities and recalled the aldeamentos—alienated many from the government's tactics.

Also in the late 1970s, Mozambique stepped up support to the nationalist military force Zanla (the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army), fighting across the border in Rhodesia. In response, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization established and generously funded the Mozambique National Resistance, later called Renamo. Renamo was comprised of Frelimo dissidents, and combatants who had fought with the Portuguese. Its initial mission was to disrupt the Mozambican government, and to provide intelligence to Rhodesia on Zanla operations. Initially, Renamo posed little threat to the Frelimo government. In 1980, however, with the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia—now Zimbabwe—patronage of Renamo passed to the South African intelligence directorate, and the conflict intensified. South Africa's objectives were to counter Mozambique's support for anti-apartheid nationalists, and to block Zimbabwe's transport access to the sea through Mozambique, thereby increasing its own dominance of the regional economy. Under South Africa's sponsorship, Renamo grew from 500 to 8,000 combatants, and a full-scale civil war, terrorizing the populace, and eventually threatening the government, ensued (Rupiya in *Accord*: nd).

Figure 3. Map of Mozambique

2. The End of the Civil War

In 1984, Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa. This was supposed to be a non-aggression pact, under which South Africa would halt sponsorship of Renamo. In return, Mozambique was to close down anti-apartheid African National

Congress (ANC) strongholds within Mozambican territory. While Frelimo mostly adhered to the pact, South Africa merely switched strategies, airlifting large quantities of arms into Mozambique, and instructing Renamo on tactics for continuing the war by commandeering necessary supplies and support from the rural population.

Renamo stepped up efforts to inspire terror in the population, striking at civilian targets, killing and mutilating, disrupting rural production, transport, schools and clinics, and weakening infrastructure symbolic of government capability. Through 1988, Renamo continued to gain ground, with ongoing support from South Africa, and Portuguese and other outside business interests. The Mozambican government, however, gained assistance, including military participation, from Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Malawi. By late 1988, the war was at a stalemate.

Beginning in 1987, Joaquim Chissano, who had become Mozambique's president following the death of Samora Machel in a plane crash in 1986, took steps that would open the path toward a negotiated settlement. Chissano instituted reforms in Mozambique's economic, foreign and civil rights policies, and reconciled with the Catholic Church. Chissano initiated a retreat from Marxism, which was to be important for achieving regional and outside Western support for the peace process.

Church leaders, as well as President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, held several rounds of talks with Renamo in 1989, getting them to admit they were tired of war. Through these meetings, the guerrillas first articulated their political demands and conditions for negotiation with the government. Renamo was a military force, created by anti-Frelimo entities with grudges to bear from outside and inside Mozambique. It had never clearly articulated a political ideology or set of goals. In large part, the ambitions of the combatants were for individual gain; alternatively, warfare became simply an economic way of life. International companies with assets in Mozambique—such as Lonrho, a British-based company whose oil pipeline ran through the strategic Beira corridor—had arrangements with Renamo for years to pay protection money against attacks.[25] Renamo made a similar deal, to abstain from railway attacks in the Nacala corridor, a strategic route for Malawi, in exchange for border trade with the country in ivory, hardwood, precious stones and cashews (Vines in *Accord:* nd). In order to negotiate peace, Renamo would need to transform itself into a political party which could credibly participate, and which could be trusted to cooperate in the process.

Direct peace talks between Renamo and the Frelimo government began in Rome in July 1990, facilitated by the Sant'Egidio Catholic lay community, which had gained the trust of both sides. After five rounds of talks, in December 1990, the parties signed a

[25] See discussion of relationship between Renamo and Lonrho, a U.K-based multinational company with assets in Mozambique, Vines, Alex. Nd. "The Business of Peace: Tiny Rowland, Financial Incentives and the Mozambican Settlement," in The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective. *Accord*. London: Conciliation Resources (online) www.c-r.org/acc_moz/contents_moz.htm.

preliminary ceasefire agreement. Renamo agreed to stop attacking the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors if Zimbabwean troops remained confined to these areas. The ceasefire degenerated and peace talks stalled in 1991. Severe drought hit Southern Africa. The combination of military stalemate, political pressure from regional actors whose countries were being savaged by Mozambique's war, and the food insecurity and economic devastation that threatened both sides' ability to continue, pushed the parties toward peace. After seven more rounds of talks, on October 4, 1992, Renamo and the Frelimo government signed a General Peace Agreement.

3. Planning for the Demobilization and Reintegration Program.

The United Nations played a limited role in the peace negotiations in Rome, becoming an observer to the talks only in July 1992, just in time to provide technical advice on the verification aspects of the agreement. In anticipation of signing the agreement, in August President Chissano invited the UN to send two technical teams to Mozambique, one to evaluate cease-fire arrangements, the other to assess the situation for the elections. The government wished the ceasefire to begin no later than a week following signing of the agreement, and wanted the UN to be ready to assist. The agreements signed stipulated that the United Nations would assume the major role in monitoring the General Peace Agreement. Components of the United Nations' mandate included: monitoring the ceasefire; overseeing the withdrawal of troops from Malawi and Zimbabwe from the transport corridors and securing those corridors by stationing UN peacekeepers; carrying out and creating programs for the encampment, demobilization, disarmament, reinsertion and reintegration of 90,000 Renamo and government combatants; coordinating humanitarian assistance for and resettlement of nearly five million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); and organizing elections, initially scheduled for October 1993. After the operation had begun, the parties would also request that the UN implement the formation of a new army, and civilian police force.

Immediately upon the signing of the General Peace Agreement, the UN moved to establish the ONUMOZ. The Security Council approved the operation, agreed to its mandate and encouraged member states to contribute personnel, equipment and funds. Within the broad mandate of ONUMOZ, the DDR components would be divided under three separate commissions. The Ceasefire Commission (CCF) would be responsible for demobilization and disarmament of combatants, the Commission for Reintegration (CORE) would oversee reintegration of demobilized soldiers, as well as refugees and IDPs, and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Force (CCFADM) would integrate the new military. Members of these commissions, in addition to the UN, Renamo and the Mozambican government, included Botswana, Denmark, Egypt, France, Kenya, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zimbabwe, and the European Community (United Nations: 1995, p. 150).

A. Political, Economic and Social Conditions

Political and Economic. The settlement of the conflict in Mozambique and the transition away from civil war occurred at a time and in a location in southern Africa that were of great interest to regional and international actors. Mozambique's strategic location for trade from the interior and the interest of regional actors in promoting stability have been mentioned. The decline of Portugal's influence in the region peaked the interest of Italy, among others, which saw the impending opening of new markets in southern Africa in the early '90s, and the opportunity to establish a presence there, due also to South Africa's transition to majority rule. Another factor heightening international interest in ONUMOZ was the recent failure of UNAVEM II in Angola. Donor countries found it worth considerable effort and money to bring Mozambique's conflict to conclusion, and avoid protracted involvement in another unsolved civil war.

Mozambique's own economy had been completely exhausted by the war. The government had borne substantial defense-related costs—one estimate was that military expenditure used up between 40 and 50 percent of the government's budget throughout the second half of the 1980s (Baptista Lundin et al in Kingma, ed.: 2000, p. 178). In addition, the country bore the uncounted cost of supporting Renamo's war enterprise, and the unmet needs of needs of Frelimo soldiers. Combatants from both sides stole resources from the rural population, or forcibly controlled trade and agriculture to support themselves. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure had been destroyed. It was estimated that the GDP was half what it could have been without the war (Baptista Lundin, p. 181).

Because of the disrupted economy, industry and small business had slowed to a crawl. This affected ex-combatants greatly when they sought to reintegrate and began looking for jobs. Few jobs were available; however, former combatants were in no better and no worse a position in trying to make a living after the war than resettled refugees and those who had remained in place during the conflict. The fact that all were in the same boat actually assisted reintegration.

Social. Mozambique had suffered greatly from the war in social terms as well. Sixty percent of primary schools had closed because of the conflict. Only a minority of health centers were operational. Hundreds of thousands had died because of the war. Around five million people had been internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries as refugees, and 250,000 children had been orphaned or separated from their parents (Baptista Lundin et al in Kingma: 2000, p. 181).

After the war, many ex-combatants chose to settle in areas different from where they had lived before. Partly, this was due to the methods Renamo had used to recruit fighters. People were kidnapped and forced to kill relatives and destroy villages where they had lived, becoming alienated from their social origins and disconnected from their families. Many of the combatants were very young when they joined the conflict—28 percent of the demobilized were under age 18 (Baptista Lundin, et al in Kingma: 2000, p. 195).

Many were thus unmarried. Some nonetheless had extended families that came to depend on the DDR assistance ex-combatants received. Others married into new communities. On the whole, ex-combatants were generally accepted, and became a part of the integrated society, faring somewhat better in rural communities than in the cities.

B. Rationale

The reasons for the UN and the international community's strong support for DDR was twofold. First, in the near term, ONUMOZ had learned the lesson from operations in Angola that demobilization of combatants through which they severed the connection with the fighting unit, command and faction, and then reinsertion into communities where they could start to achieve a new identity, must occur prior to elections. In Angola, elections had occurred during encampment; when the losing faction chose not to accept the results, they simply mobilized out of assembly areas and back to the bush to continue the war. Elections were mandated by the peace agreement, and ONUMOZ determined to ensure the best possible conditions for acceptance of the results.

Second, the international community had been pouring assistance into Mozambique for years, extensive food aid and humanitarian assistance made necessary by the war, the poor economy and recurring drought. Achieving longer-term stability and growth in Mozambique would begin with demobilization, reintegration, and a new political and economic start.

C. Objectives

The broad range of the ONUMOZ mandate included several goals related to DDR:

The *military or security* goals included the separation and encampment of forces, demobilization, and collection, storage and destruction of weapons. Integration of the new armed forces was a goal added later.

The *political* goals were to facilitate impartial implementation of the peace agreement, which mandated equal treatment of both sides' combatants in demobilization.

Reintegration of demobilized combatants was an element of ONUMOZ' *humanitarian* goal, grouped together with humanitarian assistance to refugees, IDPs, and the local population.

Donors' *economic* objectives likely included enhancing economic stability, by encouraging ex-combatants to return to productive activities, and become a part of normal economic structures. This would lessen the likelihood of resumption of conflict as an economic way of life either through banditry or on a larger scale, and would contribute to the achievement of greater economic self-sufficiency for Mozambique.

D. Resources

Because of the high level of international interest in attaining not just a political but also a durable socio-economic situation solution in Mozambique, donors were generous in their assistance to DDR programs. Italy convened a donors' conference in December 1992, at which participants pledged over $400 million total toward emergency reintegration of IDPs, refugees and demobilized soldiers (UN: 1995, p. 26). Both the military operation of ONUMOZ, which oversaw encampment and disarmament of combatants, and the combined humanitarian operation, which implemented demobilization and reintegration assistance, were well-funded, although there were periodic delays in receipt of funds. The UN took the lead in encouraging donors to fund the different components of the operation. Major donors included Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Finland, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Germany, and the United States, as well as the World Bank. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the total cost of the demobilization support paid to former combatants and reintegration programs was approximately $95 million. The international community reportedly paid 89 percent of these costs, and the Mozambican government, 11 percent. This constituted close to $1000 per demobilized combatant (Baptista Lundin in Kingma, ed.: 2000, p. 187).

4. How Were Demobilization and Reintegration Implemented and Managed?

Planning for demobilization proved to be a much smoother process than carrying it out. The delays which occurred had several sources—member states' reluctance to contribute peacekeeping forces, protracted disputes and delay tactics between Renamo and the government over conditions for encampment and demobilization, infrastructure problems due to poor roads and landmines, and Renamo's insistence on receiving sufficient financial support to become a political party. The delays caused unrest and incidents of violence among combatants in the camps, some of whom remained there for many months not knowing when they would be demobilized. These incidents became so frequent that it seemed delays could derail the ONUMOZ mission and cause donors to withdraw support. It took the personal intervention of then-UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali to get the process back on track.

Some demobilized combatants experienced difficulty with the reintegration support programs. Payments intended to continue for two years fell by the wayside for some, who had to travel far at an expense to collect bimonthly. Other programs, while administered well, did not reach a high percentage of former combatants. Delays in the demobilization process may have caused a disconnection in the approach to reintegration.

While the United Nations repeatedly adjusted according to the circumstances, ultimately delaying elections and the conclusion of ONUMOZ for a year past the initial date, the operation ran out of time to complete the important process of disarmament.

A. Organization

The highest-level organization responsible for the demobilization and reintegration programs was the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (known under its acronym in Portuguese as the CSC). The CSC, established shortly after the peace agreement was signed, served to interpret legalities of the process, resolve disputes and coordinate activities of all other commissions. The commissions charged with implementing reintegration and demobilization were, as stated above, the Ceasefire Commission (CCF), the Joint Commission for the formation of the Mozambican Defense Force (CCFADM), and the Commission for Reintegration (CORE).

A unique aspect of the Mozambique operation was that the humanitarian component, called UNOHAC, was a component within the ONUMOZ structure. In other UN operations, either UNDP or a lead agency such as the World Food Programme or UNICEF had led a separate humanitarian structure. This new structure was in response to criticisms from UN members that better coordination needed to occur between the humanitarian and political components (Barnes in Furley and May: 1998, p. 163). In Mozambique, UNOHAC coordinated all humanitarian assistance for IDPs, refugees and demobilized combatants. A Technical Unit (TU) on demobilization within ONUMOZ would oversee the assembly, encampment phase and demobilization program. Both these units were led and staffed by civilians, who reported directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Mr. Aldo Ajello, another aspect unique to ONUMOZ.

The General Peace Agreement established that the end of the armed conflict would occur in four stages: ceasefire; separation of forces; concentration of forces; and demobilization.[26] The initial timetable called for: establishment of the CCF on October 15, 1992; determination of troops to be demobilized within a month and initiation of encampment; demobilization of at least twenty percent of the combatants by December 15, twenty percent more every month, with demobilization to conclude by mid-April, 1993.

The first delay was in getting UN Member States to commit peacekeeping troops to the operation. Italy was the first to commit a battalion, in December 1992. Zimbabwean and Malawian troops remained in the strategic transport corridors. Renamo leader Dhlakama refused to begin assembly and demobilization until foreign troops had withdrawn, and 65 percent of ONUMOZ forces were in the field (UN: 1995, p. 27). This did not begin until April 1993.[27] Some assembly sites, chosen by the parties for strategic territorial advantage, had to be relocated because they did not have suitable water or road access for encampment. Renamo leader Dhlakama employed stalling tactics to delay demobilization, wanting to pursue the political path of elections, but reluctant to give up

[26] GPA, Protocol VI, I.3
[27] At its full strength, ONUMOZ numbered over 6,000 peacekeeping troops.

military capability. Dhlakama also insisted that funds to support Renamo's transformation to a political party, stipulated in the General Peace Agreement, be provided by the international community. President Chissano wanted to speed up demobilization, as the government was running out of money to support its large forces (Coelho and Vines: 1994, p. 6). Secretary General Boutros-Ghali went to Maputo in October 1993 to negotiate solutions to outstanding issues, and to personally impress upon the parties the need to get on with the process for support from the UN and donors to continue. For these and other reasons, demobilization did not begin until November 1993, and was not concluded until August 1994.

B. Targeting participants

About 92,600 combatants were demobilized, including 21, 900 Renamo soldiers and 70,700 government troops. Approximately 1.5 percent were women. The demobilized had a total of about 215,000 dependents. Thirty-one percent had no education. At recruitment, 28 percent of the demobilized were under age 18. About 6000 demobilized combatants were disabled. The great majority of combatants would end up resettling in rural areas, far fewer in semi-urban or urban areas (Baptista Lundin et al in Kingma: 2000, p. 182).

Initially, the Mozambican government preferred a non-targeted approach, that is, a program that did not provide special benefits to ex-combatants over other groups needing assistance. However, the unrest which arose in the camps when demobilization was delayed caused the international community to insist on programs expressly for combatants which would be an incentive to disperse quickly back to the communities.

Few programs were created for specific groups within the demobilized combatants. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) started a program with the Secretariat of Social Welfare, the Mozambican Red Cross, Save the Children and the International Committee of the Red Cross to assist those under age 18, who were not recognized as soldiers and thus could not be demobilized and receive the associated benefits. The program included a database of information about the children, designated transition centers, and a program to circulate photos of individuals around the country. In six months the program reunited 800 families. The program provided food for two months and other items upon the children's departure from the centers. Little is known about children who simply left the armies when the war ended (Baptista Lundin et al in Kingma: 2000, p. 195).

Non-government organizations also provided some specific targeted support to disabled combatants in the assembly areas (Barnes in Foley and May, eds: 1998, p. 172).

C. Demobilization

The main phases in demobilization that occurred in Mozambique were cantonment of troops, demobilization, and the formation of FADM, the Mozambican Defense Force. Combatants were required to turn in their weapons as they entered the assembly areas,

but this cannot be said to constitute a disarmament phase. Both sides' armies hid away their better weapons before they reported to encampment, bringing older weapons with them to turn in. Disarmament in Mozambique occurred long after demobilization, partly with the UN's limited inspection of the two armies' facilities and the rounding up of weapons at that time. The country took additional steps toward disarmament in the years following ONUMOZ. This is discussed below in the demilitarization section.

i. Implementation

Cantonment. Following the protracted renegotiation of many elements of the General Peace Agreement, as described, the parties agreed to begin demobilization on November 30, 1993. So as to proceed at a roughly equal rate of encampment of both parties, only 20 camps were opened initially—12 for government troops and 8 for Renamo. Camp commanders were either from the Government or Renamo, under close surveillance from ONUMOZ. Combatants arriving at the camps would be registered, receive identity cards and would turn in their weapons—to be stored on site in an area to which the camp commander and resident ONUMOZ representative had keys. Weapons were periodically sent to regional depots. Camps would turn in registration lists on a regular basis. Each party would decide which of its combatants would be demobilized and which integrated into the new armed forces.

An education and social program was implemented while combatants were encamped. The Information and Social Reintegration Program, trained monitors from both combatant groups to become trainers, informing combatants about the terms of the General Peace Agreement; providing health education—especially on HIV/AIDS and family planning; providing civic education on the rights and duties of demobilized soldiers, and their entitlements. The program provided literacy classes, sports, and cultural opportunities in the camps (Barnes in Furley and May, eds: 1998, p. 172).

Controversy occurred over the relative pace of encampment, each side carefully watching that the other was proceeding in parallel percentages before it would agree to continue. Logistics problems due to mined roads and disrepair of infrastructure delayed transport of food and supplies to the camps. Camps opened more slowly than expected, such that overcrowding occurred and insufficient provisions were available.

Mutinies and incidents of violence began to occur in the camps. Government troops had already seized buildings and hostages near their camps along the Nacala corridor in December 1993 and January 1994, demanding that salaries be paid and other compensation given. As the months passed and combatants remained in the camps, incidents increased.[28] Combatants would threaten camp commanders or ONUMOZ teams if their demands were not met, would block roads, and loot surrounding areas. In the Renamo camps, located in rural formerly Renamo territory, incidents were initially

[28]In government camps, 6 incidents were reported in January 1994, 13 in March and 36 in May. In Renamo camps, 12, 21 and 31 incidents were reported in the same months. Coelho and Vines: 1994, p. 16.

primarily related to lack of food, water, shelter and clothing. Conditions were slightly better in government camps as they were often located near small towns where combatants could go to buy supplemental supplies. But as time went on, incidents in both camps related to frustration and boredom from remaining in the camps with no information about when they would be demobilized, or why they had not been so far. These incidents threatened to escalate to more dangerous levels if demobilization did not occur.

Demobilization. In February, the CSC finally negotiated that demobilization would begin on March 1st. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that UN personnel should leave Mozambique by the end of October 1994. While it was evident that the process would need to proceed steadily to achieve the deadline, delays still occurred. The principal reason for dispute was over the number of government troops to be demobilized. At the outset of ONUMOZ, the government had said 61, 638 troops were to be cantoned, with 14,480 considered "non-cantonable"—necessary to leave outside encampment to ensure national security and to maintain military installations. In April 1994, the government revised that number down to 49,630 combatants to be cantoned. The government stated that the difference lay in 13,000 men who had been demobilized in 1993 before the implementation of the General Peace Agreement process. Renamo accused the government of transferring troops to the police force. In July, the government completed cantonment of its forces (Coelho and Vines: 1994, p. 20).

To speed demobilization, and keep tensions in the camps from escalating further, the donor community recognized the need for a quick incentive for now ex-combatants to reintegrate into their communities. The program arrived at motivated combatants to choose demobilization, and establish themselves in a new life, so as to receive additional benefits. The initially agreed six months' severance pay was extended to two years. Demobilized combatants and their families were to receive three months' severance plus supplies upon leaving encampment, transport to a chosen district, more food and supplies upon arriving in the district, and after four months, installments of the continuing subsidy for another 18 months. This program was called the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS).

Formation of FADM. The General Peace Agreement envisioned a new armed force for Mozambique of 30,000—15,000 each from Renamo and the government's forces. CCFADM, with responsibility for overseeing the formation of the new army, included representatives from Portugal, France, and the United Kingdom, as well as military leaders from both Renamo and the government. Under the General Peace Agreement, co-commanders from each party's army were appointed to lead FADM up until the election, when the new government would appoint a single commander.

In 1994, participant countries began conducting training. Portugal held four 30-day leadership courses, each for 25 officers from each side. Portugal also conducted marine

courses, and trained three battalions of special forces. The French sent military instructors to form the first FADM company of landmine clearance personnel, and established a center for landmine clearance training outside Maputo. The British trained six infantry battalions.

FADM was, however, unable to meet its numerical goals. In July 1994, the parties had agreed that rather than designate personnel to join the new army, FADM would be composed of troops who volunteered to join. By the end of the UN mandate in December 1994, only 11,579 combatants had volunteered (UN: 1995, p. 42). War fatigue, reluctance to trust a new institution after a prolonged and difficult encampment period, and the attractiveness of the demobilization benefits combined to draw former combatants toward civilian life.

ii. Organizations Involved in Demobilization.

ONUMOZ worked in coordination with other UN departments, international agencies bilateral agencies and NGOs to implement demobilization. UNICEF was responsible for water supply, and the World Health Organization (WHO) provided medical care. The World Food Programme had a cooperative arrangement with the government to supply food to the camps; WFP was to supply "dry" goods—maize, rice, beans, cooking oil, biscuits and sugar, while the government was responsible for perishables including meat, fish and bread. The International Organization on Migration (IOM) implemented a methodology for transporting all demobilized soldiers from the camps to their chosen areas for resettlement. Other major organizations that participated in demobilization and reintegration activities included the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), USAID, UNDP and the World Bank.

D. Reinsertion

The reinsertion phase covers the period of six months to one year after demobilization, beginning when the former combatant and his dependents are transported to the area they choose. During this phase, the ex-combatants face the challenge of establishing a civilian household.

In Mozambique, because of the experience in Angola, great emphasis was placed on the reinsertion program as a follow-on to demobilization. The program was to provide incentives to former combatants to disperse from encampment and begin to forge a new social and economic identity, prior to elections.

i. Implementation

Reinsertion support for demobilized combatants included transport to their destination of choice, civilian clothes, a seed and tool kit, two weeks' ration of food and three months' severance pay, provided by the government. Once arrived, each ex-combatant received three months' food ration for himself and family members, another three months' pay

from the government, and then after another four months, the 18-month RSS subsidy—funded by international donors—began. Demobilized soldiers were eligible to participate in relief food and seed and tool distribution programs that were part of the general humanitarian support programs for all those resettling. These programs were considered key in the "social pacification" of ex-combatants in the pivotal pre- and post-election intervals (Barnes in Furley and May, eds: 1998, p. 173).

ii. Organizations Involved in Reinsertion

Transportation of demobilized combatants and their dependents was coordinated and carried out by the IOM. UNOHAC oversaw many of the same organizations involved in demobilization, in carrying out the reinsertion program. RSS payments were made through the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BNP), a Mozambican Bank, and the program was under the auspices of UNDP.

E. Reintegration

Reintegration refers to a long-term period during which ex-combatants gradually become "normal" community members, both in social and in economic terms. Reintegration programs were intended to assist ex-combatants in developing a longer-term means of support, through a trade or vocation, the establishment of a business, or by initiating projects that would employ former soldiers.

i. Implementation

An Information and Referral Service (IRS) was set up in each province to provide information to the demobilized on their benefits, and refer them to available training and employment programs. The Occupational Skills Development project (OSD) provided self-employment kits, vocational and entrepreneurial training. The Provincial Fund (PF) was a local small grants program to fund projects such as training, education and businesses that would employ former soldiers. The Open Reintegration Fund (ORF) emphasized creation of jobs and different aspects of social and economic reintegration (Baptista Llundin et al in Kingma, ed: 2000, p. 185).

In 1995, perceiving additional need to identify where support to ex-combatants had been insufficient, and where local government institutions at the provincial, district and village levels could assist in bringing about jobs and community development, the World Bank established a pilot program. The pilot Provincial Reintegration Support program (PRSP) was established in Manica and Nampula provinces. The pilot program provided $500,000 to develop apprenticeship training with small employers, and $1.5 million for an employment fund. The latter supported micro-enterprise, public works and community-based initiatives through grants. By early 1997, 2100 ex-combatants had received skills training, and over 300 micro-projects had been financed.

Targeted projects and programs	Cost (US$ thousands)
Government severance payment, transport and other benefits*	26,045
Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS)	35,500
Information and Referral Service (IRS)	7,865
Occupational Skills Development (OSD)†	14,888
Provincial Fund (PF)	11,340
Total	95,638

* Including reintegration services in the assembly areas and transport home.
† Including tool kits and food-for-home.

Figure 4. Direct Financial Cost of Demobilization and Reintegration Support[29]

ii. Organizations Involved in Reintegration

The International Labor Organization (ILO) executed the OSD program. IOM administered the IRS, along with Creative Associates, a private consulting group. The PRSP pilot program was conducted by the World Bank, the government's Institute for Training and Employment in the Ministry of Labor, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and IOM.

iii. Perception of Demobilization and Reintegration Programs by Population and Ex-combatants

According to an association formed to represent the interests of former combatants, AMODEG, many felt that their interests have not been a focus of the postwar settlement. Roadblocks and riots by unhappy ex-combatants occurred in 1996 after demobilization pay ran out (OECD: 1997, p. 33).

Disabled ex-combatants were—for a period of time—dissatisfied with the reintegration support they received, including military pensions. Complaints included insufficient assistance from the state, such as health care and housing. Disabled former combatants staged demonstrations between 1992 and 1994, setting up road blocks to call attention to their particular needs (Baptista Lundin et al in Kingma: 2000, p. 197).

5. Was the Mozambican Demobilization and Reintegration Program a Success?

The demobilization and reintegration program in Mozambique was disrupted by delays in implementation due to disagreements between the parties. However, eventually, the process moved forward, due in no small part to combatants' and the country's will to move on. Over 92,000 combatants achieved a separation from their wartime military identity, and transitioned to a post-conflict identity, the majority as civilians, attempting to fit in and make a living alongside the rest of the population.

[29] Source: UNDP, as cited in Baptista Lundin in Kingma, ed.: 2000, p. 186.

Not all goals could be achieved. Ex-combatants' battle fatigue, exacerbated by difficult conditions in encampment, reduced the number of volunteers to FADM, leaving the new armed forces weaker after the withdrawal of the UN than had been envisioned in the General Peace Agreement. This also left more former combatants who needed to reintegrate into civilian society, an added burden on the structures for reintegration.

The cash payments that combatants received upon demobilization helped them to resettle and take care of dependents during the period it lasted. The funds did not contribute as a longer-term development stimulus, however. Ex-combatants had no experience and received little advice on saving or managing the money.

Reintegration overall has been more successful in rural areas than in urban; in rural areas, it is difficult to identify who is a former combatant. Social reintegration has been easier than economic. The heavy reliance on small-scale agriculture as the solution for reintegration of combatants overlooked the fact that for several decades, rural families have not been able to subsist only on agriculture. Wage earning migrant or plantation labor was needed to supplement income (Coelho and Vines: 1994, p. 59). The economy's weakness made finding employment difficult in any area. With the economic growth that Mozambique has experienced since 1995, more employment opportunities have arisen.

Reintegration programs in Mozambique were set up to follow on from the demobilization and reinsertion assistance which ex-combatants received. An information and referral service, vocational and entrepreneurial training, kits for self-employment and small grants to businesses or projects which employed former soldiers were set up. These, however, were set up piecemeal, not in a strategic manner. Employers often took the money and employed non-combatants. Because support payments were bimonthly, saving for bigger needs was difficult. A majority of ex-combatants stated that they would have preferred to receive cash payments in a lump sum, to start a business or project (Kingma, ed.: 2000, p. 189). As a result of this fragmentation, but also because of the extremely weak status of the economy, reintegration support had no significant effect on initiating recovery or development in Mozambique.

While the implementation was imperfect, the common objective in the country of moving past civil conflict and on to recovery, reconciliation and stability was largely achieved.

6. Demilitarization in Mozambique

Starting with the demobilization and reintegration programs, Mozambique has slowly moved towards a more demilitarized society. The civil war in Mozambique was waged largely in rural areas; it revolved primarily around the control of civilian populations by both sides, and it was extremely violent. Renamo, in particular, developed a reputation for the ritualistic use of violence aimed at instilling incapacitating fear in rural communities. These tactics served to severely disrupt the social fabric and to undermine the legitimacy of the government that was unable to protect large parts of the country.

Despite limited economic opportunities and a lack of recognition for the ex-combatants' sacrifice during the war, the reintegration process has been relatively successful. War-affected populations in rural Mozambique continue to draw on a wide range of traditional rituals to help them deal with the traumas of war and to open the way to reconciliation. For example, many families in rural areas have performed a cleansing ritual to purify and protect their relatives from the atrocities they experienced during the war. The healing process consists of several symbolically charged rituals aimed at restoring the identity of the individual and reintegrating him or her back into the community (Hanwana).

The trend towards demilitarization is also supported by the improving economy in Mozambique. Although the floods in early 2000 were the worst in memory, Mozambique was ranked as among the world's fastest-growing economies during the year. The human development index (HDI) for Mozambique, a measure that includes GDP per head, literacy, life expectancy and living standards, has improved steadily since 1994[30] (The Economist Intelligence Unit: 2001, p. 18).

In establishing the FADM, in addition to the low number of combatants who volunteered, difficulties included creating a joint force between the rivals. At the officer level, for example, there was little parity in terms of numbers and training between the Renamo and government army officers. Joint training courses have engendered a sense of belonging to the same team and the equal benefits which both sides now receive in the FADM is an attempt to blur the differences between the former enemies.

During the civil war, the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of General Staff were under direct control of the party hierarchy. Under the current restructuring, the army is viewed as a state institution and not dependent on any party. The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the FADM and hold constitutional responsibilities for the armed services. There also have been positive steps for civilian control over the military in the establishment of the parliamentary Joint Standing Defense Committee (JSDC) with powers of oversight, consultation and investigation of actions for defense related affairs. Despite these improvements, however, it still appears that the transition to full civilian control of the army without the influence of political parties will take more time.

There has also been a significant decrease in the defense budget since the end of the civil war. Mozambique showed a decrease in the defense and security share of the government budget from 40-50 percent in the late 1980s to 15 percent in 1996 and 17 percent in 1997 (Kingma, ed.: 2000, p. 208). This decrease in defense spending is not without controversy, however, as many observers note that the budget cuts have hindered the FADM in transforming itself into a professional army. The limited budget has left the FADM unable to conduct proper training, equip troops, maintain bases, purchase fuel and even clothe and feed soldiers. The lack of resources has also been explained by some as a

[30] It still is the lowest HDI score of any member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

result of widespread corruption among senior officers and politicians who have diverted funds for personal gain. A large part of the security budget has also been allocated to the police force, which is facing a serious crime problem throughout the country (Willet: 1997, p. 31).

Conscription, previously in operation in the country, was also abolished following the 1992 peace agreement. This situation changed once again when a new law governing conscription was adopted in 1997. Renamo voted against the law, arguing that Mozambique did not have the financial means for conscription and that it ran counter to the peace agreement which envisaged the formation of the FADM, to be composed of demobilized government and Renamo forces.

A specific problem has arisen with the possible drafting of former child soldiers from the civil war into military service based on a new law adopted in 1998. Many of these youths are now of draft age and are vulnerable to military service again because a demobilization certificate did not recognize their prior service. Many of these former child soldiers have already undergone serious trauma in service to military entities. To avoid conscription of those most vulnerable, the government has set up technical and administrative mechanisms during the recruitment classification and selection tests to identify citizens who suffer from various forms of trauma. Potential conscripts are questioned about previous involvement in armed conflict. Those stating previous participation are submitted to detailed observation to determine if they are suffering from trauma. If there are indications to this effect, the individual is declared psychologically or physically unfit for military service (Human Rights Watch, Child Soldiers Global Report: 2001).

A positive indicator towards demilitarization is the active role Mozambique is taking in regional organizations. Recently, Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano was named by the SADC as the new chairman of the organization's organ on politics, defense and security. In his new position, President Chissano is expected to pursue peaceful settlements in the conflicts in the DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe. Mozambique has also played a leadership role in supporting the international ban on landmines and served as co-chair of the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance.

In spite of positive steps, Mozambique faces many challenges on the road towards demilitarization. At a national level, the political process has remained relatively nonviolent despite controversy and the continuing intense rivalry between Frelimo and Renamo. The presidential and parliamentary elections in 1999 were rated as free and mostly fair. Renamo at first rejected the declared results and then grudgingly accepted them when the Supreme Court declined its suit.

A transition to a genuine multiparty democracy, however, is suspect as some argue that the Frelimo elite have used the new democratic system to retain their own power. The ruling party has also extended its domination over the state into the private sector. There is little evidence of autonomous areas of power developing, such as an independent

judiciary that could hold Frelimo accountable. Frelimo has also been under increasing pressure to respond to rumors of corruption among party members, particularly in the banking sector (The Economist Intelligence Unit: 2001).

While there has not been a resumption of violence at the national level, there have been some sporadic conflicts between Renamo and the government at the regional level. One such incident occurred in May 2000 when a group of one hundred people led by senior Renamo figures, armed with clubs and bushknives, attacked a police station in the locality of Aube in Angoche district with the intention of stealing weapons. The police said they opened fire in self-defense, killing several attackers. The incident appeared to have been provoked by a dispute over paying tax in the local marketplace and the arrest of a Renamo supporter by the police.

Police behavior was the source of the majority of human rights complaints in 2000. Allegations of arbitrary detention and extortion were made. Journalists in Mozambique are often too frightened to cover sensitive stories, which has led to self-censorship and reluctance to pursue certain subjects.

Mozambique has also become a major transit center for the international drug trade and some experts claim that drugs are now one of the country's most prominent exports. Mozambique is an attractive operating area because of its long coastline, weak security institutions and corruptible officials. In several drug-trafficking cases in recent years, the main suspects have been able to either evade charges or leave the country secretly before their cases were heard in court (The Economist Intelligence Unit: 2001, p. 14).

The landmine situation in Mozambique also still hinders the demilitarization and reintegration process by limiting the revival of economic activity, particularly in the agricultural sector. Minefields have been located in all provinces of Mozambique, but the most heavily mined regions are found along the border with Zimbabwe in the west of Manica province, in the center of the country in Zambezia and Tete provinces, and in the south in Maputo and Inhambane provinces. Few maps and records were kept of the mines laid during Mozambique's decades-long civil war. Mines were used by both Frelimo and Renamo around areas including military headquarters, towns and villages, sources of water and power, pylon lines and dams, as well as on roads, tracks and paths and alongside bridges and railway lines. Many of the mines in Mozambique were laid around bridges and culverts, to protect bridges from being attacked by people intent on blowing them up (Human Rights Watch, The Landmine Monitor Report: 2001).

There still is a problem in Mozambique with the arms trade. The weapons for this lucrative yet destabilizing market have come from weapons not properly collected and registered during ONUMOZ's disarmament activities and other new sources in the region. The arms trade has provided a means of income for some ex-combatants who left the army with few marketable skills. The proliferation of weapons has led to increases in banditry and other forms of crime.

There have been major steps taken in disarmament post-civil war, however, that seem to be having a positive impact, especially at the local level. For example, the Mozambican Council of Churches reported in September that its "Weapons to Hoes" project had met with success, collecting more than 55,000 weapons for destruction in return for productive useful tools such as sewing machines, bicycles and roofing materials. Mozambique has also entered into several cooperative exercises with South Africa to stem the arms trade, since South Africa is a primary market for the weapons (Vines: 1998).

Appendix D.
Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration Case Study: Liberia

1. Nature of the Conflict

Background. Liberia was founded in 1847 by a group of freed slaves from the United States, called the Americo-Liberians. The Americo-Liberians has historically dominated politics and society in Liberia. While making up only 5% of the population, 300 closely-knit Americo-Liberian families formed the ruling elite. The remainder of the country is made up of the indigenous population, including 16 major ethnic groups: Bassa, Dei, Gbandi, Gio (Dahn), Glebo, Gola, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn (Wee), Kru, Kuwaa (Belle), Loma, Mano (Ma), Madingo (Manding), Mende and Via. The Americo-Liberian elite ran the country like the Old South in the United States, using the indigenous population as forced labor on plantations including the Firestone Rubber Company Plantations. The profits and benefits of foreign trade flowed directly to Monrovia and the Americo-Liberian elite. Common hatred of the Americo-Liberians united the indigenous ethnic groups. Once this unifying factor was removed, traditional ethnic divisions reemerged (Mackinlay and Alao, 1995).

Figure 5. Map of Liberia

Liberia had a one-party system under the rule of the True Wig Party. The last Americo-Liberian president, William Tolbert, was overthrown in 1980 by a group of enlisted members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe. He successfully consolidated power and enriched his supporters who were primarily ethnic Krahn. Doe's rule was authoritarian and brutal. The Krahn make up only 5% of the

population, yet Doe rapidly promoted them in the armed forces. Ethnic tensions came to revolve around the Krahn as Doe repressed the rest of the country.



Figure 6. Structure of the NPFL

In 1984, Doe held elections to transform him from a military leader to a political leader. Doe barely won a majority even though there was extensive fraud, harassment and intimidation of opponents. In 1985, Thomas Quiwonkpa, one of Doe's original co-conspirators, attempted to overthrow Doe. His followers were Gio and Mano. The coup attempt failed, resulting in Quiwonkpa's brutal execution. Doe launched a violent military reprisal against thousands, including civilians. Following the coup attempt, Doe cracked down on opposition political parties and had the constitution altered, enabling him to retain and consolidate power (Clayton, 1995).

Doe's brutal crackdown would come back to haunt him in 1989. On Christmas Eve 1989, a band of approximately 100 men crossed the Liberian border from the Ivory Coast. Charles Taylor, who had participated in Quiwonkpa's coup attempt, led these men. They were known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The NPFL quickly moved across Liberia, gathering support. By June 1990, it was estimated that Taylor had 10,000 followers (Clayton, 1995). By July, Taylor surrounded Monrovia and besieged Doe in the presidential mansion.

At the same time, a third group emerged, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) led by "Prince" Yourmie Johnson. Johnson was involved in the 1985 coup attempt against Doe. He was described as mentally unstable (Clayton, 1995), psychopathic and a new species of human kind (Ellis, 1995: 165, 167). Johnson's splinter group consisted of the best-trained NPFL soldiers including the Libyan-trained Special Commandos (Ellis, 1995: 167).

By August the conflict was completely out of control with all sides committing atrocities. The conflict destroyed the economic infrastructure of the country and killed more civilians than then soldiers (Howe, 1996: 149). As the conflict worsened the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) of the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) decided to create the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG was Nigerian-led and consisted of troops from Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Togo, Sierra Leone and Guinea. ECOMOG had a broad mandate that included both peacekeeping and peacemaking. Taylor believed ECOMOG to be an invading force, whereas Doe and Johnson welcomed the force.[31] ECOMOG landed in Monrovia to hostile fire from NPFL.

In early September, Doe met with the INPFL and ECOMOG in an attempt to broker a peace at the expense of Taylor. Shooting broke out at the meeting and Doe was captured by INPFL troops. The next day he was slowly tortured as television cameras recorded his death. Johnson then declared himself to be head of state. However, ECOWAS had created an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), appointing Dr. Amos Sawyer as president.

The Factions. The Liberian conflict is littered with factions in addition to the NPFL and INPFL. The NPFL itself split into the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and the Central Revolutionary Council National Patriotic Front for Liberia (CRC-NPFL). Most of the factions have an ethnic element to them. However, ethnic affinity was not always the main element uniting a faction or the reason behind intra-faction fighting. This is especially true in the case of the Krahn/Mandingo split within the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). Two groups were formed from this split, ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K.

Also in 1994 another faction emerged, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC). The LPC was made up of mostly Krahn soldiers from the AFL and was led by George Boley. The AFL used the LPC as a proxy force. The Krahn warlords in the AFL used the LPC to continue the fighting while they could be seen as observing the cease-fire prescribed in the Cotonou Accord. Other smaller factions included the Lofa Defense Force, the Citizens Defense Force, the Bong Defense Force and the Black Berets.

All of the factions received external support. There was a distinctive split between the Anglophone and Francophone nations of West Africa. The Anglophone countries tended to support Nigeria and the efforts of ECOMOG whereas the Francophone countries, led by the Ivory Coast, supported Taylor and the NPFL. Additional external participants included Libya, Burkina Faso, France and Lebanon who had trading interests in Liberia, the European Union and United States. Diamonds and other Liberian resources such as timber, iron ore and gold played a critical role in keeping the conflict going.

[31] ECOMOG quickly lost any legitimacy as a neutral force. The Liberian population nicknamed it "Every Commodity or Moving Object Gone." ECOMOG and especially Nigerian troops were known to participate in looting and throughout the conflict ECOMOG facilitated and supported various factions' activities against NPFL.

2. The End of the Civil War

The Liberian conflict resulted in 14 peace agreements. The most important of these are the Cotonou Agreement, the Akosombo Agreement and the Abuja I and II Accords.[32] The Cotonou Agreement established the disarmament—resettlement—elections formula for Liberia. The Akosombo Agreement amended and modified the Cotonou Agreement in a number ways that are important to disarmament and demobilization. The two Abuja Accords were the final peace agreements in the conflict and established the disarmament, demobilization and elections that took place in 1996 and 1997.

The three main Liberian armed factions—NPFL, AFL, ULIMO-K and Amos Sawyer for the IGNU– signed the Cotonou Agreement in July of 1993. Cotonou's 19 articles covered a cease-fire, disarmament, demobilization, elections, repatriation of refugees, a general amnesty and other issues that were considered in 1992 talks in Geneva. The Accords called for a cease-fire to take effect from 1 August 1993, with a specified process of encampment, disarmament and demobilization. A Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG) would be created to replace the IGNU. A five-person council of state and a cabinet, both appointed by the signatories, would dominate the LNTG. Multi-party elections would follow a six-month period of transitional rule. A reconstituted electoral commission would supervise the elections. The Accord stipulated that no member of the transitional government could stand for office in national elections, and that council of state decisions must be reached by consensus. ECOMOG would be expanded to include troops from outside the region and a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) would be created to assist ECOMOG in the implementation of encampment, disarmament and demobilization. Finally, Cotonou created a joint cease-fire/monitoring unit made up of UNOMIL, ECOMOG and representatives of the three signatories.

Cotonou created real optimism for an end to the Liberian conflict. On March 7, 1994 the LNTG Council of State was installed, the transitional legislative assembly was sworn in and the Supreme Court opened. ECOMOG and UNOMIL troops were being deployed to monitor the disarmament and demobilization process. This deployment came to a halt as new factions emerged and continued to skirmish and the security situation deteriorated. Careful plans were made for encampment, disarmament and demobilization. However, funds remained insufficient for the resettlement of the fighters. Ultimately, only 3,500 of the estimated 60,000 combatants disarmed to ECOMOG. New fighting broke out and the September 1994 elections were postponed. Once again, the factions met in Akosombo in an attempt to save the Cotonou Accords.

[32] The text of both these agreements as well as other peace agreements from the Liberian conflict can be found at http://www.c-r.org/accord/contents.htm.

They settled on another set of agreements during this process, the Akosombo Agreements and Abuja Accords. The Akosombo Agreement modified the Cotonou Accord in the following ways:

1. It strengthened the role of the LNTG in supervising and monitoring the implementation of the Cotonou agreement.
2. It required the LNTG to begin the formation of "appropriate national security structure" and to reform the AFL into a national army.
3. It empowered the LNTG to collaborate with ECOMOG and UNOMIL in monitoring and verifying disarmament and demobilization.
4. It stipulated that no group or individual is to bear arms in the perimeter of the capital, except for the personal protection of faction leaders.

On disarmament and demobilization, Abuja reaffirmed Cotonou and the Akosombo Agreement. The Akosombo Agreement amended Cotonou stating that the ultimate objective of disarmament was to create a security environment conducive to absolute peace in order to have free and fair elections in the country. The NPFL, ULIMO and AFL all agreed to disarm to ECOMOG with the cooperation of the LNTG, monitored and verified by UNOMIL. Under Akosombo, the factions were given responsibility for maintenance of command and control in encampment areas. In the area of demobilization, Akosombo called upon the LNTG, Organization of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS in addition to the UN to provide for the demobilization effort. The Agreement also added the LNTG to the groups responsible for community information or education programs.

The Abuja Accord, the thirteenth peace agreement in the Liberian conflict, was signed on August 26, 1995 by the NPFL, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, LPC, AFL, Lofa Defense Force, CRC-NPFL and the Liberian National Conference (a civilian group). The Accord supplemented the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreement and Accra Clarification. The Accord expanded the Council of State to six members, appointing a third civilian, as chairman with all other members being vice-chairman of equal status. It named the LPC's George Boley as "Coalition" representative on the council and allowed the signatories to the agreement to participate in the LNTG and future elections. It declared a cease-fire in force from 26 August with installation of Council of State soon after and stipulated that the Council of State was to have a life span of approximately twelve months.

Even after Abuja I, persistent fighting continued in Liberia. ECOMOG and UNOMIL troops were not fully able to deploy, but plans for disarmament and demobilization continued. The supplies necessary for the disarmament and demobilization effort were moved into the country and aid workers were hired and trained for the operation. On April 6, 1996, after an attempt to arrest ULIMO-J leader Roosevelt Johnson on murder charges, Monrovia was engulfed in a rampage of looting and violence. Gangs of youth and members of all factions killed approximately 1,500 people and looted 500 UN

vehicles. US Marines evacuated 2,000 foreign nationals who were there as aid workers. ECOMOG watched and sometimes joined in the mayhem. The April "pay yourself war" lasted for two months and seemed to confirmed the fears of many that Liberia was an irretrievable and ultimately failed state (Tanner, 1998: 133).

The fighting in Monrovia subsided after everything had been looted. Within this context of seeming anarchy, the faction leaders met once again in August 1996 and signed what became known as the Abuja II Accord. Abuja II supplemented Abuja I and provided for an amended schedule for disarmament, demobilization and elections because of the previous year's delays in implementing these activities.

3. Planning for DDR

The major Peace Agreements all included well-planned and organized DDR efforts. There were two large DDR efforts in Liberia. The first was conducted in 1994 following the Cotonou Accord. The second and final effort was conducted in 1996/1997 and followed the Abuja II Accord. In addition, many of the structures and agencies created in 1994 were renewed for the 1996 effort.

Article Six of the Contonou Agreement described disarmament as the ultimate objective of the cease-fire and that the parties would disarm to and under the supervision of the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the UNOMIL. The factions were to list all weapons and warlike materials and ECOMOG was given the authority to disarm combatants and non-combatants and to conduct searches and recover lost or hidden weapons. ECOMOG could forcibly disarm combatants if necessary, which raised fears in the NPFL that ECOMOG might forcibly implement the Accord and eliminate them from the conflict (Mackinlay and Alao, 1995).

Article Seven stipulated the terms and purpose of encampment. The purpose of encampment was, in addition to the disarmament and demobilization, to serve as a transit point for the further education, training and rehabilitation of combatants. Encampment was to begin immediately upon the deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL.

Demobilization was dealt with in Article Nine of the Accords. In addition, it requested that the UN, other international organizations and countries, program and finance the process of demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and re-absorption of all former combatants to normal social and community life. It also required each faction to immediately implement a community information or education program, explaining to the public the essence and purpose of the cease-fire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization.

Planning for the DDR effort was interrupted by the April 6 war. All pre-positioned assistance package items were looted along with most resources from UN agencies and NGOs that would have supported the exercise. Nearly all of the UN and NGO staff was

evacuated from the country and the UN pulled out nearly all its national and international demobilization staff.

The initial planning of the 1996 DDR effort began after the Abuja I Accord. In late 1995, the DRTF was reconstituted after a two-year absence. A UN Secretary General's Report eliminated many of the elements identified as to be provided in the 1994 demobilization. These included services at the demobilization sites and cash incentives for the combatants as envisioned in the Akosombo Agreement. In addition, responsibility for the demobilization effort was reassigned from UNOMIL to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs—Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office (UNDHA—HACO).[33] There was confusion between UNOMIL and HACO as to their roles and responsibilities until March 1996 when the Secretary General clarified them. This was a clear indication of an internal UN rivalry between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UNDHA.

The Abuja II Accord extended the deadlines of the Abuja I Accord and provided a new implementation schedule for DDR. The Cotonou Accord continued to form the foundation for the DDR effort. As the security situation improved, HACO reactivated its Demobilization and Reintegration Unit, which was responsible for coordinating and managing the provision of food, health services, locally produced shelter, water and basic sanitation for the disarmament and demobilization centers and coordinating bridging activities with local authorities, UN agencies and international and national NGOs. In September, HACO reactivated the DRTF. HACO chaired the DRTF and its members included representatives from the US and EU, UNOMIL, ECOMOG, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, and Liberian governmental agencies. In November, the DRTF and the Council of State adopted a Demobilization Plan (UNDPI, 1997). The DDR operation began on November 22,1996.

A. Political, Economic and Social Conditions

Political. Official elections were seen as the solution to the unstable peace situation in Liberia. Planners felt that the sooner a legitimate election was held, the faster a lasting peace in Liberia would be achieved. As a result, a date was set for elections and the DDR process was to occur until elections took place. Planners viewed the election of a permanent government as more important than the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of the former combatants of the civil war. The short timeline placed on the DDR process greatly effected its success.

Under these numerous peace accords signed in Liberia, ECOMOG, the regional military group, headed by Nigeria, was tasked with setting up a temporary government and with implementing DDR. Unfortunately, during the civil war ECOMOG involved themselves in extensive fighting with many of the factions. Most Liberians saw ECOMOG, not as a

[33] The UNDHA is now the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

peacekeeping faction, but as a combative group, controlled by Nigeria. In addition, underpaid and over-tasked ECOMOG soldiers developed a reputation for looting and other crimes against the Liberian people. These actions severely damaged the ECOMOG's integrity as a governing or peacekeeping force. As a result, there was little trust by anyone that they would treat all factions equally. UNOMIL, a UN sponsored group in charge of monitoring the ECOMOG, was viewed as a weak and ineffective force that was not truly monitoring the situation. This lack of a strong central authority with integrity in the eyes of the Liberians was a great hindrance on the successful completion of DDR.

Economic. Before the outbreak of civil war, agriculture accounted for about 40 percent of GDP. The rubber industry generated over US$100 million export earnings annually. The discovery of significant iron ore deposits attracted substantial foreign investment in the 1960's and 1970's. The export-oriented concession sector generated about one-third of Government revenue.

By the end of the war in 1996, real GDP was as low as ten percent of its pre-war level. Most foreign business left the country during the civil war. Depletion of iron ore deposits, damage to mines and the impact of the war on rubber production, meant recorded exports fell from US$440 million in 1988 to US$25 million in 1997. However, real GDP doubled in 1997 and increased further by an average of 25-30 percent in 1998-2000, reflecting a post-war surge in rice, timber and rubber production. Still, real income per capita remains at about one third of pre-war levels

The basis of fighting in Liberia was economic competition. Various factions were all vying for the control of the major economic resources including diamonds and rubber. During the fighting, war bands based themselves in any area where there were exploitable resources, especially diamond producing areas, or where villagers were still producing crops, or places where humanitarian convoys could be looted. They would defend these strategic positions while raiding the territory of rival militias with the aim of looting and destruction. Armies preyed upon the unarmed civilian population, looting their belongings, stealing their food. A veritable mode of production had evolved in which the main goal was enrichment through looting. Wealth was sucked upwards within the militias' rudimentary hierarchies, from fighters to officers. This systematic looting by rival armies destroyed the basic infrastructure of the country.

Social. The civil war left behind the wreckage of fourteen failed peace agreements, drove 666,000 Liberians from their own country, left more than a million people internally displaced and killed more than 150,000 people. The civilians who remained in the country were subjected to horrifying atrocities, mass ethnic killings and prolonged harassment by all of the warring factions. At the center of this were children. When the ranks of the militias began to drop, children were forcibly recruited. It is estimated that as many as 15,000 children have served as soldiers in Liberia' civil war. Of those 4,319,

including 78 girls, participated in the nations third and final attempt at disarmament and demobilization.

There were many challenges to reintegrating ex-combatants, especially children, back into society. For example, the disabling physical wounds incurred by many ex-soldiers led to ostracism, isolation, and even banishment to remote villages. In addition an enormous psychological toll has been exacted on the adults and children who lived through this violent time. Symptoms of this psychological impact include: a highly agitated state, enormously inflated egos, a high level of distrust of authority, a fear of being rejected from their community as a result of the atrocities they were forced to commit, drug addiction, and a deep sense of hopelessness. In many cases the communities themselves had been uprooted and dispersed so that reorganization became impossible. The Liberian conflict destroyed many of the traditional structures of tribe and community without providing workable alternatives.

There are also many economic realities faced by ex-combatants, especially children. Many are afraid to return to their communities for fear of being molested, or even killed, for the atrocities they committed there. As unskilled, uneducated, self-supporting youths, their options are limited. The vast majority of young people sell small market stuffs, beg or steal. Those who have been reunited with families may face similar circumstances. Usually displaced and made poorer by the war, the families these children return to often cannot afford school fees. Some have refused to take back their children simply because they cannot afford to feed another mouth.

B. Rationale

The main focus in returning Liberia to a peaceful stability after the war was a national election. DDR was viewed as a transitional phase before the elections were to take place. Many essential parts of the DDR process were foregone because of financial and time constraints, as well as differences of opinion. For example, the factional and transitional government were adamantly opposed to the encampment or quartering of fighting soldiers. They felt it would stigmatize combatants while creating a target for their enemies that could not easily be protected due to the continuing unrest in the country and the limited deployment of ECOMOG. With the deadline of an approaching national election, the quick approach was taken to DDR. The focus was placed on the election of a legitimate government rather than the successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-soldiers into society.

C. Objectives

The objectives of DDR as outlined in the Akosombo agreements were “to create a conducive security environment for absolute peace in order to have free and fair elections.” This objective included the establishment of encampments that would serve as transit points for the further education, training and rehabilitation of combatants.

D. Resources

Unlike previous DDR plans that have been readily supported and funded by the international community elsewhere, the Liberian program received less than enthusiastic support; donors were strongly disinclined to spend money on it. In 1994, a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Task Force (DRTF) was created. It was chaired by UNOMIL with representatives from the LNTG, ECOMOG, NGOs and international donors. International donors included UN agencies, USAID and the European Union (EU). The LNTG created a National Disarmament and Demobilization Committee (NDDC). A Technical Working Group on Child Soldiers was also created which was chaired by UNICEF and the Child Assistance Program (CAP), a Liberian NGO. Meetings of the Working Group included representatives from the UN Development Program (UNDP), the National Readjustment Programme, Save the Children–UK, and the International Organization for Migration. CAP, with funding from the EU was given the responsibility of implementing child soldier demobilization (David, 1998: p. 34). As a result of the April 6, 1996 debacle the international community was severely handicapped in its resource base and ability to respond to the next attempt at DDR.

In August 1996, Abuja II restarted the DDR planning process and provided three months to devise and carry out a plan. The plan had to include the selection, surveying and preparation of approximately twelve demobilization sites, the hiring and movement of hundreds of people, the procurement of tons of supplies such as food, fuel, water, data forms, vehicles, cameras and film. To make matters worse, HACO had only one non-cargo helicopter and only $300,000 to accomplish its task (David, 1998: 39-40). This lack of resources greatly hindered the DDR process.

4. How Was DDR Implemented and Managed?

Careful plans were made for the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the fighters. There were to be two sites for the AFL, four for NPFL and four for ULIMO. The UNOMIL plan itself was well conceived. Lists of men and weapons were submitted to ECOMOG by ULIMO and NPFL (Clayton, 1995). The plan had well-developed arrangements to provide for the rehabilitation and personal needs of each fighter. The rehabilitation plan recognized the psychological dislocation of young Liberians who left school to train and be indoctrinated as faction fighters. It also took account of the resentment and hostility that they would experience on their return to their original communities.

A. Organization

Following the civil war, ECOMOG was placed in charge of the DDR process. UNOMIL, organized by the UN, was to observe the process. Unfortunately, no written guidelines were established to delineate the relationship between the two groups. In addition, neither group was furnished with enough manpower to successfully complete its tasks.

B. Targeting Participants in DDR.

Ex-combatants identified themselves as members of one of eight factions with the addition of a small number of civilians. Two factions, NFL and ULIMO-K, accounted for over 83% of all disarmed personnel, almost 85% of the serviceable weapons, 82% of the unserviceable weapons and 93% of the ammunition collected by ECOMOG. Out of eighteen total sites, four of the sites (Monrovia, Kakata, Gbarnga, and Camp Naama) accounted for 70% of the total disarmed population.

Additional socioeconomic data on ex-combatants was collected at each of the sites including, information on education, skills, and work experience. From this information the following characteristics of ex-combatants have been deduced:

- The average ex-fighter presents an average age of slightly over 24 years old.
- Most of the demobilized soldiers were male (98.7%).
- Most of the demobilized soldiers have attended school at some point (84.3%).
- 60% of demobilized soldiers have been able to achieve more than an elementary education.
- Most demobilized fighters claimed to have spent more than five years in a faction. This was significant in demobilization because most fighters were exposed to long periods of violence and conflict.
- Most ex-fighters are not from the area, but want to remain for a variety of reasons such as fear of returning home due to confrontation of parents, dead relatives, or atrocities committed there (Creative Associates International, 1997: 18-43).

C. Demobilization

The DDR process comprised a twelve-week voluntary disarmament period in eighteen different locations. Due to the lack of Liberia-wide security and the failure of the ECOMOG troops to reach all their agreed locations, disarmament and demobilization sites were not opened in all of the areas originally proposed. The disarmament and demobilization process was supposed to include the following phases:

- Transportation of fighters to sites by ECOMOG
- Disarmament
- Registration and distribution of rations
- Transportation of ex-combatants to their destination

Even though the DDR operation commenced, major components of the disarmament and demobilization process, as outlined in the Abuja Accords, were not implemented. Encampment areas, buffer zones and safe havens were not created as specified and a

complete listing of the combatants was not submitted. Each faction was to conduct an information and education campaign as stipulated in Cotonou. However, not only were these campaigns not carried out, the factions conducted misinformation campaigns regarding the benefits to be provided to the ex-combatants which caused confrontations at the disarmament and demobilization sites and injured the UN and international community's legitimacy in the process (UNDHA, 1996).

Required preconditions to the DDR were not implemented. UNOMIL and ECOMOG did not present a disarmament plan. UNOMIL, the NDDC and ECOMOG failed to identify and verify the demobilization sites, and security for both the workers and demobilizing fighters at these sites was not guaranteed. Human and material resources for the demobilization and bridging programs were not positioned and HACO's budget for those programs was not approved (UNDHA, 1996).

i. Implementation

On November 22, as the DDR effort began, only seven of the proposed thirteen sites were ready and these were in various stages of preparedness. They were Voinjama, Camp Naama, Zwedru, Ducanan, Camp Schiefflin, Barclay Training Center, and Tubmanburg. A week later Bo Waterside, Kakata and Tappita were opened. By the end of the DDR process, however, only eighteen sites were opened (CAI, 1997: 15).

The final DDR plan called for a "quick and dirty" process wherein the fighters would be transported to the sites in the morning, disarmed and demobilized and returned to their communities on the same day. Though called for in the Cotonou Accords, encampment did not take place in the 1996 DDR effort. Therefore, no decompression time, no health care, educational programs, rehabilitation interventions or in-depth data gathering—other than the registration interviews—took place (CAI, 1998: 16-17).

Ultimately the disarmament and demobilization process was conducted in different ways at each site. No transportation for ex-combatants to their destinations, other than in the Harper area, occurred. This was because vehicles were not available for transportation (CAI, 1997: 17). In addition, the DRTF decided to omit the counseling and civic education components of the process for adults because there was not time to do it properly (David, 1998: 43). The NDDC had opposed an aid package to the combatants on the grounds that the funds would be better spent on creating reintegration programs that would provide long-term employment (David, 1998: 42).

Disarmament. At some sites weapons were collected in bulk from commanders, with the individual fighters arriving later. Initially a "one man, one gun" policy was adopted. This meant that each fighter had to bring at least one weapon or 40 rounds of ammunition to be demobilized. This policy was modified for children out of fear that the factions would hold the children back and adults would receive the limited supply of weapons in order to disarm and demobilize. After the modification, children were allowed to demobilize with or without weapons. The result of this policy was that the factions sent great numbers of

children to the demobilization sites, many of whom were street children, in order to give the appearance that they were disarming without actually doing so (David, 1998: 43, 45).

The criteria for weapons acceptance also varied from site to site. Initially, all weapons were accepted without regard for their condition, and the fighter was given an ID card. However, UNOMIL was not satisfied with these criteria and the policy was changed. All weapons would be accepted, but ID cards would be given out only for serviceable weapons. As a result, the quality of weapons being submitted immediately improved (CAI, 1998: 16). The initial requirement of 40 rounds of ammunition was increased to 100 rounds after it appeared that 40 rounds were easy to acquire. In fact, street children were observed taking handfuls of ammunition from ECOMOG troops in Monrovia so that they could receive the benefits of demobilization.

ii. Program Perception by Ex-combatants.

Without encampment, the objective of breaking the command structure of the combatants was not achieved (David, 1998: 48-49). Since there was no transportation available for the ex-combatants, many of them returned to their commanders. Of the 4,306 children who were demobilized, 3,509 said they were in the care of an adult and were allowed to leave the demobilization site. Another 303 left the sites after declaring themselves unaccompanied. Approximately 89 percent of the child soldiers simply “wandered away” from the sites.

Ex-fighters were disillusioned and disappointed because they felt misled. There was a perception that the DDR process would lead to employment. In addition, many ex-combatants were promised monetary incentives to resettle.

D. Reinsertion

Reinsertion pertains to the short-term period of approximately six to twelve months after demobilization. During this phase, the ex-combatants face the challenge of establishing a civilian household. Ex-combatants in Liberian were not provided the tools that they needed in order to successfully rejoin the civilian society. They were not provided with money to resettle. No job opportunities or training was provided to the ex-combatants who went through the couple-of-hour demobilization process. In fact, due to a lack of vehicles, ex-combatants were not even provided with transportation to their localities. In addition, ex-combatants were not always welcome in their home villages and as such new communities are a mixture of original inhabitants, ex-combatants from other areas, and displaced individuals in transit (Sprecht and van Empel, 1998: 19). As a result, the destination of most ex-soldiers became their command structure.

E. Reintegration

Though well planned, the reintegration programs that were to follow the disarmament and demobilization effort never fully materialized. HACO established an Executive

Committee to provide relevant and timely information and coordination among those agencies funding the bridging and reintegration programs. An Advisory Board was also established to guide the program and to formulate policy guidelines for project preparation and implementation (UNDHA, 1996). The initial reintegration programs were to address civil reconstruction teams—public works programs, vocational training programs, special programs for ex-child soldiers and war-affected youth, agricultural sector assistance for those choosing go into farming and education. The assistance of demobilized soldiers was to be integrated with community development programs in order to promote the fastest reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. Both the International Labour Organization (ILO) and USAID conducted reintegration projects for war-affected Liberians that include community development projects. But these programs are small and the security situation in Liberia continues to hamper efforts.

The reality was that few reintegration programs were implemented due to lack of time, difficult conditions on the ground and lack of funds. Those labor-intensive programs that were implemented were discontinued after the July elections and the labor market simply could not absorb the ex-combatants (Tanner, 1998:135).

The reintegration of child soldiers was relatively successful. The USAID sponsored UNICEF/Save the Children project, which is still in operation, included family tracing and reunification along with emphasis on counseling, education and vocational training, the revitalization of schools, physical rehabilitation for the disabled and community sensitization. These programs were oriented toward ex-combatants and war-affected youth so as to neither stigmatize the former nor marginalize the latter group (David, 1998: 55). The ILO was also involved in this program and provided a special program for older war-affected children called “missed-out youth” or “youth at risk.” This program was a combination of vocational training, regular education and some income-generating activities (Specht and van Empel, 1998: 29).

In general, however, reintegration programs in Liberia have been lacking. The international community and Taylor government have not properly funded or implemented the programs. As such there was not an effective and immediate deterrent to prevent the ex-combatants from returning to crime and dependency. The fighters were not given opportunities to decompress and receive counseling and this was a critical step. The Liberian conflict was one in which atrocities were severe and the economy was almost completely destroyed. Without proper encampment and reintegration programs the factions—or new factions—could easily remobilize the fighters.

The disarmament and demobilization effort ended on February 7, 1997 after being extended an additional seven days past the original deadline. According to the UN, 20,332 fighters were disarmed and demobilized. This figure included 4,306 children and

250 adult female fighters.[34] Two of the factions (NPFL and ULIMO-K) accounted for 83 percent of all disarmed personnel, approximately 85 percent of the serviceable weapons, 82 percent of the unserviceable weapons and 93 percent of the ammunition collected by ECOMOG (CAI, 1997: 18).[35] Following the voluntary disarmament and demobilization effort, ECOMOG conducted an intensive cordon-and-search operation (IPS, 1997).

5. Was the Liberian Demobilization and Reintegration Program a Success?

Despite relative success in child soldier reintegration programs, the overall demobilization and reintegration program was not successful. The demobilization process failed because it did not accomplish its goals of severing the chain of command between the combatants and their leaders. Furthermore, it did not facilitate the dissolution of the factions themselves. Reasons for the demobilization and reintegration failure included:

- **An accelerated pace for demobilization.** This was due to donor and observer fatigue and a push to quickly reach elections.
- **No encampment for combatants**. Without an encampment phase combatants received no benefits such as health care, educational programs, or rehabilitation interventions.
- **Lack of resources.** Again donor fatigue contributed to a lack of funding and also the belief that the combatants had already obtained their relief packages during the April 6, 1996 looting.
- **Lack of cooperation between ECOMOG and UNOMIL.** There were rivalries between the organizations and both had unclear mandates. ECOMOG and UNOMIL were also not provided with enough manpower to adequately perform their missions.
- **ECOMOG forces were not a trusted neutral party.** ECOMOG forces became combatants themselves in the conflict, which generated mistrust on the part of the combatants.
- **Reintegration programs were not implemented.** Programs never came on-line due to lack of resources and planning. Reintegration became a responsibility of the government.

Overall there was a lack of political will and long-term commitment from all parties. The international community simply wanted to get out, the interests of regional players (that

[34] HACO reports demobilizing 21,315 fighters as of March 31, 1997 and that an additional 4,000-5,000 fighters were disarmed by ECOMOG at checkpoints throughout Liberia (UNOCHA, 1997). The difference in the numbers is attributed to differences in eligibility for disarmament and/or operational coordination problems (CAI, 1997: 20).

[35] CAI's "Assessment of the Demobilization and Disarmament Process in Liberia" provides additional, extensive statistics on the Liberian disarmament and demobilization effort.

is, Nigeria, Sierra Leone) super-ceded national Liberian interests, and there were no economic incentives for the combatants to end the conflict.

6. Elections

Elections formed an important part of the Liberian peace process. In December 1996, a special UN technical survey team conducted a study of what steps would be needed to create a viable and credible framework for free and fair elections by their scheduled date of May 30, 1997. The team identified three key conditions for success:

- A fair and credible political framework
- An efficient and well-planned electoral operation
- Adequate support from the international community (UN/S/1997/90)

On April 2, 1997 the Liberian Independent Elections Commission (IECOM) was installed. The IECOM was responsible for organizing and conducting the elections.

The timetable called for in the Abuja Accord did not allow sufficient time for preparations, repatriation of refugees and voter registration. At the ECOWAS Summit meeting held in May 1997 it was decided to extend the electoral schedule by 60 days, rescheduling elections for July 19, 1997.

It was decided that those refugees who wished to return to Liberia for the elections would be allowed to do so. However, in May 1997 it was estimated that 700,000 Liberian refugees or 25 percent of the population remained in the Ivory Coast. The UNHCR estimated that there were 660,000 refugees in the sub-region and 750,000 internally displaced persons (UN/S/1997/478). This included 130,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberian (UN/S/1997/643). Many of the Liberian refugees did not return for the elections, though provisions for them to vote outside of the country were made. The IECOM ultimately registered more than 750,000 voters.

Thirteen parties registered with the IECOM as participants in the election. Both Charles Taylor of the NPFL and Alhaji Kromah of the ULIMO–K advanced their candidacies for President. Taylor was the only candidate with national standing, having controlled much of the interior of the country during the war. Taylor was also at an advantage because he controlled the only nationwide radio station capable of broadcasting outside of Monrovia. UNOMIL ran a civic information campaign dealing with registration and voting and the UNDP and USAID distributed non-battery short-wave radios.

In June, the campaigning began with relatively little disturbance. There were some clashes between Taylor's supporters and Mandingo supporters of Kromah. Taylor used a leased helicopter to canvass the country. The IECOM continued to be plagued by political, logistical and financial difficulties (Tanner, 1998). Teams of international election monitors from the OAU, UN, EU, Jimmy Carter Center and Friends of Liberia arrived in the country and began preparing for the elections.

The elections were held as scheduled on July 19, 1997 and Charles Taylor won 75 percent of the votes cast. The voter turnout was high, with over 80 percent of registered voters casting a ballot. Registering and voting was more difficult for refugees in Guinea and the Ivory Coast. Only an estimated 10-20 percent of the eligible population actually voted (Tanner, 1998).

The process was peaceful and the UN Secretary General declared that the election results met international standards for democratic elections. The Secretary General issued a statement certifying that the elections reflected the will of the Liberian voters and that the process as a whole was free, fair and credible (UN/S/1997/643). Both the Carter Center and the Friends of Liberia also declared the elections to have had problems and technical irregularities, but said that they were free and fair and without intimidation (Tanner, 1998).

Taylor was inaugurated as President of Liberia on August 2, 1997. After seven years of civil war, the NPFL leader had achieved his goal and transformed himself from a military leader to a political leader. He achieved though the ballot box what ECOMOG and the international community would not allow him to achieve on the battlefield: the presidency. Ultimately, it was clear that the Liberian voters had selected Taylor because they understood that he would have returned to war if he had not won the election.

7. Demilitarization

ECOMOG began drawing down its forces in December 1997 in preparation for departure from Liberia. The Abuja Accord stated that ECOMOG would be responsible for restructuring the AFL. A number of ECOMOG troops and advisors were to remain in the country to assist in the restructuring. Taylor announced that the Government would restructure the AFL, leading to a public dispute with the ECOMOG commander. Taylor moved fighters from his NPFL faction into the national security apparatus including the Liberia National Police (LNP), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Special Security Services (SSS). Known informally as the “tie-dye” boys due to their blue camouflage uniforms, they quickly became notorious for harassing civilians and looting. In 1999, Taylor created the Antiterrorist Unit (ATU) composed of an elite Special Forces group. Former NPFL fighters were placed in the security and police forces without serious efforts to provide training or to meet pledges to incorporate members from the other armed factions (Human Rights Watch, 1999 and US DoS, 1997 and 1998).

As part of the Abuja Accords the AFL was to be downsized and a restructuring plan was developed. As of 2000 the plan had yet to be implemented. The Liberian defense minister stated that the Armed Forces of Liberia consisted of some 14,000 troops, despite the government’s estimate that it needed an army of no more than 5,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

The final withdrawal of ECOMOG took place in October 1999. UNOMIL had completed its withdrawal in 1997. However, a small UN Office in Liberia (UNOL) remained and acted as a focal point for post-conflict peace-building activities of the UN in the country, and had authority for coordination of the UN system in country (UN/S/1997/712). Efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons continue through organizations such as USAID and the ILO. The security situation in Liberia often prevents these programs from functioning properly and adequate funding remains a problem.

The current regime under Taylor is as repressive and corrupt as the previous Doe regime. The Liberian constitution was not changed following the conflict, so power and wealth continue to flow to the President and his associates. Taylor continues to involve Liberia in conflicts with its neighbors—Sierra Leone and Guinea. The UN and the US have imposed sanctions on the country and travel restrictions on its leadership. Recently, conflict has erupted in Lofa County and there have been reports of links between Taylor's regime and the al-Qaeda terrorist network through the illicit sale of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone (Farah, 2001: A01).

By June 1994 after an initial flow of personnel and weapons from each faction (except the LPC), disarmament came to a standstill, except for a small trickle of variously motivated fighters heading for Monrovia. The lack of accurate information about the factions, or their disregard for truthful declaration of personnel and weapons, was demonstrated by the extreme disparity between the estimated numbers for disarmament and the greater or lesser numbers received. It was estimated that there were approximately 60,000 fighters yet only about 3,600 disarmed (Mackinlay and Alao, 1995).

Unsettled bands of young men roamed the roads and villages in Monrovia and in the NPFL areas and caused a destabilizing influence. There had also been the problems of revenge taking. To address these obstacles there were UN programs and local NGOs tasked to reintegrate the demobilized fighters. Teams of aid workers visited villages and communities in anticipation of the arrival of the returnees, explaining the problems of reconciliation and attempting to purge away the residual inclination for violence and revenge (Mackinlay and Alao, 1995).

Annotated Bibliography

Ethiopia

Ayalew, Daniel, Stefan Dercon, and Pramila Krishnan. 1999. *Demobilization, Land and Household Livelihoods: Lessons from Ethiopia.* Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research.

This paper examines land tenure and the urban labor market and their implications or reintegrating ex-combatants back into the community. The researchers used data from four household surveys to examine these relationships. Based on analysis of this data, the paper concludes that the demobilization and reintegration programs achieved some success. They concluded that rural ex-combatants did not face major problems in gaining access to land, but have a below than average holding livestock. Ex-combatants entering the urban economy encountered a tough labor market and many became unemployed. In conclusion, the authors believed that young people have few livelihood opportunities in either rural or urban Ethiopia, a situation that must be remedied if social conflict is to be avoided and poverty reduced.

Bevan, D. L. 2001 *The Fiscal Dimensions of Ethiopia's Transition and Reconstruction, Discussion Paper No. 2001/56*, Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research.

This paper looks at the fiscal challenges that faced the Government of Ethiopia during its reconstruction endeavors. First, the paper examines the major effort to overhaul and modernize the tax system. Second, the author addresses the need to switch expenditure from military to civilian within a potentially severely reduced resource total. Third, the paper looks at the political imperatives to pursue fiscal decentralization that was the necessary accompaniment to political decentralization.

Colletta, Nat. J., Markus Kostner, Ingo Wiederhofer, and Tadesse Woldu. 1995. *From Emergency to Development: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopi*a. Washington, DC: World Bank.

This paper provides an in-depth presentation of the demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) in Ethiopia. The paper presents the political, economic, security and fiscal imperatives for the DRP and provides insight into the rationale behind the government's operational decisions. Based on extensive field work and cooperation with the Commission for the Rehabilitation of the Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans in Ethiopia and participating NGOs and bilateral organizations, this case study provides extensive information on each of the demobilization and reintegration programs including administrative details, funding, organizations involved and participant perceptions. Finally, the case study offers insight into the relative successes and failures of the programs and reasons for those outcomes.

Dercon, Stefan and Daniel Ayalew. 1998. *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone: Demobilization and Reintegration in Ethiopia.* World Development, Vol. 26, No. 9: 1661-1675.

This paper analyzes the experiences of demobilization and reintegration ex-combatants during the first part of the 1990s in Ethiopia. The authors used rural household data on ex-combatants and non-combatants households to assess whether reintegration has been successful. The authors concluded that the targeting efficiency of the demobilization program has not been as good as generally claimed. Using a "treatment effects" model, the authors found that returns to labor and assets for ex-combatants are indistinguishable from those of non-combatant families. This suggests that ex-combatants have been successfully reintegrated in the rural economy, even though this means they are the low standards of living of the rest of the rural population.

Fenton, Wendy. 1994. *Demobilization in Ethiopia: Lessons Learned.* Addis Ababa: USAID/Addis Ababa (PN-ABT-046).

This paper provides a chronology of events for the Ethiopian demobilization and reintegration program and insight into the programs from the donor perspective. The paper is primarily focused on the funding aspect of the programs and the reasons for delay and sometimes withdrawal of funding. In addition, the memorandum discusses the UNHCR repatriation of ex-combatants from Kassala and the donation of excess DoD supplies to the program.

George, Paul. 1997. *Military Spending Trends and Developments in Ethiopia and Eritrea.* Ottawa: Ottawa Symposium on Military Expenditures in Developing Countries, July 1997.

This study examines the status of the armed forces and military spending trends in Ethiopia and Eritrea. In order to assess whether the emphasis on military spending reductions and downsizing of force levels in the two countries is sustainable, consideration was given to a broad range of issues of relevance to the defense policy process. These include assessments of the internal and regional security situation and questions in the good governance domain such as the role of the military in society and the strength of its commitment to the democratic process. Finally, the prospects for nurturing the process of demilitarization and consolidating the transition from war to peace through development co-operation are assessed.

Liberia

Adibe, Clement. 1998. "Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership" Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task Sharing with Key Regional Security Arrangements and Service Providing NGOs. Ed. Thomas G. Weiss, St. Martin's Press.

This essay evaluates the effectiveness of the ECOWAS-UN partnership in responding adequately to the conflict in Liberia by answering three questions: What led to the ECOWAS-UN partnership in Liberia? What was the nature of the partnership? What lessons may be drawn from this pioneering partnership?

Alao, Abiodun and John Mackinlay. 1995. "Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency." Occasional Paper Series 2, United Nations University Press. http://www.unu.edu/unupress/ops2.html.

The purpose of this report was to discuss why the Contonou Accords failed. The attempts to decide whether the Contonou Accords was an inherently flawed process and therefore had no chance at success, or whether it was allowed to founder through mismanagement and ill-judgment. The final section of the report draws lessons learned and makes recommendations on the conduct of demobilization, the need to deploy a stronger UN executive capability in the field, the recurring mistakes made by negotiators of peace agreements and the advantages and disadvantage of regional peace forces.

Cleaver, Gerry. 1998. "Liberia: Lessons for the Future from the Experience of ECOMOG" Peacekeeping in Africa. ed. Oliver Furley and Roy May, Ashgate, UK. This article identifies some of the lessons for future African peacekeeping operations that might be drawn from the ECOMOG involvement in Liberia.

Creative Associates International. 1997. *Assessment of the Demobilization and Disarmament Process in Liberia.* Prepared for USAID. Washington, DC: Creative Associates International.

This report was the result of gathering and analyzing data on the disarmament and demobilization process available from UN-HACO, NGO and agency reports, and field visits and interviews with key informants. The report discusses the outcome of disarmament and demobilization operations that were carried out in November 1996 and February 1997. It looks at the impact of disarmament and demobilization on the present security situation in the country and identifies areas for intervention activities to improve the security conditions and support national reintegration efforts.

David, Kelly. 1998. *The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Liberia, 1994-1997: The Process and Lessons Learned.*

A Collaborative Report by UNICEF-Liberia and the US National Committee for UNICEF. Human Rights Watch. 1997. *Liberia: Emerging from the Destruction.* http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/liberia/.

This report looks at the process of child soldier demobilization and on going attempts at reintegration. Using interviews with U.N. officials, national and international NGO representatives and project staff, church leaders, academics, governments officials and children all directly involved in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, the report provides a number of conclusions and lessons learned for Liberia.

De Costa, Peter. 1994. "The Forgotten Country," Africa Report. Vol. 39, No. 2.

This article is a summary of the problems that face Liberia after the Civil War. It briefly looks at the political and humanitarian issues that face the Liberia during the demobilization disarmament and reintegration process.

Drumtra, Jeff. "Post-War Liberia Starts Over Again Towards Fitful Peace, Economic Hardships" US Committee for Refugees. http://www.fol.org/reports/liberia_starts_over.html.

This article looks at the refugee situation in Liberia after the Civil War and discusses the security situation. It also talks about the limited international aid due to the international communities hesitation about lasting peace Liberia.

Dunn, Elwwod. 1998. "Liberia's Internal Responses to ECOMOG's Interventionist Efforts" Peacekeeping in Africa, ed. Karl P. Maygar, NY St. Martin's Press.

This article looks at the responses of Liberians to the ECOMOG intervention by placing this response in the context of the struggle involving the various factions and political persuasions in Liberian society. This article examines these struggles as deeply embedded in Liberian history.

Ellis, Stephen. 1998. "Liberia's Warlord Insurgency" African Guerillas. ed. Christopher Clapham. Indiana University Press.

This article examines how Liberia descended into conflict and why it took such violent form, suggesting that the causes are not only political, but may also be explained in religious or spiritual terms.

Francis, David. 2000. "ECOMOG: A new Security Agenda in World Politics," *Africa at the Millennium: An Agenda for Mature Development*. ed, Bakut Iswah Bakut and Sagarika Dutt. New York.

This chapter examines the role and contribution of a regional economic integration grouping to the understanding of the security problems in Third World regions. It specifically focuses on the current international relations debate concerning the role that regional organizations can play in maintaining international peace.

Howe, Herbert. "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping" International Security 21:3, 145-176.

This article examines the possible effectiveness of sub-regional military groupings by analyzing ECOMOG.

Inter Press Service, via the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa (IRIN-WA) Reports mailing list. 1997. "Chronology of Liberia's July Elections." http://www.ips.org/critical/watch/liberia.htm.

A comprehensive year-by-year (1989-1997) chronology of the events that led up to the July elections in Liberia.

Jaye, Thomas. 2000. "ECOWAS and Liberia: Implications for Regional Intervention in Intra-state Conflicts" Africa at the Millennium: An Agenda for Mature Development. Ed, Bakut Iswah Bakut and Sagarika Dutt. New York.

This chapter argues that the ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian conflict offers lessons that could be useful for future regional interventions in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. The first part examines the origins of the crisis and the immediate internal and external factors that motivated ECOWAS to intervene. The second part explores the peace-making and peacekeeping roles of ECOWAS. The third part analyses the issues arising from the role of ECOWAS as well as lessons offered by its intervention.

Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. 1994. "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia" International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No. 3.

This article examines the roots of the Liberian conflict and evaluates the performance of the ECOWAS intervention. It suggests there are lessons to be learned about the potential role of regional organizations in dealing with the intrastate conflicts.

Tanner, Victor. 1998. "Liberia: Railroading Peace." *Review of African Political Economy.* Vol. 25, Issue 75: 133-147.

Despite a great deal of skepticism, the electoral process in Liberia marked the end of the Civil War. This article looks at the political and economic ramifications on Liberia after the peace process and election of Charles Taylor.

Tarr, Bryon S. 1998. "Extra-Africa Interests in the Liberian Conflict," *Peacekeeping in Africa*, ed. Karl P. Maygar. New York: St. Martin's Press.

This article looks at the roles that the United States and France assumed in the uniquely African effort to resolve the Liberian conflict.

Tuck, Christopher. 2000. "Every Car or Moving Object Gone." The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia. *African Studies Quarterly.* Vol. 4, Issue 1. http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm.

This paper examines the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia from 1989 onwards, focusing

on its applicability as a model for African peacekeeping capabilities.

United Nations. 1997. *Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia.* S/1997/712. New York: United Nations.

This report details the developments in Liberia including political, military, humanitarian, Human Rights, and financial aspects of the situation. The report also provides a series of conclusions and recommendations.

United Nations, Department of Public Information. 1997. "Liberia-UNOMIL." United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomil_b.htm.

United Nations, Department of Public Information. 1996. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-Keeping*. Third Edition.

This chapter, as a part of a larger study on the United Nations peacekeeping efforts, looks at the role that the UN military observers played in Liberia. It takes a close look at the relationship between ECOMOG and UNOMIL from 1993 to 1996. It also assesses the effectiveness of UNOMIL.

United States Agency for International Development. "Office of Transition Initiatives Country Programs: Liberia—Giving Peace a Chance."
http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/country/liberia.html.

This report provides a summary of the Office of Transition's (OTI) activities following the end of the Liberian Civil War.

US State Department. 1996. "Liberia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996." http://www.state.gov./www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/liberia.html.

This report looks at the violations of human rights in Liberia in the year 1996 including the cases involving violations of the integrity of the person and their civil liberties during the Liberian Civil War.

US State Department. 1997. "Liberia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997." http://www.state.gov./www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/liberia.html.

This report looks at the violations of human rights in Liberia in the year 1997 including the cases involving violations of the integrity of the person and their civil liberties during the Liberian Civil War.

US State Department. 1998. "Liberia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998." http://www.state.gov./www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/liberia.html.

This report looks at the violations of human rights in Liberia in the year 1998 including the cases involving violations of the integrity of the person and their civil liberties during the Liberian Civil War.

US State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 1999 County Reports on Human Rights Practices.
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/liberia.html.

This report looks at the violations of human rights in Liberia in the year 1999 including the cases involving violations of the integrity of the person and their civil liberties during the Liberian Civil War.

Wilson, Solomon. "Liberia: ECOWAS Dilemma." *The Perspective.* http://www.theperspective.org/dilemma.html.

In this article, Wilson looks at the instability that the fighting in Liberia has caused other nations and the failure of the ECOWAS to effectively conduct disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Wilson calls upon the United Nation to step in and aid the ECOMAS and its peacekeeping force, ECOMOG in order to return stability to the region.

Mozambique

Accord. 1998. *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*. Conciliation Resources: London (online) http://www.c-r.org/accord/acc_moz/contents.htm.

Includes: an article by Martin Rupiya, describing the historical context of the end of the war and the peace process; article by Fernando Gonçalves describing the roles and interests of the states in Southern Africa and their leaders in the Mozambican conflict, and the importance of that situation to the regional political and economic situation; a piece by Dinis S. Sengulane and Jaime Pedro Gonçalves on the role of Christian leaders and especially the Roman Catholic Church in the peace process. This includes a detailed discussion of the Sant' Egidio lay community which was a key facilitator in the peace talks; "The Business of Peace," by Alex Vines, a unique discussion of the financial incentives which influenced both the Frelimo government's and Renamo's participation in the peace process, and the large role as intermediary played by a British company executive; an article by Alcinda Honwana about trauma healing in rural Mozambique; a detailed chronology of the situation in Mozambique from the establishment of Frelimo in 1962 through the end of ONUMOZ in 1994; a description of key actors in the conflict.

Baptista Lundin, Iraê, Martinho Chachiua, António Gaspar, Habiba Guebuza and Guilherme Mbilana. 2000. "Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise; The Impact of Demobilization in Mozambique." In *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa—The Development and Security Impacts* edited by Kees Kingma. New York: St. Martin's Press.

This chapter includes a discussion of the cost of demobilization as compared with military expenditure—and other costs not quantified during the war. It includes detail on the demobilization and reintegration programs and levels of payment allocated, as well as geographic distribution of these benefits. There is discussion of the degree of success of reintegration and the impact of training and education on the result. A section describes the effect of demobilization and reintegration, as well as aspects of demilitarization—such as the formation of the new army—on security in Mozambique.

Barnes, Sam. 1998. "Peacekeeping in Mozambique." In *Peacekeeping in Africa* edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

This source emphasizes as key to success in Mozambique the interrelationship between the military and political aspects of the ONUMOZ peacekeeping mission, and the humanitarian assistance, demobilization and reintegration programs, administered by UNOHAC.

Borges Coelho, Joao Paulo and Alex Vines. 1994. *Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re-integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique.* Oxford: University of Oxford (under USAID's Mozambique Demobilization and Reintegration Support Project).

This report—drafted prior to the 1994 elections in Mozambique—assesses the degree to which the General Peace Agreement was followed and ONUMOZ achieved its goals. The report concludes a high level of success in the demobilization process. A large section focuses on the specific reintegration experiences in Zambezia province, and shortcomings in reintegration efforts generally.

Malaquias, Assis. 1996/1997. "The UN in Mozambique and Angola: Lessons Learned." In *International Peacekeeping,* "Beyond the Emergency: Development Within United Nations Peace Missions." Vol. 3 No. 2. Jeremy Ginifer, editor.

This source compares the ONUMOZ and UNAVEM peacekeeping efforts. Discusses demobilization and the creation of the new army.

United Nations. 1995. *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995* (with an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali). Blue Books Series, Volume V. New York: UN Department of Public Information.

This volume includes an overview of the peace process and the implementation of ONUMOZ from the perspective of the former Secretary-General, including a discussion of DDR structures and processes. It also contains reproductions of 92 documents including UN resolutions and statements, reports of the Secretary-General and other correspondence. Includes text of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique of 1992.

United Nations. 1996. "Chapter 15: United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)." In *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping.*

This chapter gives an overview description of the Mozambique operation from the UN perspective. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.

Vines, Alex. 1998a. "Disarmament in Mozambique." *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 24 (March): 191-205. Oxford.

This article describes shortcomings in disarmament during the ONUMOZ operation as the product of a weakness in the UN mandate and a lack of political and financial resources. It characterizes the post-ONUMOZ disarmament programs as more successful,

and describes adverse effects on South Africa of the weapons flowing out of Mozambique due to inadequate disarmament.

Willet, Susan. 1997. *Military Spending Trends and Developments in Southern Africa: Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa.* Prepared for the Ottawa Symposium on Military Expenditures in Developing Countries. Co-sponsored by the Government of Canada and the OECD Development Assistance Committee.

This source describes economic steps taken in Mozambique post-conflict toward demilitarization including changes in military expenditure and the military pay structure and security sector reform. It describes the economic condition of demobilized combatants, and the relative success of demobilization benefits, in economic terms.

Zimbabwe

Barnes, Teresa A. 1995. "The Heroes' Struggle: Live after the Liberation War for Four Ex-combatants in Zimbabwe." In Bhebe, Ngwabi and Terence Ranger, eds. *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War.* London: J. Currey ; Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann (call no. DT 2988.I58 1995).

This source presents interviews with four former combatants and through their experiences, illustrates the postwar difficulties that the country and many individuals confronted.

Baynham, Simon. 1992. *Zimbabwe in Transition*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.

This book examines conditions in Zimbabwe ten years following legal independence. It includes a chapter by Dominique Darbon on the relative instability in Zimbabwe due to political "inconsistencies, " and despite some economic success. A chapter by Jeffrey Herbst on land policy looks at the maintenance of a system of white-dominated land ownership in Zimbabwe even though a main war objective was more equitable land distribution. A chapter by James MacBruce looks at the security situation in Zimbabwe from 1980-1990, including dissident violence, the Ndebele conflict, participation in South Africa's and Mozambique's civil wars and the training and makeup of the new Zimbabwean army, the Zimbabwean Defense Force.

Chitiyo, Tapera Knox. 2000. "Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe's Land and War Veterans' Debate." *Track Two*, Vol 9, No 1 (May). Rondebosch, South Africa: Centre for Conflict Resolution. http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/9_1/zimbabwe.html.

This article presents the history of conflicts over land in Zimbabwe, from 1890 through 2000. It describes the results of elements of the Lancaster House constitution, which

protected *de facto* land distribution for ten years following transition, and subsequent land use policy. It discusses the relationship of ex-combatants to land use conflicts.

Ginifer, Jeremy and Jakkie W. Potgieter. 1995. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.* Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

This article reviews in detail the elements of the demobilization program for which the CMF was responsible.

Kriger, Norma J. 1995. "The Politics of Creating national Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and national Identity." In Bhebe, Ngwabi and Terence Ranger, eds. *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War.* London: J. Currey ; Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann (call no. DT 2988.I58 1995).

The source discusses the Zimbabwean government's creation of heroes of the nationalist war in the postwar years, compared to the experiences of veterans. Includes a discussion of the dissident conflicts in the mid-1980s and disparities in treatment of Zanu and Zapu ex-combatants.

Kriger, Norma. 1998. "Zimbabwe's Peace Settlement: Re-evaluating Lancaster House." In *Peacekeeping in Africa*, Oliver Furley and Roy May, eds. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

This chapter presents a "revisionist perspective" on the Lancaster House peace settlement. It states that although that settlement has generally be widely applauded as successful in ending the war in Zimbabwe, the settlement deliberately suppressed or ignored a major element of conflict, the rivalry between the two nationalist groups. As a result, the Lancaster House settlement contributed to post-independence violence.

Stedman, Stephen John. 1991. *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980.* Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers (call no. E 183.8.Z55 H67 2001).

A comprehensive historical analysis of the civil war is presented, including each major attempt at peace settlement, as well as a detailed description of the Lancaster House conference and the interests and motivations of the parties.

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